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ABSTRACT
This is an empirical study of household income, consumption expenditures,
and savings behavior in the C6te d'Ivoire. It uses data collected in a
household survey administered in the C6te d'Ivoire in 1985 under the aegis
of the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), a World Bank sponsered
project designed to develop new ways of assessing changes in levels of
living which result from government policy actions.
Private savings rates are historically low in the C6te d'Ivoire, and have
been adversely impacted by the stagnant economic conditions occuring in
the country since early 1980. According to survey results, some two-
thirds of Ivorian households are dissaving in 1985 (current consumption
expenditures exceeds current income), and positive savings are primarily
limited to the upper 40 percent of the income distribution. Because
consumption is a better indicator of permanent income than current income,
savings rates were found to be relatively independent of overall
consumption levels.
Marginal propensities to save are highest for households participating in
farm or non-farm self-employment activities, and lowest for households in
the wage sector. Estimated permanent income is a better predictor of
consumption and savings than current income; the marginal propensity to
save out of permanent income is estimated at .2 to .3 for the country as a
whole, in contrast to a MPS out of transitory income of .5 to .6.
Convincing evidence of liquidity constraints is found for both urban and
rural areas in the C6te d'Ivoire. According to study estimates,
households in Abidjan consume on average 4.6 percent less than desired due
to liquidity constraints, households in other urban areas consume on
average 6.5 percent less, and rural households consume on average 5.6
percent less. Households who report low levels of income in the current
year are the most severely affected by liquidity constraints; by our
estimates, they consume an average of 12 to 13 percent less than they
would have chosen to if credit was more readily available.
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Title: Associate Professor, Department of Economics and
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3ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work reflects the contributions of a wide range of friends and
colleagues as well as the fruits of my own struggles with the Muse.
First, I am grateful to my thesis advisor, Professor William Wheaton, and
members of my examining committee, Professors Lance Taylor and Alan
Strout, for their continued support and patience through what was
admittedly a long and drawn out process. Much of the work was done at the
World Bank under the auspices of the Living Standards Measurement Study
(LSMS), in the Development Research Department. I am grateful to Gregory
Ingram, the department director, and Dennis de Tray and Jacques van der
Gaag, chief(s) of the Living Standards Unit, for financial, intellectual,
and personal support throughout the research period. A vast number of
people have been involved with LSMS since its inception in 1980; while too
numerous to acknowledge individually, this work would not have been
possible without their contributions. In particular, I received
occasional and very valuable advice and guidance from present members of
the LSMS team -- Angus Deaton, Paul Glewwe, Avi Dor, Paul Gertler, Dwayne
Benjamin, John Newman, Morton Stelcner, and Kalpana Mehra. In addition, I
am grateful to Juan Munoz and Martha Ainsworth, whose careful and
meticulous efforts in conjunction with the staff of the Sous-direction de
la Statistique Generale are responsible for the quality of the CILSS data,
and to the Government of the Cte d'Ivoire for allowing me to use it.
Brenda Rosa, Carmen Martinez, and Ann Van Aken patiently and cheerfully
typed through many numbers and many words, and maintained a marvelous eye
for detail and errors of omission throughout. I am particularly grateful
to Ann Van Aken for assistance with final assembly of the document. Last,
and by no means least, I am indebted to my parents, who have encouraged
and supported me throughout my academic carreer, and to Tony Brooke, whose
initial patience encouraged me to go to MIT and ultimate impatience
encouraged me to finish.
4Table of Contents
List of Tables and Illustrations
1. INTRODUCTION.................................................... 8
1.1 Policy Context............................................. 10
1.2 General Objectives of the Research........................... 10
1.3 Description of the Data..................................... 13
2. COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WELFARE. ......... .. .26
2.1 Income..................................................... .. 28
2.2 Consumption Expenditures.................................... 43
2.3 Distribution of Welfare....................................... 54
3. HOUSEHOLD ASSETS AND EXPECTED INCOME............................... 75
3.1 Composition and Distribution of Household Assets........... 76
3.2 Measuring Expected Income.................................... 92
4. SAVINGS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT..................... 117
4.1 Household Savings Rates in the Cote d'Ivoire............... 119
4.2 A General Model of Savings Behavior......................... 144
5. CONSUMPTION AND SAVINGS BEHAVIOR.................................. 161
5.1 Keynesian Consumption Functions............................ 164
5.2 Savings Propensities and Permanent Income.................... 182
5.3 Alternative Measures of Savings Behavior..................... 197
6. THE EFFECTS OF LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS ON CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR.... 211
6.1 Theoretical Overview.......................................... 212
6.2 Methodology for Liquidity Constraints Tests................. 220
6.3 Empirical Results of Liquidity Tests....................... 230
7. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS.................................... 253
ANNEX I: Imputed Rents for Urban Households......................... 259
ANNEX II: Annualized Value of Durables............................... 276
List of References..................................................... 284
5List of Tables and Figures
Basic Characteristics of 1985 CILSS Sample Households......
Counts of Households by Income Source Category.............
and Region
CHAPTER 2
Table 2-1
Table 2-2
Table 2-3
Table 2-4
Table 2-5
Table 2-6
Table 2-7
Table 2-8
Table 2-9
Table 2-10
Table 2-11
Table 2-12
Table 2-13
Table 2-14
Table 2-15
Table 2-16
Table 2-17
Components of Household Income.............................
Composition of Farm Income in the C6te d'Ivoire............
Composition of Net Farm Income in the C6te d'Ivoire,.......
by Agriculture Region
Non-Farm Self-Employment Income and Expenditure per........
Household, by Region
Percentage of Households Receiving Income, by Source.......
of Income and Region
Composition of Household Income in the Republic of.........
C6te d'Ivoire, by Region
Components of Household Consumption Expenditures...........
Average Value of Purchased and Home-Produced Food..........
Percentage Shares, and Percent of Households
Either Purchasing or Producing, by Region
Composition of Consumption Expenditures in the.............
Republic of C6te d'Ivoire, by Region
Composition of Household Income in the Republic of.........
C6te d'Ivoire, by Region and Per Capita Income
Quintile Within Each Region
Composition of Household Income in the Republic of.........
C6te d'Ivoire, by Region and Per Capita Expenditure
Quintile Within Each Region
Composition of Household Income in the Republic of.........
C6te d'Ivoire by Per Capita Expenditure Decile
Composition of Household Expenditures in the Republic......
of C6te d'Ivoire, by Region and Per Capita
Expenditure Quintile Within Each Region
Distribution of Household Income and Consumption...........
Expenditures in the Republic of C6te d'Ivoire,
by Per Capita Income and Expenditures Deciles
Composition of Household Income and Consumption............
Expenditures in the Republic of C6te d'Ivoire, by
Region and Per Capita Income Quintile Within
Each Region
Distribution of Household Income and Consumption Expend-...
itures in the Republic of C6te d'Ivoire, by Region and
Per Capita Expenditure Quintile Within Each Region
Gini Coefficients for Household Income and Consump-........
tion Expenditures, by Region and Total Country
CHAPTER 1
Table 1-1
Table 1-2
21
24
6CHAPTER 3
Table 3-1 C6te d'Ivoire: Composition of Household Assets,............
by Region and Total
Table 3-2 C6te d'Ivoire: Composition of Household Assets, by.........
Income Source Category
Table 3-3 C6te d'Ivoire: Gini Cofficients for Selected Household.....
Assets, by Region
Table 3-4 Description of Variables in Cobb-Douglas Production........
Functions
Table 3-5 C6te d'Ivoire: Variable Means for Household Production.....
Function Estimates
Table 3-6 C6te d'Ivoire: Household Production Functions, by Region...
Table 3-7 COte d'Ivoire: Value of the Marginal Product of Labor,
by Region................................................
Table 3-8 COte d'Ivoire: Production Function and Variable Means;.....
Non-Farm Family Enterprises
Table 3-9 COte d'Ivoire: Household Production Function, by...........
Production Category
Annex Table 3.1: Cote d'Ivoire: Household Production Functions for....
Urban/Rural Areas; Not Gender Segmented
CHAPTER 4
Table 4-1
Table 4-2
Table 4-3
Table 4-4
Table 4-5
Table 4-6
Table 4-7
Table 4-8
Table 4-9
Table 4-10
Table 4-11
Figure 4.1
Percentage Savers and Dissavers by Income Quintile and.....
Region
Per Capita and Total Residual Savings Ratios, by Income....
and Consumption Deciles
Residual Savings Ratios, by Quintile and Region............
Residual Savings Ratios, by Age of Head, Wage Income.......
Availability, and Male Labor Availability
Residual Savings Ratios, by Household Structure............
Food Shares, by Savings Group and Region in the
C6te d'Ivoire
Composition of Income by Savings Group and Region in the...
C6te d'Ivoire
Distribution of Savers and Dissavers in the C6te...........
d'Ivoire, by Region and Country Totals
Variables Used in Savings Models...........................
Selected Variable Means for Savers/Dissavers Indicator.....
Function, by Region and Country Totals
Savers/Dissavers Indicator Function, by Region and.........
Country Totals
Proportion of Savers and Dissavers By Per Capita Income....
and Expenditure Deciles
80
85
90
96
98
102
105
108
113
116
124
126
128
131
133
137
142
149
152
158
121
7CHAPTER 5
Table 5-1 Household Consumption Functions, Total Country.............
Table 5-2 Household Consumption Functions, by Region.................
Table 5-3 Estimated Marginal Propensities to Save Out of Current.....
Income, by Region and Selected Income Levels
Table 5-4 Household Consumption Functions, by Source of Income.......
Table 5-5 Estimated Marginal Propensities to Save Out of Current.....
Income, by Source of Income and Selected Income Levels
Table 5-6 Propensities to Consume Out of Different Types of Income...
Table 5-7 C6te d'Ivoire: Base Household Consumption Functions.......
by Region, Income Source Category, and Total Country
Table 5-8 C6te d'Ivoire: Household Consumption Functions with.......
Estimated Permanent and Transitory Income; by Region and
Total Country -
Table 5-9 COte d'Ivoire: Household Consumption Functions with.......
Estimated Permanent and Transitory Income; by Production
Category
Table 5-10 C6te d'Ivoire: Marginal Propensities to Save Out of.......
Current and Permanent Income; by Region, Income Source
Category, and Total Country
Table 5-11 Changes in Stocks of Productive Assets; Total Country......
Table 5-12 Permanent Income Determinants of Cash Savings in the.......
Cote d'Ivoire; by Region and Total Country
Table 5-13 Income Source Determinants of Cash Savings in the Cote.....
d'Ivoire; by Region and Total Country
Annex Table 5.1 Variable Means for Consumption Functions, by Region...
Annex Table 5.2 Variable Means for Consumption Functions, by Source...
of Income
CHAPTER 6
Table 6-1 Limit and Non-Limit Observations, By Region................
Table 6-2 Sample Statistics for Two Subsamples.......................
Table 6-3 Log-Log Consumption Models by Region, Limit/Nonlimit.......
Categories, and Per Capita Adjustment (Within Croup
Permanent Income Estimates)
Table 6-4 Log-Log Consumption Models, by Region and Limit/Nonlimit...
Categories
Table 6-5(a) Abidjan: OLS Estimates..................................
Table 6-5(b) Abidjan: Tobit Estimates................................
Table 6-6(a) Other Urban Areas: OLS Estimates........................
Table 6-6(b) Other Urban Areas: Tobit Estimates......................
Table 6-7(a) Rural Areas: OLS Estimates..............................
Table 6-7(b) Rural Areas: Tobit Estimates............................
Annex Table 6.1 Household Production Functions, by Region and.........
Limit/Nonlimit Croupings
165
167
171
175
177
180
188
189
190
192
200
203
206
209
210
225
231
234
239
244
244
246
246
248
248
252
81. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between income and consumption is fundamental to
economic analysis. Savings is generally defined as the residual between
the two -- income not spent in the current period is saved to finance
consumption needs in later periods. Aggregate savings are derived from
the private (or household) sector, the corporate sector, and the
government. In developing areas, savings accruing to the formal corporate
sector tend to be small in comparison to private sector savings, primarily
because the corporate sector is itself typically small. A significant
majority of output is derived from the so-called informal sector and
smallholder households. For example, Alamgir (1974) found that private
savings constituted an average 60 to 70 percent of total savings in ECAFE
countries. In India, the private sector contributed 78 percent of total
savings in 1970-71 according to Bhalla (1976).
It is generally agreed that private savings can play a critical
role in economic development. The extent and effectiveness of savings in
the household sector clearly depend on private investment opportunities,
the role of government investments and public policy, the existence of
financial intermediaries, and competing uses for resources. Development
specialists claim a pressing need to "mobilize" private resources, that
is, to increase private savings rates and channel resources towards
desirable investment ends. Many developing areas are characterized by
poorly developed capital markets and uneven access to investment
opportunities, which may serve to depress overall levels of private
9savings, limit new capital formation, and thereby decrease levels of
growth. There is conflicting evidence as to whether savings respond to
investment opportunities or investment is itself constrained by a lack of
resources; in general, the assumptions one makes in this regard reflect
both ideological orientation and region/country-specific problems and
institutions.
Although much has been said about the role of savings in overall
economic development, rather less attention has been given to questions of
the inter-sectoral composition of savings and the distribution of
welfare. Growth models generally treat savings as a single aggregate
value and ignore the impact of structural change on savings decisions.
Such an approach "offers only limited insight into the development process
and contributes little to the policy-maker who seeks to understand the
savings decision and how he might act upon it" (Kelley and Williamson,
1968, p. 385). The major constraint to a structural analysis of savings
lies in data availability -- with a few notable exceptions, most LDC's do
not have sufficient resources to collect micro (or household-level) data
nor to process it once it has been collected. This is particularly true
for some of the poorest countries.
This study attempts to rectify in a small way the relative dearth
of information on the structural determinates of household savings
behavior in one of the poorer areas of the developing world -- Africa
south and west of the Sahara. It uses recent (1985) budget and
expenditure data collected in the Republic of the C6te d'Ivoire under the
10
auspices of the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) to examine
selected aspects of household savings behavior for urban and rural
households. Like earlier efforts, this research is bound by data
constraints; the survey was not designed explicitly for the analysis of
private savings behavior and is limited to a single year (for reasons
discussed later, repeated observations of the same households over time
would have been far better). However, we live in an imperfect world, and
the data are among the best obtained to date for an analysis of household
savings behavior in sub-Saharan Africa.
1.1 Policy Context /
Following independence in 1960, the Cbte d'Ivoire experienced
some twenty years of impressive economic growth. Spearheaded by an export
crop-led growth strategy, output grew at nearly 8 percent per annum
between 1960 and 1973, and the real value of exports expanded at 9 percent
per annum over that same period. While early growth was primarily led by
the agriculture sector, the late 1970's and early 1980's witnessed an
increasing emphasis on economic diversification and industrialization.
The economy began to slow in the mid-1970's, following the first oil shock
in 1974. However, the boom in the coffee and cocoa prices (both major
export crops in the Cote d'Ivoire) in the latter part of the 1970's shored
up the faltering economy through the early 1980's. During this period,
coffee and cocoa growers were taxed heavily; for example, in the mid-
1/ This section is primarily drawn from Zartman and Delgado (1984).
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1970's, smallholders were paid only 52 percent of the world price for
cocoa for their crops, which dropped to a 38 percent share in 1978/79.
Not surprisingly, nearly a third of all government revenues were derived
from coffee and cocoa during this period.
Interestingly, although agriculture served as the so-called
"engine of economic development", the share of agriculture in GDP declined
from 43 percent in 1960 to only 26 percent by 1979, while other sub-
Saharan countries showed an increase in the share of agriculture from 30
to 36 percent over that same period. In the C6te d'Ivoire, industry
accounted for some 25 percent of GDP in 1979, and the service sector for
the remainder.
This impressive economic performance was both insured by and
helped to insure a high degree of social and political stability in the
country. The country has had a single party system headed by a
charismatic and extremely adroit political leader, Felix Houphouet-Boigny,
since independence. Rivals have been co-opted into the system or
carefully eased out if deemed politically expedient. While the political
elite who run the country initially had a strong rural orientation
(Houphouet himself was a chief and son of a chief, coffee planter and son
of a coffee planter), they have grown increasingly urban in their social
and economic orientation in the years since independence.
The Ivorian economy stagnated in the early 1980's due to a series
of external shocks and internal problems. This stagnation has been
12
accompanyied by a serious deterioration in the balance of payments.
According to outside estimates, total private expenditures have fallen by
an estimated 26 percent since the boom-years of 1978/79. In response to
falling levels of output, the government has attempted to implement a
series of austerity measures, "liberalize" the economy, and mobilize
domestic resouces so as to increase levels of private investment. In the
latter case, it appears to have meet with little success.
Private savings levels have always been low in the COte
d'Ivoire. In 1979, for example, a year typified by extremely favorable
economic conditions, private savings constituted only 6.7 percent of
private income (World Bank, 1986) according to national accounts and
Central Bank (BCEAO) estimates. By 1981/82, the savings rate had fallen
to a low of 1.2 to 1.3 percent. Recent estimates put the private savings
rate at only around 3 percent of total income, low by any standards in the
developing world.
Why are private savings rates so low in the Cote d'Ivoire? There
a number of possible reasons: First, the Ivorian population are
considered a highly consumption-oriented society, accustomed to a booming
capitalist economy with impressively high rates of growth, which in itself
provides little incentive to save. In addition, there is little to save
for in the C6te d'Ivoire; until recently, there were virtually no rural
land markets, labor was plentiful and cheap (a substantial share of the
Ivorian population are job seekers from other African nations) and coffee
and cocoa requires little in the way of mechanical cultivation, public
13
services such as education and health care are either free or highly
subsidized and are increasingly available in rural as well as urban areas,
and financial institutions are generally poorly developed. Also, some
two-thirds of the population live in extended households, which mitigates
the need for lifecycle savings behavior.
However many of these economic and social conditions either have
changed or are changing in the C6te d'Ivoire. The government is following
an aggressive policy of economic liberalization, user charges and lowered
subsidies are under consideration in the health and education sectors, and
population pressures are such that land markets are developing rapidly in
many of the more accessible rural areas. In addition, the flow of foreign
capital into the country has slowed to a trickle in recent years. Clearly
there is much to be gained by explicit policies to mobilize private
resources and encourage savings and investment in the private sector.
Equally clearly, such policies can only effectively be planned if one has
a clear understanding of the structural determinates and intersectoral
composition of savings in the COte d'Ivoire.
1.2 General Objectives of the Research
This study seeks to establish the empirical relationship between
income, consumption, and savings in the C8te d'Ivoire; it draws on a large
body of theoretical development on savings and consumption functions in
doing so. It examines three major hypotheses:
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1. Entrepeneurs (e.g., households deriving income from
farm and non-farm self-employment activities) save
more intensively than households dependant on wage
income, regardless of income levels.
2. Households respond to long-run, or permanent income
in establishing consumption levels (i.e., some form
of the permanent income hypothesis holds in the Cote
d'Ivoire) rather than simply current income.
3. However, the timing of consumption is not completely
independent of the timing of income flows. Among
other factors, liquidity constraints may cause some
households to consume at levels less than those
commensurate with permanent income levels.
Accordingly, the permanent income hypothesis will
hold more strongly for households not currently
liquidity constrained than for constrained
households.
Regarding the relationship between savings (and implicitly
consumption) and income: There is a massive body of theoretical and
empirical work on the relationship between income and consumption. The
work is structured around two basic questions; (i) whether savings rates
are independent of income levels and income distribution, and (ii) whether
current income or some longer-run measure of income is the prime
determinate of savings behavior (the so-called Keynesian or absolute
income hypothesis in contrast to Friedman's (1957) permanent income
hypothesis and the lifecycle models developed by Modigliani, Brumberg, and
Ando (1954, 1963, 1966, and 1970)). If savings are not independent of
income, then current income is the appropriate income concept in modelling
savings behavior.
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Regarding liquidity constraints: Consumption forms the basis of
economic well-being; consumers derive utility largely from what they
consume rather than from what they earn. The timing of consumption
expenditures may not be independent of the timing of income flows for the
following reasons: (i) differences in short-term borrowing and lending
rates; (ii) differences in the liquidity of assets, often caused by
transaction costs in asset markets; (iii) uncertainty as to future price
and income levels; and (iv) rationing in the credit market. This
represents a departure from the standard model of consumer behavior, which
assumes perfect markets for all commodities, and that all markets clear.
The ability to save or dissave at certain points in time may play
a critical role in ensuring that basic standards of living are meet.
Further, the form that savings take and the composition of asset holdings
may also affect welfare levels. Poor households in particular may face
credit and liquidity constraints that prevent them from borrowing against
future income for either consumption or investment purposes. While
informal sources of credit may substitute for formal credit sources for
some households, others may be faced with the necessity of liquidating
existing resources or simply consuming less until income levels rise.
Most studies of savings behavior based on cross-sectional data
have simply ignored the effect of liquidity constraints in estimating
savings or consumption functions. While it is possible that questions of
liquidity may be ignored in more industrialized countries without
seriously compromising the results of empirical analyses, this is unlikely
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to be the case in most of the developing world, particularly regions such
as West Africa. However, it is difficult to identify which households are
liquidity constrained, and which are not -- the constraint cannot be
observed directly. For purposes of comparison, we first estimate current
and permanent income-based consumption functions ignoring possible effects
of liquidity constraints, and then test for the existence of such
constraints and re-estimate the consumption models accordingly.
Any study of this type necessarily has a large methodological
component -- our results are affected by the assumptions we make regarding
the measurement of income, consumption, and estimates of savings rates.
However, for purposes of this study, we do not concentrate on
methodological issues, but instead push to develop a better understanding
of household consumption and savings behavior despite possible data
problems. This does not mean that we ignore data and measurement error,
but rather that we do the best we can with existing information. Efforts
are made in several places to verify research findings and assess possible
impacts of measurement error and data limitations. Based on these and
similar analyses, we find rather reassuring evidence that the Cote
d'Ivoire Living Standards Survey (CILSS) data are robust and internally
consistent.
The thesis has seven chapters. This, the first, describes the
policy context and objectives of the research, and briefly discusses the
data used in empirical work. The second chapter overviews salient
features of the household economy in the C6te d'Ivoire, discusses
17
measurement issues pertinent to income and consumption, and describes the
composition and distribution of both measures based on CILSS survey
results. The third chapter begins with a discussion of the composition
and distribution of household assets in the C6te d'Ivoire. Various asset
and variable factor input measures are used to obtain an estimate of
permanent household income. These models are desribed in the latter half
of Chapter 3. The fourth chapter discusses the measurement of savings,
and derives empirical measures using an annual residual income approach to
measure changes in net worth. In addition, a general model to predict the
proportion of savers and dissavers in the sample population is presented
in the chapter. Chapter 5 describes current income-based or Keynsian
consumption models as well as permanent income-based consumption models.
Estimates of marginal propensities to save for various segments of the
Ivorian population are derived from both Keynesian and permanent income
models. The sixth chapter chapter explores the extent to which liquidity
(or credit) constraints affect consumption and savings behavior in the
COte d'Ivoire. Consumption functions are re-estimated for households that
are not liquidity constrained, and compared to previous estimates. The
seventh and final chapter briefly summarizes the main findings of the
research, and identifies directions for future work.
1.3 Description of the Data
The empirical work makes use of the first year of data from the
C6te d'Ivoire Living Standards Survey (CILSS). The survey is part of a
larger research effort sponsered by the World Bank "to improve the
18
quantitative basis for the design and monitoring of development policy"
(Grootaert, 1985). The study, called the Living Standards Measurement
Study (LSMS), focuses on ways of measuring changes in the quality of life
in the developing world. It has three phases; the first, completed
several years ago, was primarily conceptual, and involved the development
of an general framework for measuring living standards in developing
areas. Based on these findings, and with the assistance of numerous field
experts, the LSMS team developed prototype household and community
questionaires and began data collection efforts in the Republic of C6te
d'Ivoire in February, 1985, and Peru in July, 1985. This particular piece
of research is a part of the final phase of the study, which involves
analysis of LSMS data sets and research dissemination.
The CILSS is a permanent survey and will be re-adminstered every
year to a national sample of households. Some 1600 households living in
100 distinct areas (designated primary sampling units, or PSU's) were
interviewed during the first year, in such a way as to insure a self-
weighted sample. A two staged sampling procedure was used: First, 100
PSU's were selected with probability proportional to size from a list of
cities, towns and rural villages. A group or cluster of households was
then chosen from the PSU by means of a field presurvey. Each cluster has
16 households, randomly selected during the presurvey from a randomly
chosen group of 64 households within the PSU. Of the 100 PSU's, 21 were
located in Abidjan, the capital city, 5 in Bouake (the next largest city),
17 in other urban areas, and 57 in rural areas. The sample constitutes
roughly a 1.3 percent share of the total Ivorian population.
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The same areas will be resampled during the second year; 800 of
the households will be visited again, and 800 will be replaced. The third
year entails replacement of half of the PSU's, while the remaining half
will be reinterviewed.
The CILSS household questionaire includes a broad spectrum of
questions relating to all aspects of household welfare (see Grootaert,
1986, for an annotated description). In particular, there are seperate
sections on household composition, housing, education, health, employment
activities and time use, migration, agriculture, family enterprises,
household expenditures, durables, fertility, other income sources, private
transfers, and credit and savings. Efforts were made to include a
detailed accounting of both income and household expenditures; initial
tabulations suggest that this was done with some degree of success. The
derivation of household level income and consumption measures is described
in detail in the next chapter.
One of the more difficult aspects of the survey was determining
an appropriate definition of household membership. In general, a decision
was made to base membership on co-residence rather than kinship (in much
of West Africa it is not unusual for individuals to reside together --
share food and lodgings -- who are not closely related by blood or
marriage. The household was first asked to identify a "head", and then
list all persons who (i) slept in the dwelling unit last night, (ii)
typically sleep and eat in the dwelling unit, or (iii) occasionally
sleep/eat in the dwelling unit. Persons were classified according to
20
their relationship to the household head. Household members were
identified as all individuals who were (i) the head, or (ii) slept and ate
in the unit for at least 3 months over the last 12 and were not tenants or
servants. Some 14 percent of individuals initially listed in the
household roster are not household members according to these criterion.
In addition, some 25 percent of all children less than 14 years old live
in a household without either of their natural or adopted parents.
Clearly, household membership is a somewhat fluid arrangement in the Cote
d'Ivoire.
The results presented here are based a sample of 1569 households
(1569 in the case of consumption expenditures, and 1564 in the case of
income) interviewed in the first 12 months of the survey. Much of the
analysis is done seperately for households living in (i) Abidjan, (ii)
other urban areas (defined rather broadly as villages or small cities with
more than 1000 inhabitants), and (iii) rural areas, primarily due to
expected price differentials and differences in the structure of
production and availability of public services. Table 1-1 shows the
distribution of households by region, average household size, and
percentage of households with at least one member in the labor force,
participating in farm activities, and participating in non-farm self-
employment activities. Roughly one-quarter of the sample is drawn from
Abidjan, one-quarter from other urban areas (Bouake and large villages),
and the remaining half from rural areas. Note also that rural households
are on average larger than urban households (and large in some absolute
sense compared to households in other regions of the world).
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Table 1-1
Basic Characteristics of 1985 CILSS Sample Households
Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total
Areas Population
Number of Households 334 333 902 1569
Average Household Size 7.3 8.9 8.5 8.4
Income Generating
Activities:
(i) Percent of house-
holds with employees 71.6 52.2 10.6 32.4
(ii) Percent of house-
holds reporting
farm income 4.5 41.4 93.6 63.5
(iii) Percent of house-
holds with non-farm
family enterprises 45.8 53.5 27.1 36.6
Source: CILSS tabulations
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According to Table 1-1, households with at least one member in
the labor force tend to live in urban areas (71.6 percent of households
residing in Abidjan received wage income, 52.2 percent in other urban
areas, and only 10.6 percent in rural areas). In all likelihood, there
are more effective wage earners in rural areas than the survey was able to
identify; there is evidence of undersampling of non-indigenous households,
who tend to live outside rural communities. For example, nearly a third
of all farm households reported having sharecroppers work their land, and
nearly as many appeared to make use of casual laborers. However, the
survey identified only one-fifth as many sharecroppers as landlords, and
very few rural laborers.
Not surprisingly, nearly all rural households receive income from
agriculture activities (93.6 percent), as do a substantial proportion of
households residing in towns and villages outside Abidjan (41.4
percent). Non-farm self-employment is predominately an urban phenomena
(45.8 and 53.5 percent of households in Abidjan and other urban areas,
respectively, receive non-farm self-employment income), although a
reasonable share of rural households (27.1 percent) receive non-farm self-
employment income as well. Two-thirds of non-farm family businesses are
in the commercial food sector, and over 80 percent are one person
enterprises. Two thirds of the total are operated by women.
Two classification schemes are used extensively throughout the
research -- by region (as in Table 1-1) and by structure of productive
activity (defined in terms of income sources). Households are grouped
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into five major categories based on how they obtain income: (i) those
receiving only wages; (ii) those receiving income only from own-farm
activities; (iii) those receiving only income from non-farm self-
employment, or income from non-farm self-employment in conjunction with
own-farm activities; (iv) those receiving both wages and income from self-
employment; and (v) households who receive no earned income. In total,
16.7 percent of households are in the first (wage only) category, 39.6
percent receive only farm income, 26.0 percent receive non-farm or farm
and non-farm self-employment income, 16.1 percent obtain income both from
wage activities and self-employment, and only 1.7 percent report receiving
no earned income at all. It is important to note that the two
classification schemes are not independent of one another; for example,
most farmers live in rural areas while most wage earners reside in the
cities. To provide a context for the analysis described in ensuing
chapters, Table 1-2 shows the cross-categorization of survey household by
region and income source category.
According to this table, nearly all households (92.4 percent)
wholly dependent on wage income live in Abidjan or some other city. In
contrast, nearly 94 percent of households wholly dependent on farm income
live in rural areas. Households reveiving at least some income from non-
farm self-employment in addition to wage income are spread rather evenly
through the country (31.1 percent reside in Abidjan, 36.7 percent in other
urban areas, and 29.6 percent in rural areas), while households that
receive only self-employment income (but not solely farm income) tend to
Table 1-2
Counts of Households by Income Source Category and Region
Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total Country
N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent
Wage income only (N) 161 48.4 84 25.3 15 1.7 260 16.7
(percent) 61.9 32.3 5.8 100.0
Farm income only (N) 3 0.9 35 10.5 580 64.7 618 39.6
(percent) 0.5 5.7 93.9 100.0
Non-farm self-employment income, (N) 79 23.7 113 34.0 214 23.7 406 26.0
farm & non-farm self-employment
income (percent) 19.6 27.8 52.7
Wage and self-employment income (N) 78 23.4 92 27.7 81 9.0 251 16.1
(percent) 31.1 36.7 29.6 100.0
No earned income (N) 12 3.6 8 2.4 7 0.8 27 1.7
(percent) 44.4 29.6 25.9 100.0
Total Country 333 100.0 332 100.0 897 100.0 1562 100.0
21.3 21.3 57.4 100.0
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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be in rural areas (57.2 percent), but reside in urbanized areas as well
(19.6 percent in Abidjan, 27.8 percent in other urban areas).
Table 1-2 also presents percentage shares along regional
dimensions. For example, of the 333 household surveyed in Abidjan, nearly
75 percent receive income from wages, and 48 percent on wholly dependent
on wage income. In contrast, some 65 percent of rural households depend
on farm income to satisfy all consumption needs, while less than 11
percent obtain income from wages.
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2. COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WELFARE
The change in net worth, or private savings rate over a
particular period can be defined as the difference between income flows
and consumption expenditures over that period. The maximum increase in
the net worth of a household is bounded by the flow of income into the
household; the maximum decrease is bounded by the flow of consumption
expenditures out of the household. Thus, an estimate of savings as an
income/consumption residual requires prior estimates of both income and
consumption expenditures. Note that savings can also be estimated
directly if infomation is available on the value of capital stocks at the
beginning and end of a specified period, and adjustments for within period
price changes can be made.
Primarily due to data availability, this research measures
savings as the difference between current income and consumption
expenditures; we are limited to a single year cross-section of
households. Ideally, one would like to have a series of observations on
the same households over time, so that changes in asset holdings (i.e.,
changes in net worth) could be evaluated directly. With a few notable
exceptions (see, for example, Bhalla, 1978, for India, and Kusnic and
DaVanzo, 1980, for Malaysia), panel data are generally not available in
developing areas. The CILSS will constitute such a panel as field efforts
proceed over the upcoming months. When the full data set is available,
comparisons should be made between residual savings rates based on a
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single year cross section of data, and the changes in the asset holdings
of a single household over time.
How good are residual savings estimates? Clearly this will
depend on the accuracy with which income and consumption can be measured,
as well as the validity of the income and consumption concepts used. Past
work indicates the tendency to overstate consumption and understate income
in typical budget and income surveys, which suggests that residual savings
will be understated as well (see Bhattacharya, 1963, Deaton, 1985a, 1985b,
Visaria, 1980). Efforts were made to obtain very detailed measures of
both income and consumption in the CILSS, which should help to minimize
measurement errors. Comparisons with national accounts data show that
CILSS consumption estimates are on average very similar to national
accounts consumption estimates (from the IFS data base maintained by the
International Monetary Fund). Unfortunately, there are no good external
sources of data with which to compare income estimates. Comments on
potential error introduced by measurement problems will be made as
appropriate throughout the paper; for the present, we can only hope that
the careful efforts to obtain accurate information in the field will be
reflected in the quality of the data.
Estimates of average consumption expenditures and income are
presented in this chapter, stratified by income and consumption
rankings. The first section describes the measurement and composition of
income. The second section does likewise for consumption expenditures.
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The third and final section of the chapter examines distributional issues
relating to both welfare measures.
Current, or annual income has typically been used as a measure of
welfare in past studies. More recent evidence suggests that consumption
expenditures provide a better measure of long-term welfare than income,
due to a high correlation between permanent income and consumption
(Deaton, 1980, Anand and Harris, 1985). Current income is expected to be
more variable over time than consumption, particularly for farm
households, those dependent on the informal wage sector, and households
who derive income from family enterprises -- in short, all households
outside the formal wage sector. Households suffering transitory
shortfalls in income can finance current consumption needs out of savings
or through borrowing, while households with surpluses can save or invest
to insure against future income shortfalls. According to the CILSS, less
than 10 percent of the COte d'Ivoire's working age population are in the
formal wage sector, which suggests that the transitory component of income
may be high for many households. Questions relating the the relative
advantage of using consumption expenditures instead of income as a measure
of household well-being are discussed in the final section of the chapter.
2.1 Income
For purposes of this research, income is defined as the returns
to household labor inputs and capital stocks, plus the annualized flow of
services from durable goods and the housing stock. It has nine major
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components: (i) wages; (ii) farm income; (iii) non-farm self-employment
income; (iv) capital and interest income; (v) income from forced savings;
(vi) other unearned income; (vii) private transfer income; (viii) imputed
rents; and (ix) income from durable stocks. For purposes of the present
work, no effort was made to impute a flow of income to time spent in home
production activities (housework, childcare, and the like), nor to leisure
time -- in short, no effort was made to measure full income (see Becker,
1965, Gronau, 1976, Evenson and Quinzon, 1977). This is not because we
feel that time spent working at home is unimportant, but rather due to
limitations in the scope of the present work.
Wage income is derived from Section 5 of the CILSS questionaire,
which describes time use and earnings for all individuals aged 7 years or
older. Respondants described earnings and time inputs for up to four
unique wage-paying jobs over the 12 month period preceeding the
interview. Information was solicited on in-kind as well as monetary
payments; of the 785 individuals who described themselves as employees
(out of a universe of 10,067 potential employees), some 43 percent
reported receiving some form of in-kind payments. These payments
constitute an average 12 percent of total wage renumeration. Note that
142 persons, or some 18 percent of employees, claimed not to receive any
cash payments for their work. Upon inspection, the bulk of these appear
to be young (15 to 25 years old) persons serving unpaid apprenticeships.
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Table 2-1
Components of Household Income
Income Component
1. Wage
2. Farm
3. Non-farm Family
Enterprise
4. Capital and Interest
5. Social Security,
Pensions, etc.
6. Other Unearned Income
7. Private Transfer Income
8. Imputed Rents
9. Service Flows from
Durables
Description
Cash and in-kind income from employment
Net revenues from crop and livestock
activities
Net revenues from agriculture product sales
Net revenues from non-farm self-employment
Land and buildings rental income,
dividends and interest payments
Income from social security and pensions
Income from grants, scholarships, gifts,
dowery and inheritance, etc.
Gross income from private transfer payments
Net imputed value of housing services from
residing in one's own dwelling unit (rural
households excluded)
Annual imputed value of services from
durables
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Farm income is derived from Sections 9 and 12 of the CILSS
questionnaire. Section 9 is the source of all agriculture related
measures except the value of home-produced agriculture goods consumed at
home, which is drawn from Section 12. Farm income includes the returns to
family labor and productive assets (Singh and Asokan, 1981). It is
defined as the difference between gross farm income and expenditures on
variable inputs. It includes (i) income from crop sales, (ii) income from
livestock sales and changes in livestock holdings due to non-market
transactions (gifts, births, deaths), (iii) income from the sales of
products made from agriculture outputs, (iv) the estimated value of
agriculture outputs consumed at home (see Section 2.2 for a description of
how this measure was derived), and (v) land and equipment rents.
Measurement problems were encountered in apportioning
sharecropping income between the landlords and the sharecroppers; survey
results indicate that sharecropping arrangements are more akin to a labor-
buying than a land-leasing system. For the most part, the farmer retains
control of the land and provides necessary inputs. The sharecropper
essentially provides muscle, for which he or she receives one-half to one-
third of total output. The vast majority of sharecropping arrangements in
the sample involved cash crops, e.g., coffee and cocoa. Sharecroppers in
the Cote d'Ivoire tend to be immigrants (or, autochtones) from other parts
of the country or other West African countries, attempting to work their
way into the rural economy in areas of relative land abundance and rich
growing conditions. (Ruf, 1984) It is important to note that only 36
percent of farm households surveyed claimed to be able to sell their land
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should they choose; for the remainder, hired labor or sharecropping
arrangements are the only way to adjust factor proportions between land
and labor inputs. Given this situation, it is not surprising that nearly
27 percent of all farm households report involvement in sharecropping
arrangements.
Table 2-2 shows the composition of agriculture income in the
country. According to our estimates, the average annual value of farm
output (including outputs consumed at home) is CFA 932,344 per household,
which is produced at a cost of 21 percent of gross output, or CFA 196,230,
and thus yields a net farm income of CFA 736,114 per household. The vast
majority of farm output is derived from crop cultivation. The value of
home-consumed goods constitutes some 40 percent of the average value of
net farm output (CFA 285,328 for crop consumption, and CFA 13,104 for
consumption of livestock-related outputs). Table 2-3 shows the compositon
of net farm income stratified by the three major agriculture regions in
the Cote d'Ivoire -- The West Forest, East Forest, and the Savanne.
According to this table, farmers in the West and East Forests earn
significantly more on average than do farmers in the northern Savanne
region.
Income from non-farm self-employment is derived from Sections 5
and 10 of the CILSS questionaire. Rather severe problems were encountered
in attempting to compute the measure based on Section 10 alone, although
this was the intended purpose of the section. Section 10 has three parts;
(i) information on revenues and structure of the family enterprise, (ii)
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Table 2-2
Composition of Farm Income in C8te d'Ilvoire
(CFA)
Crop Production
Livestock
Agriculture
Product Sales
Agriculture
Rents
Total Agriculture
Activities
Gross Income
836,726
41,317
37,765
16,536
932,344
Expenditures
187,264
4,315
1,483
3,168
196,230
Net income
649,462
37,002
36,282
13,368
736,114
Percentage Shares
of Net Income
88.2
5.0
4.9
1.9
100.0
Source: 1985 CILSS Survey estimates.
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Table 2-3
Composition of Net Farm Income in Cte d'lvoire by Agriculture Region
West Forest (N=239)
Avg. CFA Percent
Crop Production
Livestock
Agriculture
Product Sales
Agriculture
Rents
Total Net Income
829,675
37,330
69,967
4,790
941,852
88.1
East Forest (N=478)
Avg. CFA Percent
721,582
4.0 39,775
7.4 24,425
0.5
100.0
27,168
812,950
88.8
Savanne (N=329)
Avg. CFA Percent
413,765
4.9 32,737
3.0 26,133
3.3
100.0
-448
472,187
87.6
6.9
5.5
0.0
100.0
Source: 1985 CILSS Survey estimates.
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information on business expenditures, and (iii) an accounting section on
business assets. Information is collected for a maximum of three
enterprises per household. On average, a third of these were managed by
the household head, a third by his/her spouse, and the remainder by some
other household member. Over 50 percent of enterprises sold foodstuffs,
and 25 percent were involved in other forms of commerce.
Based on data reported in Section 10, 65 percent of enterprises
have negative profits. Clearly these figures are not realistic. Evidence
suggests that spurious net revenue estimates are caused by underestimates
of gross business revenues in the questionaire. It appears particularly
difficult to obtain estimates of gross revenues for small enterprises
(involving one or two family members), which consititute over 80 percent
of all enterprises sampled in the CILSS, because the budget for the
business and the budget for the household are seldom maintained
separately.
Consider a woman who makes meat pies at home and sells them at
noon time: she buys meat, vegetables, and flour in bulk. She uses some
of the flour to make bread for the family (which we attempted to account
for in the questionnaire), some of the vegetables for dinner, and her
children take some of the meat pies for lunch at school (also supposedly
accounted for in the questionnaire). She makes a tray of pies and goes to
the school to sell them; after a few hours, she gives some of the money
she received from the pies to one of her children for school supplies.
She stops on her way home and buys rice and milk for the next day's
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meals. After she gets home, a man from a CILSS survey team comes to ask
her some questions about her "business" (selling meat pies). In
particular, he asks her what her total revenues have been since his last
visit (roughly two weeks ago). What he would like her to do is estimate
the number of meat pies she has sold and multiply by some price per pie.
What she does may be very different, however. For example, she might
think of the money in her pocket at the end of the day, which means that
her reply would reflect net business revenues minus payments for household
consumption expenditures. Alternatively, if she buys supplies in bulk and
infrequently, the money in her pocket might represent gross revenues minus
some payments for household consumption expenditures. Recent field
experiments suggest that both kinds of responses are not infrequent, and
are far more typical of individual's responses than actual measures of
gross business revenues. In either case, our prototypical respondent may
not think of her business' budget as logically separate from the
household's budget.
For present purposes, net income from family businesses is
estimated using a judicious mix of information from Section 10 and Section
5, which describes individual time use and earnings. This requires that
individuals be merged across households in Section 5 and enterprises be
merged across households in Section 10 (it is not possible to obtain an
accurate match of individuals with enterprises) and information matched
between the two sources at a household level. Thus, the basic unit of
observation is the household rather than the individual enterprise in
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income estimates, and enterprise level information cannot be fully
recovered.
Table 2-4 shows average business revenues and expenditures per
household involved in non-farm self-employment for Abidjan, other urban
areas, and rural areas, further stratified by a proxy measure for large
(net revenues greater than CFA 3,000,000 per annum) and small enterprise
households. Note that 37 percent of all households in C6te d'Ivoire
report some non-farm business activity, which encompasses 46 percent of
households in Abidjan, 54 percent of households in other urban areas, and
27 percent of rural households. l/ Net and gross business incomes are on
average highest in Abidjan and lowest in rural areas, and a greater
proportion of households have "large" businesses in Abidjan than in other
regions of the country.
Capital and interest income is derived from Section 14 of the
CILSS questionnaire, and includes rents on buildings and land (with the
exception of land used for agriculture), dividends, and interest
payments. Income from forced savings include payments from pension plans
and social security, which are likewise reported in Section 14.
Information on private transfer payments is also provided in Section 14.
Some 23 percent of households in the COte d'Ivoire recieve income through
l/ These percentages are slightly different than those obtained by
dividing counts in Table 2-4 due to a slight underreporting of business
activities in the section of the questionnaire dealing specifically with
family enterprise activities (Section 10), rectified through use of
information from the general employment section (Section 5).
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Table 2-4
Non-Farm Selfemployment Income and Expenditures Per Household by Region
(CFA)
Abidjan
Large Enterprise Households
(>3,000,000 CFA/Year)
Small Enterprise Households
(<3,000,000 CFA/Year)
Total Households
Other Urban Areas
Large Enterprise Households
(>3,000,000 CFA/Year)
Small Enterprise Households
(<3,000,000 CFA/Year)
Total Households
Rural Areas
Large Enterprise Households
(>3,000,000 CFA/Year)
Small Enterprise Households
(<3,000,000 CFA/Year)
Total Households
Total Country
Large Enterprise Households
(>3,000,000 CFA/Year)
Small Enterprise Households
(<3,000,000 CFA/Year)
Total Households
Number of Gross Total Net
Households Revenues Expenditures Revenues
17
137
154
7
179
186
7
247
254
31
563
594
45,452,463
1,780,137
6,601,108
7,107,402
1,942,746
2,138,165
9,371,968
1,676,867
1,892,330
28,646,692
1,787,036
3,200,702
37,854,213
1,122,959
5,177,708
3,213,464
1,399,013
1 ,467,299
4,518,736
1,341,638
1,429,196
22,504,743
1,306,667
2,412,963
7,598,250
657,178
1,423,400
3,893,938
679,915
801J,527
4,853,231
374,960
500,351
6,141,949
541,530
836,289
Source: 1985 CILSS Survey estimates.
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private support systems, with the vast majority of payments coming from
individuals related by blood or marriage.
Two imputations are made for the income estimates, one for the
annual value of housing services (net of maintainence costs) for home
owners, and one for an imputed annual stream of income from durables owned
by the household. These imputations are described in detail in Annexes I
and II for housing and durables, respectively. Imputed rents were
estimated using what has become a fairly standard technique, entailing the
estimation of selectivity-corrected hedonic rent equations (see Heckman,
1979, Lee and Trost, 1978, Malpezzi and Mayo, 1985, or McFadden, 1974).
An estimate of the annual flow of services from durables is simply
computed as the product of the annual depreciation rate times the present
value of the durable, summed over the total stock of durable goods owned
by the household (van der Gaag, n.d.).
Table 2-5 shows the percentage of households receiving income in
each of the nine income categories, by region and for the country as a
whole. From this table, it is clear that income sources vary
significantly between regions. In Abidjan, for example, 71.6 percent of
households have at least one member who earns wages, and 45.8 precent
receive income from non-farm self-employment. In contrast, only 10.5
percent of rural households receive wage income and 27.2 percent reveive
non-farm family enterprise income. However, nearly all rural households
(93.5 percent) receive income from farm activities, while few urban
households do so (4.5 percent). The category labelled "other urban areas"
Table 2-5
Percentage of Households Receiving Income, by Source of Income and Region
Abidjan (N=334) Other Urban (N=332) Rural (N=898) Total Country (N=1564)
(1) Annual Wage Income 71.6 52.1 10.5 32.4
(2) Net Agriculture Income 4.5 41.6 93.5 63.5
(3) Net Income from Family 45.8 53.6 27.2 36.8
Enterprises
(4) Rents and dividends 26.9 25.6 8.5 16.0
(5) Income from Social Security, 24.6 16.9 1.6 9.7
Pensions, etc.
(6) Other Unearned Income 37.7 40.1 25.6 31.3
(Gifts, Scholarships, etc.)
(7) Gross Annual Transfer 21.9 24.4 23.5 23.3
Income
(8) Imputed Rents for Urban 22.5 44.6 14.3
Home Owners
(9) Annual Value of Durables 91.3 92.2 73.1 81.0
NOTE:
- No imputations were made for rural areas due to the general absence of a housing market, and constraints on property sales.
Source: 1985 CILSS Survey estimates.
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typically evidences a pattern of income composition that lies between
Abidjan's and that of rural areas -- households are more likely to receive
wage income than rural households, less likely to receive farm income, but
more likely to receive non-farm self-employment income than either
households in Abidjan or rural areas. It is interesting, although not
surprising to note that some 24.6 percent of households receive income
from pensions or social security payments in Abidjan, while only 16.9
percent do in other urban areas, and 1.6 percent in rural areas. The
reasons for this are simple; only individuals who hold government or
private sector jobs are eligible for pensions (government) or social
security (private sector) coverage upon retirement, and the vast majority
of employees work in urban areas. Rural households also receive little
income from rents or dividends in contrast to urban households. One must
wonder how rural households manage to cope with lifecycle effects given
their high dependence on earned income.
Table 2-6 shows the composition of household income for each of
the three regions. The results are in line with those of Table 2-5:
wages form an important component of income in urban areas, followed by
income from non-farm family enterprises. Rural incomes are composed
primarily of payments from agriculture activities, with some income from
non-farm self-employment and wage activities. It is important to note
that some 20 to 25 percent of income in urban areas is derived from
indirect or "unearned" sources, while only 5 percent of rural incomes are
derived from sources not directly related to income generating
activities. We shall return to the welfare implications of differences in
T'ihhe 2-6
Composition of Ibusehold Tnxm In the ipeptbic of (Be d'Ivoire by lgi
(1) Annual Wage
Income
(2) Net Agriculture Incne
(3) Net Inome from Fanly
Fnterprises
(4) Rents and dividends
(5) Income fran Social Security,
Pensions, etc.
(6) Other Unearned Income
(Gifts, Scholarships, etc.)
(7) Gross Annual Transfer
Income
(8) Imputed Rents for Urban
Home Owners
(9) Annual Value of Durables
Total Annual Household
Income
Abidjan (N=334)
CFA Percent
1,454,201 51.5
42,431 1.5
652,%1 23.1
276,672 9.8
90,052 3.1
99,986 3.5
69,099 2.5
97,145 3.4
40,463 1.5
2,823,011 100.00
Other Urban (N=332)
Other Urban (N=332)
CFA Percent
907,291 46.9
188,148
437,669
107,593
53,276
37,141
19,902
150,032
33,841
1,934,893
9.7
22.6
5.6
2.8
1.9
1.0
7.8
1.7
100.0
Rural (N=698)
CFA Percent
'btal Ountry (N=1564)
CFA Percent
65,628 6.4 540,830
766,838 75.0 489,295
136,141 13.3 310,517
19,259 1.9 92,982
3,911 0.4 32,786
14,540 1.4 37,585
7,343 0.7 23,197
- - 52,594
8,936 0.9 2D,955
1,022,597 100.0 1,600,743
33.8
30.6
19.4
5.8
2.0
2.3
1.5
3.3
1.3
100.0
N'IES:
I/ No imtations were made for rural areas due to the general absence of a housing rental market, and
property sales.
Source: 1985 CIISS Survey estimates.
constraints on
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income composition in a later chapter; for the present, it is important to
simply note the differences in income composition across regions.
2.2 Consumption Expenditures
Initially, we begin with a broad and fairly traditional
definition of consumption expenditures. In particular, we include
expenditures on education and health, components of consumption that might
better be treated as investments in human capital, and transfer payments,
which may represent informal credit activities. Alternative definitions
will be discussed briefly at a later point.
For purposes of the research, we define seven major expenditure
categories: (i) food expenditures, including both purchased and home
produced food commodities, (ii) education expenditures, (iii) health
expenditures, (iv) gross private transfer payments, (v) housing costs,
including imputed rents, (vi) an annualized cost of durables, and (vii)
all other expenditures (clothing, households goods, utilities, leisure,
etc.). These are outlined in Table 2-7. Note that imputed rents and the
durables imputation are included in both income and expenditures. The
reasons for this are straightforward; we wish to use both estimates as
welfare measures, and must derive some flow of services over time from
stocks of personal assets. In the case of housing, we assume that home
owners receive some flow of services equal to the rental payments they
would have had to make had they rented their dwelling unit rather than
owned it. This can be treated as income (in a welfare sense), but also as
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Table 2-7
Components of Household Consumption Expenditures
Consumption Component
1. Food Consumption
2. Education
3. Health
4. Private Transfers
5. Housing Costs
6. Annual Cost of Durables
7. Other Expenditures
Description
The value of purchased foodstuffs and
food produced at home
The annual cost of education, including
tuition, books, clothing, and
transportation
The annual cost of medicine, visits to
health practioners, and items for
personal hygiene
Remittances and transfers out of the
household
Rents, maintenance costs, and imputed
rents
Annual imputed cost of services from
durables
All other consumption expenditures,
including utilities, transportation,
households goods, clothing, etc.
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a measure of the amount of housing they are consuming. Certainly imputed
rents (ignoring capital gains) should cause no change in the net wealth of
the household. The argument is essentially the same for durables -
households receive a flow of services from durables on the income side,
and a stream of consumption value on the expenditure side.
The "other" category is large (composing on average 30.3 percent
of total expenditures), and includes a number of items that are
traditionally treated separately in expenditure analysis. However, we are
not interested in household expenditures per se in this work, but rather
in the relationship between expenditures and income, and how the
composition of expenditures changes in response to changes in income.
Accordingly, we use consumption aggregates that reflect those elements of
consumption (health, education, private transfer payments) we are most
interested in.
Food expenditures constitute a major share of total household
expenditures, particularly for the poor. In fact, poverty is often
defined in terms of the share of total expenditures that the household
devotes to food consumption. There are a wide number of empirical studies
on the relationship between welfare and food consumption, beginning with
Engel's work (Engel, 1857, 1895) and continuing through the present day
(see, for example, Deaton, 1980, 1985, Sen, 1981, 1984, Srinivasan,
1981). Much of it is motivated by Engel's law -- that the food share
declines with levels of welfare. Another important poverty statistic
based on food consumption is the share of home-produced foodstuffs in
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total consumption; in some very poor areas nearly all food consumed is
produced within the household. The statistic is also a measure of the
monetarization of the rural economy, and thus has broad policy
implications.
The total value of food consumption is derived from Section 12 of
the CILSS. In the CILSS, food consumption is measured in value terms
rather than through separate price and quantity measures. In the case of
purchased foods, respondents were asked what they typically spent for a
specific foodstuff, and how frequently the expenditure was made. In the
case of home-produced goods, respondents were asked how much they would
expect to pay for the amount typically consumed in a day, and how many
days they typically consumed the foodstuff. In neither case were separate
quantity (e.g. kilos consumed) or price (cost per kilo) measured obtained.
Thirty-two separate categories were detailed for purchased
foodstuffs, and twenty-two categories for home produced foods. Two
reference periods were used in this part of the questionnaire.
Respondants were asked to detail food purchases over a two week period,
and to detail food purchases over a twelve month period (how many months
did you purchase ... , during those months, how frequently did you purchase
.. , and each time you made a purchase, how much did you typically spend
on ... ). Data used here are based on responses to the twelve month
reference period.
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The value of home-produced food is derived in a similar manner.
For twenty-two food items, respondents were asked how frequently they
consumed a particular item (how many months over the past twelve months,
and typically how many times), and what it would cost to purchase the
amount the household consumed in a day. Community price surveys were
performed in the rural sampling units, so quantity estimates could be
recovered if deemed desirable.
There has been a great deal of discussion regarding the
desirability of measuring home consumption in the fashion described. Such
measures are typically obtained from residual farm production estimates;
all crop outputs not sold, given away, stored, or used for seed are
assumed to be consumed by the household. In our case, we estimated the
total value of farm output by adding the value of home consumption
(obtained as described above) to value measures of marketed output, gifts,
and seeds, and storage. There are advantages and disadvantages to the
approach used in the CILSS: in terms of the advantages, we avoid problems
caused by differences in local units both in measuring agriculture output
and in measuring consumption (household inputs). Also, we simplify data
collection effort significantly. In terms of the disadvantages, we have
made rather heroic assumptions regarding the degree of monetarization in
the Cote d'Ivoire's rural economy, and respondent's knowledge of the
"value" of a food item that he or she may seldom if ever buy. Also, there
is likely to be strong seasonal variation in prices of basic foodstuffs,
so that prices at the time of the interview may not reflect average prices
across the year. However, early field tests indicated that respondents
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were quite willing to make statements regarding value and the rural
consumption estimates appear robust in initial modelling efforts, so we
feel that the approach used for estimating the value of home-consumed farm
output is valid.
Table 2-8 shows average expenditures on purchased food, the
estimated value of home-produced foodstuffs, and the total estimated value
of food consumption, stratified by region. According to these
tabulations, urban households in Abidjan purchase almost all of the food
they consume (99.8 percent of the total), urban households outside Abidjan
purchase most of the food they consume (11.5 percent of the total is
produced at home, although over 41 percent of households produce some food
at home), and rural households purchase on average less than half of the
food they consume (53.6 percent of the total is home-produced, and just
under 95 percent of rural households produce some food at home). In the
total country, an average of 28.2 percent of the value of food consumed is
produced within the household, and 63.8 percent of all households produce
at least some of the food they consume.
Education expenditures and health expenditures are derived from
Section 11 of the CILSS questionnaire. Nearly all households, both urban
and rural, spend money on health care, which includes personal hygiene as
well as medicine and medical services. However, 80 percent of households
in Abidjan report educational expenditures, as compared with 65 percent of
households in other urban areas, and only 55 percent of rural households.
Table 2-8
Average Value of Purchased and Home-Produced Food,
Percentage Shares, and Percent of Households Either Purchasing or Producing, By Region
Abidjan Other Urban Areas liral Areas 1btal (ountry
Fercent Percent Percent Percent
irchasirg Percent archasim Percent PIurchasing Percent Parchasrig (erhent
Producir CFA Share Producir CFA Share Producirg CA Shre Producirg WA Shre
Furchased Food
Ekperditure 100.0 1,010,377 99.8 100.0 652,554 88.5 99.9 275,341 46.4 99.9 511,868 71.8
Value of Hame-Produced
Food Comnsuetton 2.7 2,672 0.2 41.1 84,433 11.5 94.8 317,951 53.6 63.8 2)l,275 2.2
Vale of Ibtal Food
Consumptio - 1,013,149 100.0 - 736,937 100.0 - 593,292 100.0 - 713,143 10.0
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An annualized cost of durables is included in total consumption,
as described previously and in Annex II. Housing costs are also
included. For home owners, we estimate housing costs by imputing an
annual rental value to the dwelling unit (see Annex I). For renters, we
use actual rents and maintenance costs, derived from Section 2 and Section
11 in the CILSS questionnaire. In total, only 23 percent of households in
Abidjan own the dwelling unit in which they reside, 47 percent of
households in other urban areas, and 93 percent of rural households. Rent
imputations were not made for rural homeowners, primarily due to data and
market limitations.
Gross transfer payments are derived from Section 11 of the
questionnaire. In total, 68 percent of Abidjan's households report making
private transfers, 53 percent of other urban households, and 39 percent of
rural households.
Table 2-9 shows the composition of average consumption
expenditures by region and overall. Population budget shares are defined
as the average of budget shares for each household, that is
SHRj - (exp. )
HH i exp..
where: j denotes consumtion categories,
i denotes households,
exp is expenditures, indexed by j (categories) and
i (households),
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HH is the total number of households in the population,
and
SHRj is the population budget share for consumption
category j.
This technique gives each household's expenditure pattern equal weight,
and it is generally preferred as a welfare measure to measures of the
ratio of aggregate total expenditures to aggregate expenditures in a
consumption category (Deaton, 1985).
According to Table 2-9, the food share in Abidjan is 39.8
percent, in other urban areas is 41,7 percent, and is 62.4 percent in the
rural areas. Overall, the food share is 53.2 percent. How do these
numbers compare to other survey estimates in LDCs? Insofar as the food
share is a good indicator of poverty, households in the COte d'Ivoire
appear fairly well off. Using a definition of consumption similar to
ours, Deaton (1985) found a food share of 66.7 percent in urban Sri Lanka
(1980-81) and 70.8 percent in rural Sri Lanka. Using data from Indonesia
(1978), he found food shares of 57.9 and 71.2 for urban and rural
households, respectively. In the Sudan, food shares range from 62.7
percent of total expenditures tO 74.3 percent in one of the poorest
regions of the country (Deaton and Case, 1985). Recent work in Pakistan
(Ali, 1985) reports an overall food budget share of 50.8 percent.
Education expenditures are highest on average in Abidjan (not
surprising, because of generally greater availability of schools), and
'Ikhle 2-9
oqmpositim of (Iumption Eritnres In the Replic of (ste d'Ivoire by Regiao
(1) Food expenditures
(2) Fducation R&penditures
(3) Health Care Expenditures
(4) Annual Cost of Irables
(5) Gross Transfer Payments
(6) Housing Costs!!
(7) Other Household Expenditures
Total Annual xpenditures
Abidjan (1$334) Other Urban (N.~333)
Abidjan (N-334)
CFA Percent
1,013,050 39.8
131,854 4.2
128,140 4.5
40,463 1.2
109,482 3.3
331,038 11.1
1,018,452 37.1
2,772,481 100.0
Other Urban (N=333)
CFA Percent
736,978 41.7
61,578 2.6
90,964 4.5
34,286 1.6
69,798 2.6
279,235 14.2
686,374 34.3
1,958,942 100.0
Rural (W902)
CFA Percent
593,293 62.4
31,722 2.5
54,470 4.9
8,987 0.9
16,250 1.3
10,962 0.6
296,926 28.2
1,012,610 100.0
'btal (ountry (N=1569)t2
CFA Percent
713,144 53.2
59,374 2.9
77,840 4.7
21,057 1.1
47,461 2.0
83,60B 5.6
533,176 31.4
1,588,088 100.0
NUIES:
Includes both rents paid and an inputed annual value of housing services for home owners in Abidjan and other urban areas.
The full sample of 900 households was used for this table. Note that sample means are slightly higher for this full sample
than the incae constrained sample.
Source: CILSS Survey estimates.
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fall significantly in rural areas. The latter is due both to lower
enrollment rates (57 percent of individuals 15 years of age and younger
are enrolled in school in Abidjan, in comparison to 47 percent in rural
areas) and to compositional difference -- students in rural areas are more
likely to be enrolled in state-supported primary schools than students in
Abidjan. In contrast, while health care expenditures are lower on average
in rural areas (where public health care is free and medicine highly
subsidized), health care budget shares are roughly constant across
regions.
Housing costs constitute some 11 percent of total expenditures in
Abidjan, and 14 percent in other urban areas. These figures are much in
line with similar estimates for other developing areas. Gross transfer
payments constitute a rather small share of household budgets; however, if
the bulk of remittance are moving from urban to rural areas (as studies
have shown in other Africa countries, see Anker and Knowles, 1983, Oucho
and Mukras, 1983), and if households in rural areas receive on average
what Abidjan's households remit out, income from remittances would
constitute nearly 11 percent of total rural incomes. In fact, reported
income from remittances constitutes less than one percent of rural
incomes. Analysis suggests that transfers of income into the household
have been underreported, and transfers occur between urban households as
well as between urban and rural households in the C6te d'Ivoire.
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2.3 Distribution of Welfare
The ability to monitor changes in the distribution of welfare in
an economy is a critical aspect of development planning. Economic and
social policy will inevitably affect different groups in different ways;
indeed, it is often the intention of policy to redress imbalances and
shift the burden of economic adjustments from one group to another.
Survey data can serve an important function in helping to identify the
poor and in assessing the impacts of policy interventions.
There is an extensive literature on what is the "best" measure of
welfare, focusing primarily on total income, per capita income, total
expenditures, or per capita expenditures. At present, a consumption-based
measure is preferred, both for theoretical and empirical reasons (for a
discussion of these issues, see Deaton, 1980). On theoretical grounds,
individuals derive utility from the consumption of goods, typically
measured in value terms as money metric utility. Liquidity plays a role
in shifting the timing of consumption; this year's income represents the
highest level of welfare an individual could attain if he/she were
completely liquidity constrained. Such an event is unlikely for most
households, however. "Young" households tend to dissave in early years
through borrowing, save in peak earning years, and then dissave again in
later years by consuming accumlated savings so as to maintain adequate
levels of consumption regardless of fluctuations in income. On pragmatic
grounds, it is easier to obtain good measures of household expenditures
than of income, as household may be reluctant to reveal information on
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income (which is tax liable), but be willing to do so for consumption
expenditures. Further, the typical recall period for adequate consumption
estimates is generally shorter than for income estimates due to
differences in timing and variability. Farmers, for example, may receive
income only when they harvest and sell their crops, although they purchase
foodstuffs and basic consumption needs throughout the year.
We analyze both the distribution of income and consumption
expenditures for the following reasons: (i) we wish to compare the
welfare implications of using alternative definitions of welfare and (ii)
the relative distributions will ultimately define the distribution of
residual saving. Analysts concerned with distributional issues typically
examine income and expenditure patterns by demographic (i.e., life cycle,
household size) and economic groupings (income or consumption
categories). In this section, we describe the distribution of both income
and consumption by quintiles (for each region) and deciles (for the
country as a whole). This analysis is rather brief as it is primarily
intended as background to the analysis of household saving behavior in
later chapters.
Composition and Distribution of Income and Expenditures
Table 2-10 presents a description of household income composition
by per capita income quintiles for Abidjan, other urban areas, and rural
areas. Note that Quintile 1 represents the poorest households, while
Quintile 5 represents the wealthiest. There are several important
lable 2-10
Qmposithmn of Rwehn1id Inrm In the eplic of (te d'Ivoire, by fi on
and Ber Qapita Irm q(nele Wtidn Fach RE!Pic I/
(apital
and
Interest
Income
1.2
5.5
17.9
6.8
10.0
Social
Security
Pensions, etc.
11.2
7.2
3.6
4.2
1.1
Other
Uneanied
Income
0.9
3.6
2.4
4.5
3.8
Private
Transfer
Payments
1.9
2.7
2.4
1.9
2.7
Inputed
Rent
5.9
6.0
5.2
3.5
2.2
Service
Flows
from
Ibrables
2.0
1.3
1.5
1.4
1.4
Total
Income
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
Other Urban Areas
Qidntile 1
Quintile 2
Qdntile 3
Quintile 4
Qdntile 5
Total
Rural Areas
Qdntile I
Quintile 2
Q.dntile 3
Qidntile 4
Qantile 5
Total
51.5
14.3
22.8
33.2
53.7
61.7
46.9
1.5
0.9
3.0
3.1
10.9
1.5
22.4
23.2
12.1
6.0
5.0
9.7
84.6
88.4
84.6
81.0
65.0
6.4 75.0
23.1
18.7
27.8
28.6
22.9
18.5
22.6
7.0
6.7
8.8
11.1
17.9
13.3
9.8
8.2
3.6
7.2
3.1
1.5
5.6
0.6
0.3
0.4
1.9
2.8
1.9
3.2
3.3
0.7
4.6
4.0
1.5
2.8
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.5
0.4
3.5 2.4 3.4
0.9
2.1
0.9
2.0
2.5
1.9
1.1
0.8
0.8
1.1
1.9
1.4
4.2
1.3
1.2
0.8
2.0
25.6
16.4
10.6
5.6
2.3
1.4 100.0
2.4
2.1
1.5
1.9
1.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1.0 7.8 1.7 100.0
2.6
1.1
1.0
0.6
0.4
0.7
2/ 2.6
1.5
0.9
0.7
0.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
- 0.9 100.0
N6tes: 1.
2.
Qdntile 1 is the lowest, Qdntile 5 is the highest income group.
tb imputations made for rural areas.
Source: CLSS Survey estimates.
Abidjan
Quintile
Qdntile
Quintile
1
2
3
Wage
Income
44.8
49.0
45.4
59.9
50.9
Quintile 4
Quintile 5
Ierm
Income
-0.7
0.7
-0.5
0.9
2.8
Nor-Farm
Family
Ehterprise
Income
32.8
24.0
22.1
16.8
25.1
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characteristics of income composition in the Cte d'Ivoire revealed in the
table. First, and perhaps most important, the share of wage income
increases with rising levels of per capita income, except for in the
highest quintile in Abidjan. This effect is most marked for households
residing outside of Abidjan (14.3 percent of income is derived from wages
in the lowest quintile in other urban areas, as compared to 61.7 percent
in the highest quintile, and a scant 1.5 percent of income is derived from
wages in the lowest rural quintile, as compared to 10.9 percent in the
highest quintile), but still apparent within Abidjan (44.8 percent in the
lowest quintile, and 59.9 percent in the second to the highest
quintile). There is a drop in the wage share for households in Abidjan's
highest income quintile, primarily due to the increasing importance of
income from (large) family enterprises as income levels rise.
Table 2-11 shows the composition of household income stratified
by consumption quintiles rather than income quintiles. If consumption is
indeed a better measure of long term welfare, then the estimates in this
table should be less sensitive to transitory shifts in income, and better
reflect the relationship between current income and welfare. Concerning
the role of wage income in welfare: not surprisingly, the effects noted
in Table 2-10 remain and in fact are strengthened by the new groupings;
clearly the share of wage income in total income rises as levels of
welfare rise, increasing from 38.1 percent of total income in the lowest
consumption quintile to 59.4 percent of income in Abidjan's highest
quintile, and 20.9 percent rising to 73.5 precent in the highest quintile
in other cities.
Table 2-11
cmositim of bmehold rme In the Ekeplic of (Zte d'lvoire, by egion md
ler Capifta Ebgenditure Qrindle Wthin Fach Wegon 1/
Abidjan
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Qiintile
Quintile
Wage Farm
Income Income
1
2
3
4
5
Total
Other Urban Areas
Qxintile 1
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Qidntile 5
Total
Rural Areas
Qtdntile 1
Quintile 2
Qintile 3
Quintile 4
Qintile 5
Total
38.1
43.8
44.9
55.4
59.4
51.5
20.9
31.8
29.0
55.7
73.7
46.9
1.8
4.1
5.8
8.7
8.2
1.0
0.5
0.5
-0.2
4.3
Non-Farm
Family
Ehterprise
Income
39.3
21.4
31.5
2.8
16.2
1.5 23.1
29.0
19.3
10.4
3.5
0.3
9.7
82.6
75.1
80.7
67.6
74.2
6.4 74.9
26.4
28.8
35.3
19.0
10.9
22.6
12.6
13.2
10.0
19.7
10.7
13.3
Capital
and
Interest
Income
5.2
15.1
9.6
13.3
6.0
9.8
4.2
3.7
5.1
7.5
5.6
5.6
0.1
1.0
1.1
1.0
4.3
1.9
Social
Security
lensions, etc.
5.9
9.5
3.2
1.0
1.4
Other
Unearned
Income
3.5
2.1
1.4
4.5
4.5
3.1 3.5
3.6
1.5
3.2
4.5
0.7
0.8
1.0
5.0
1.5
1.3
Private
Transfer
Payments
1.3
1.0
3.0
1.2
4.3
Service
Flows
Inputed from
Rent Durables
4.7
5.7
4.7
2.8
1.9
2.5 3.4 1.4 100.0
0.8
1.3
0.8
0.5
1.6
13.0
11.3
9.6
6.1
3.2
2.8 1.9 1.0 7.8 1.7 100.0
0.0
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.6
4.4
0.7
0.9
0.7
-- /1.0
0.7
0.6
0.8
0.6
1.4 0.7 - 0.9 100.0
Notes: 1. QSintile 1 is the lowest, Quintile 5 is the highest consunption group.
2. No imutations ude for rural areas.
Source: ClLSS Survey estimates.
Total
Income
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.9
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.9
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.5
2.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1.3
1.0
0.8
0.8
0.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
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Note the role of non-farm entrepreneurial earnings is curious in
Abidjan; according to Table 2-10, they consititute a major source of
income for the very poor (a 32.8 percent share at the lowest end of the
distribution) and for the relative rich (25.1 percent of income for the
upper 20 percent of the per capita income distribution). This suggests
two kinds of family enterprises -- small, one or two person operations
which yield relatively little cash revenues, and larger enterprises that
employ a number of workers outside the households as well as within. 2
Analysis of the family enterprise data bears this out; we find more food
sellers and petty traders at the lower end of the income distribution, and
much of the construction, large traders, and industry at the upper end.
Small enterprises operated by poor households tend also to have low
capital endowments and limited stocks.
Based on Table 2-10, the impact of non-farm family enterprise
income is rather different in regions outside Abidjan, particularly rural
areas. There, the share of income from family enterprises clearly
increases with increasing levels of income, likely indicating the
importance of labor diversification and the age-old adage that wealth
begets wealth. Farm households who diversify their labor portfolio are
clearly better off than those who do not. In other urban areas, family
enterprise income constitutes a small share of total income for the very
poor (income quintile 1, with a share of 18.7 percent) and the rich
2! Or, alternatively, the effect of measurement error which causes a
substantial understatement of net earnings from family enterprises.
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(income quintile 5, with a share of 18.5 percnet) and a large share for
the middle classes, averaging around 25 percent of total income.
Table 2-11 suggests a different story about the role of income
from non-farm family businesses in household welfare. In Abidjan and
other urban areas, the income shares tend to fall with increasing
expenditure levels, and are lowest in the highest expenditure quintiles
(16.4 percent and 11.4 percent for Abidjan and other urban areas,
respectively). Further, in rural areas the distribution of family
enterprise income shares are roughly equal across the welfare
(consumption) distribution. In all likelihood, this reflects the
transitory nature of most kinds of non-wage income in the Cote d'Ivoire.
If income from family enterprises has a significant transitory component,
then the correlation between consumption (a proxy for permanent income)
and family enterprise income would be less than the correlation in a
particular time period between household income and family enterprise
income. The relative stability of wage income shares across income and
consumption deciles lends credence to this explanation.
According to Tables 2-10 and 2-11, the share of income derived
from agriculture falls with increasing levels of income and consumption
expenditures in all regions outside Abidjan. Farm income likely has a
relatively high transitory component, although perhaps less than non-farm
self-employment income. We find some smoothing in the distribution of
farm income shares across rural consumption quintiles, which bears this
out.
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Table 2-12 collapses the information in Table 2-11 across
regions, showing the composition of income by per capita expenditure
decile for the country as a whole. Ignoring regional differences for the
moment, it is quite clear that the share of wage income in total private
income increases with total consumption expenditures (2.2 percent in the
lowest decile to 59.6 percent in the highest), the share of farm income
falls steadily, family enterprise income initially rises and then falls,
and rent and dividend income increases steadily with per capita
consumption levels (0.6 percent rising to 9.2 percent of total income).
Note however, that possible price differentials among regions prevent us
from making definitive statements regarding welfare and income composition
based on these statistics; however, initial estimates of regional price
indices (Glewwe, n.d.) show relatively little price variation across
regions.
A brief comment is in order regarding what we mean when we speak
of a "transitory" element in farm and business incomes. In a formal
sense, the designations "transitory" and "permanent" income were coined by
the group of so-called permanent income theorists headed by Friedman
(1957, see also Mayer, 1966, for a good overview of related theories and
relevant empirical work), in order to differentiate between the behavioral
response to long-run, stable components of income and to more variable
components. The marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income is
hypothesized to be much greater (in the strictest sense of the theory,
Table 2-12
Composition of Household Income In The Republic of 06te d'lvolre by Per Capita Expenditure Decile
Family Enterprise
I ncome
14.1
19.2
12.6
16.2
20.4
30.6
21.9
20.9
18.5
16.7
19.4
Rents and
Dividends
0.6
1.7
1.4
2.4
2.6
3.0
8.4
6.7
7.8
9.2
5.8
Social Security
Pensions, etc.
0.0
0.8
1.0
1.3
1.0
3.6
1.5
6.6
1.3
1.1
2.0
Other Unearned
income
0.6
0.6
5.0
0.7
1.1
1.9
3.1
1.6
2.4
3.4
2.3
Source: CItSS Survey estimates.
Wage
Income
2.2
5.6
6.5
17.2
21.0
19.2
26.2
38.5
46.2
59.6
33.7
Decile 1
Decile 2
Decile 3
Decile 4
Decile 5
Decile 6
Decile 7
Decile 8
Decile 9
Decile 10
Total
Agriculture
income
79.2
69.2
69.1
56.3
48.0
35.4
32.3
18.5
17.5
3.6
30.6
Transfer
Payments
1.3
0.7
1.0
0.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.3
1.2
2.8
1.4
Imputed
Rent
0.8
1.1
2.5
4.4
3.8
4.3
4.5
4.6
3.8
1.9
3.3
Annual Value
of Durables
1.2
1.0
0.9
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.3
1 .5
1.7
1.3
Total
Income
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
"
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converging to one) than the marginal propenisty to consume out of
transitory income (likewise in the strictest sense converging to zero).
Our use of the term transitory here encompasses a broader set of
issues than strict adherence to theory might indicate; a more rigorous
approach is described in the next chapter. For the present, we assume
that income from farm and non-farm family enterprises likely has a
consumption and an investment component. Farmers accrue farm profits and
ultimately plow (in a figurative sense) them back into the farm or other
family business through capital and land purchases. One expects similar
behavior on the part of small entrepreneurs -- the cash for investment
capital must come from somewhere, and credit is difficult to obtain and
costly in most West African countries. Thus, income from farm and non-
farm self-employment is likely to be less correlated with consumption than
wage income for two reasons; (i) inherent income variability, which leads
the household to save cash in times of plenty in anticipation of future
shortfalls, and possibly spend more than annual earnings alone might
indicate in times of relative scarcity and (ii) the role of self-
employment profits in expanding investment capital and ensuring adequate
levels of future liquidity.
As noted earlier, other sources of income constitute a fairly
small share of the total in the Cote d'Ivoire. Capital (rents) and
interest income appear evenly spread throughout mid-to-upper levels of
both income and consumption distributions, and transfers and remittances
constitute a slightly higher share of income for households at the lower
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end of the distribution living outside of Abidjan. Social security and
pension payments, whether grouped by current income or consumption
quintiles, constitute a larger share of total income for households at the
lower end of the relevant distributions. This likely reflects lifecycle
differences rather than primarily wealth, as only retired employees (who
we have already seen to be in the most wealthy segment of the population)
are eligible for social security and pension benefits.
Table 2-13 shows expenditure shares (computed as the mean of
individual household shares, as noted earlier) by expenditure quintiles,
for Abidjan, other urban areas, and rural areas. The most important
statistic in the table is the average budget share devoted to food
consumption, which falls steadily with rising incomes in Abidjan (47.5
percent decreasing to 28.1 percent) and other urban areas (49.4 percent
decreasing to 30.0 percent), but falls rather unevenly and much less in
absolute terms in the rural areas (67.9 percent decreasing to 57.7
percent). This provides yet another piece of evidence that households are
on average worse off in rural areas than in urban areas, and that the
difference between the poorest 20 percent of households and the wealthiest
is much greater in Abidjan and other cities than in the countryside.
Without adjustments for price differentials and availability of public
services, however, it is not possible to make definitive comparisons
between urban and rural households. Such adjustments are unfortunately
beyond the scope of the present work.
'nahle 2-13
(bposition of Ibusehld Incom in the N!public of (te dIvoire,
I legion and ler Capita fEpenditure Qdntle Within Fach Raglan 1/
lercent of Expenditure by Category
Food
Expenditures
Abidjan
Quintile 1 47.3%
Quintile 2 44.3
Qintile 3 40.2
Quintile 4 37.5
Quintile 5 29.2
Total 39.8
Other Urban Areas
Quintile 1 49.5
Quintile 2 45.5
Quintile 3 42.6
Quintile 4 40.5
Quintile 5 3).4
Total
Rural Areas
Quintile
Quintile
Qiintile
Quintile
Quintile
41.7
67.9
61.3
63.8
61.1
57.9
62.4
1
2
3
4
5
Total
Educatian
Expenditures
5.4%
4.8
4.2
3.5
3.1
4.2
3.0
3.3
2.4
2.9
1.4
2.6
2.1
2.9
2.6
2.7
2.3
2.5
Health Care
Expenditures
4.3%
4.4
5.2
4.7
3.9
4.5
4.7
4.5
4.9
4.4
3.9
4.5
4.8
4.9
4.6
4.6
5.4
4.9
Cost of Gross Transfer
Drables Payments
0.9 .
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.7
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.2
1.6
1.3
1.1
0.7
0.9
0.6
0.9
1.5%
3.1
3.6
3.5
4.9
3.3
0.8
1.4
1.8
2.7
6.6
2.6
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.7
2.5
1.3
Notes: 1. (intile 1 is
2. Includes both other urban areas.
Source: CUSS Survey estimates.
Housin
Costs
10.9 T/
8.6
9.3
10.8
16.0
11.1
15.4
14.0
13.3
13.5
15.0
14.2
0.1
0.8
0.3
0.6
1.3
0.6
Other
Household
Expenditures
29.5%
33.7
36.4
38.6
41.2
35.9
25.2
30.0
33.5
34.4
40.6
32.7
23.1
28.1
26.9
28.4
30.0
27.3
the lowest and Quintile 5 is the highest consunption group.
rents paid and an inputed annual value of housing services for home owners in Abidjan and
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Several other results in Table 2-13 deserve brief mention:
First, the share of education expenditures falls with increasing levels of
income, likely due in part to the high levels of public subsidies and
scholarships in the education sector. Health care expenditures fall
slightly with increasing levels of total expenditures, and transfer
payments tend to increase with rising levels of expenditures. For the
upper 20 percent of the urban welfare distribution, private transfers and
remittances make up a rather signficant share of expenditures -- 4.8
percent (or, an average of CFA 135,460 per household) in Abidjan, and 6.5
percent (an average of CFA 128,580 per household) in other urban areas.
This suggests that private transfers may play a significant role in
redistributing wealth in the economy. Interestingly, the cost of durables
is distributed rather evenly over households, with some slight increase in
shares for the very wealthiest households.
Cumulative Shares of Income and Consumption Expenditures
Table 2-14 shows average household income and consumption
expenditures by income and consumption deciles and the cumlative share in
each decile for the country as a whole. If these results are to be
believed, total expenditures is much more evenly distributed in the Cote
d'Ivoire than prior analyses would lead us to expect. Consider the first
panel in the table, which shows average income and consumption by income
deciles. Clearly income is much more unevenly distributed than
consumption expenditures, as intuition would suggest. In particular, the
bottom 20 percent of the per capita income distribution receives some 3.6
1hb1e 2-14
Dstrihetin of flbueld Tnr and Osumpmtion ExpeIditumes In 1he pu co (Bte d'Iwvire
by %er (hpita Tncme and Pepiuze ia=l1m 1
Per Capita IncAe Deciles
Average Anual
Average Anual amIntive Ombsumptions Cmulative
Income Share in Expenditures Siare in
(CFA) Decile (CFA) Decile
162,339
420,744
631,889
805,802
873,528
1,412,216
1,517,711
2,031,526
2,839,940
5,330,844
1,600,743
1.C%
3.6
7.6
12.6
18.1
26.9
36.3
49.0
66.7
100.0
736,615
785,395
1,087,679
1,147,582
1,305,554
1,546,240
1,682,859
1,%7,835
2,292,813
3,278,632
1,582,554
4.7%
9.6
16.5
23.7
32.0
41.7
52.4
64.8
79.3
100.0
Per (apita Expenditure Deciles
Average Annual
Average Anual mnulative (bnsumption (Xilative
Incae Share in Expenditures Siare in
(CFA) Decile (CFA) Docile
5%,664
807,082
1,020,302
1,065,524
1,177,594
1,601,438
1,531,848
1,973,441
2,444,464
3,795,199
1,600,743
3.7%
8.8
15.1
21.8
29.1
39.1
48.7
61.0
76.3
100.0
467,711
711,112
891,140
1,124,906
1,294,380
1,581,282
1,711,649
2,104,781
2,701,713
3,303,476
1,588,088
2.9
7.4
13.0
20.1
28.2
38.2
49.0
62.2
79.2
100.0
Notes: 1. Decile 1 is the lowest, Decile 10 is the highest income/expenditure group.
Source: CUSS Survey estimates.
Deocile
Dlcile
Decile
Decile
Decile
Docile
Decile
Docile
Decile
Decile
lbtal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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percent of income and accounts for 9.6 percent of total consumption
expenditures. The distribution between consumption and income evens out
somewhat towards the middle and upper end of the distribution --
households in the wealthiest decile receive a third of all income and
spend some 20 percent of the total spent on private consumption. If we
rank households by per capita consumption (the second panel in Table
2-14), we find a surprising degree of equality across the distributions.
Income is clearly more evenly distributed across expenditure deciles than
income deciles. We might expect this distributional effect if (i) incomes
are more variable than expenditures, and (ii) expenditures serve as a
proxy for long-run welfare. Households in the lower 20 percent of the
welfare (consumption) distribution receive some 8.8 percent of total
income and consume 7.4 percent of total private consumption. The lower 50
percent of the welfare distribution receives 29.1 percent of total income
and accounts for 28.2 percent of total expenditures. Finally, the upper
10 percent of the welfare distribution receives 23.7 percent of total
income and accounts for 20.8 percent of consumption expenditures in the
country, significantly less than the 33.3 percent of income received by
the highest income decile. Interestingly, at least some households at the
lower end of the expenditure distribution are rather substantial savers,
which could be explained by a number of factors: (i) basic thriftiness
amongst the poor, and a tendency to save against possible future income
shortfalls, which suggests that at least some households at the bottom of
the expenditure distribution are there through choice rather than purely
through necessity, and (ii) borrowing constraints, which particularly
constrain the consumption behavior of the poor. Note also that many of
69
these households are quite large; due to scale effects and possible
measurement error which is compounded by each additional household member,
not all households in the lowest decile may actually be "poor". These
issues will be discussed in greater detail later in the thesis. Note also
that households in the lowest income decile evidence substantial
dissavings, as one might expect if income has a substantial transitory
component.
There is no reason to assume that prices are the same across
regions, which is a necessary prior condition for interregional welfare
comparisons without price adjustment. Thus, measures in Table 2-13 must be
viewed with caution. Tables 2-15 and 2-16 present similar information to
that in 2-14, stratified by Abidjan, other urban areas, and rural areas.
There is certainly a greater likelihood that prices will be more constant
within the three regions, than between them.
Table 2-15 shows average income and expenditures by per capita
income quintile and region, while Table 2-16 shows similar averages by per
capita expenditure quintile and region. These tables suggest that the
degree of difference in average income for the highest and lowest deciles
in Table 2-14 is to a large extent caused by urban/rural differences in
income and consumption. For example, Table 2-16 shows that rural
households in the highest quintile earn on average CFA 1,452,483 per
household annually, while urban households in Abidjan's highest quintile
earn on average CFA 4,477,391 annually. This is a marked differences in
earnings, and is roughly paralleled by differences in expenditures. While
lable 2-15
GompositIom of Imbsehold Innme and nmptioln qwH dltunes In the Wp&11e of (Bte d'lvoire,
y Region ad ler Qipita bneme Qdndle Within Fach Wgion 1/
Average Anual
Income (CFA)
640,343
1,264,920
2,237,140
2,966,330
7,069,707
Omulative Siare
Income
4.5%
13.4
29.2
50.1
100.0
Average Aimual
(bnsumptions
Expenditures (CFA)
1,835,820
2,160,975
2,592,486
2,851,982
4,446,120
Cumulative Siare
in Quintiles
13.2%
25.2
47.4
68.0
100.0
Other Urban Areas
Qudntile 1
Quintile 2
Qiintile 3
Quintile 4
Qdntile 5
Rural Areas
Qdintile 1
Quintile 2
QAntile 3
Quintile 4
Quintile 5
Source: CILSS Survey estimates.
Quintile
Qintile
Quintile
Qdntile
Quintile
1
2
3
4
5
605,216
1,053,046
1,906,523
2,390,959
3,725,169
226,583
551,553
720,897
1,214,277
2,402,921
6.3%
17.1
36.8
61.5
100.0
4.4%
15.2
29.3
53.0
100.0
1,321,827
1,603,546
2,065,907
2,161,091
2,551,578
685,908
829,361
909,098
1,162,448
1,452,177
13.6%
30.1
51.4
73.7
100.0
13.6%
30.1
48.1
71.2
100.0
kctes: 1. Qiintile 1 is the lowest, Quintile 5 is the highest income/expenditure group.
lable 2-16
Distribution of busebldTm an (bInmcption Expditures in the Iepilc of (Zte d'Lvoire,
By Beglon and Per (hpita Etpenditure qdntile Wlthin Each Rgion 1/
Average Amual
Income (GFA)
1,451,715
1,979,245
2,325,277
3,906,122
4,477,391
1
2
3
4
5
Cumulative Share
Income
10.% M
24.3
40.7
68.3
100.0
Average Ainual
(bnsumptions
Expenditures (CFA)
1,613,095
2,282,652
2,768,962
3,271,974
3,943,192
Cunmlative Share
in quintiles
11.6%.
28.1
48.0
71.6
100.0
Other Urban Areas
Qiintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Qintile
1
2
3
4
5
Rural Areas
Qintile 1
Quintile 2
Qintile 3
Quintile 4
dilntile 5
1,160,178
1,623,799
1,821,558
2,707,282
2,354,657
553,502
923,676
1,003,775
1,179,332
1,452,483
Source: CILSS Survey estimates.
Abidjan
Quintile
Qintile
Quintile
Qintile
Qintile
12. 0%
28.8
47.6
75.6
100.0
10.8%
28.9
48.5
71.6
100.0
1,020,332
1,663,365
1,849,%1
2,481,917
2,777,339
472,188
775,788
1,036,956
1,188,936
1,589,518
10.4%
27.4
46.3
71.6
100.0
9.3%.
24.6
45.1
68.6
100.0
R)tes: 1. (pintile 1 is the lowest, (pintile 5 is the highest income/expenditure group.
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it is not possible to make definitive statements regarding the welfare gap
between urban and rural areas, the differences in the means are suggestive
of substantial differences in urban and rural welfare. Simple comparisons
of extremes suggest that while the disparity in income between the
wealthiest and poorest groups is greater in Abidjan than in rural
communities, the disparity in consumption expenditures or welfare is
greater in rural areas. A simple count of the number of households
reporting food budget shares greater than 80 percent (another standard
poverty indicator) lends further support; in Abidjan, none of the
households interviewed reported food budget shares of more than 80 percent
of the total value of consumption, and in other urban areas, only 1.2
percent of households reported food budget shares greater than 80
percent. In contrast, over 14 percent of rural households reported a
value of food consumption that constituted more than 80 percent of the
total value of consumption.
Table 2-17 shows gini-coefficient estimates for household income
and consumption expenditures. The gini coefficient is a commonly used
measure of inequality in studies of income and asset distribution. For
purposes of this study, we used Sen's (1973) definition of the gini
coefficient, which is
Gini = n+l _ (n+-i)x.
nn 2.i
where n is the sample size, x is the variable of interest, and y is its
estimated mean value. Note that households are ranked in ascending order
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Table 2-17
Gini Coefficients for Household Income and Consumption Expenditures,
By Region and Total Country
Income-Gini Expenditure-Gini
Abidjan .536 .354
Other Urban Areas .449 .347
Rural Areas .525 .379
Total Country .555 .433
Source: CILSS Survey estimates.
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of x. A coefficient of zero implies perfect equality while a measure of 1
implies perfect inequality. Anand (1983) has shown that computed values
of gini coefficients are the same, regardless of which of a variety of
numerical methods are used to estimate them.
As expected, the gini coefficients for income are substantively
higher than like coefficients for consumption expenditures. Further, the
gini coefficients for the country as a whole are typically higher
(particularly in the case of consumption) than region-specific values.
This high degree of between-region variation was also identified in Tables
2-15 and 2-16; income (and consumption) may well be more unequal between
regions than within regions. Note that the level of inequality tends to
be higher in Abidjan and in rural areas compared to other urban areas.
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3. HOUSEHOLD ASSETS AND EXPECTED INCOME
Household income represents returns to labor inputs and private
capital. Capital is held in the form of physical assets, financial
assets, and human assets, which include education and specific skills
(typically represented by work experience). Human assets may also include
less tangible items such as access to certain kinds of employment, credit
sources, or educational opportunities. Because of the importance of
assets in determining income flows, the first section of this chapter
describes the extent, composition, and distribution of (measurable)
private assets for households surveyed in the first year of the CILSS.
The intangibles, while possibly of considerable importance, cannot be
measured directly.
The description of asset holdings should serve as background to
household production function estimates described in the latter part of
the chapter. These estimates provide a means for estimating "expected"
(or, if you will, permanent) income levels given household labor inputs
and asset holdings. Measures of expected income are used in later
chapters to estimate permanent income-based consumption functions and to
characterize savers and dissavers in the economy -- if the high proportion
of dissavers typically found in household surveys in developing areas is
at least in part caused by high levels of transitory incomes, then
households with a large disparity between expected and current income
(e.g., households earning less in the survey year than time inputs and
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assets would lead one to expect) would be more likely to be dissaving, all
other things being equal, than a household with a comparatively small
disparity. Households with "negative disparities", that is, households
with current incomes above expected income levels, are more likely to be
saving.
Note that the measure of expected income derived in this chapter
suffers from a number of limitations, most imposed by data constraints; we
have only a single-year cross-section of data to work with. The estimates
are prone to two major sorts of error -- errors in measurement and lack of
temporal variability. Empirical results must be viewed in light of these
limitations. We do not feel that limitations imposed by data are
sufficient to seriously call into question the general findings of the
research. However, questions of data limitations and interpretation of
results are considered numerous times throughout the thesis.
3.1 Composition and Distribution of Household Assets
Physical assets are grouped into three major categories: (i)
personal assets, which include all private capital not directly used in
productive market activities, (ii) non-farm family enterprise assets,
which include capital used in non-farm self-employment activities, and
(iii) farm assets, which include all farm capital and land. Assets held
in the form of stocks of human capital are discussed later in the section.
Personal Assets. Subsumed under this category are jewelry
purchases over the past 12 months (admittedly, this is a flow rather than
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stock value; unfortunately, no measure of the gross value of jewelry owned
is available in the CILSS), total cash savings, the present value / of
all durables owned by the household, the present value of automobiles
owned, the estimated value of owned housing stocks 2 , and the household's
net debt position (money loaned out minus money borrowed). Country-wide,
the value of personal assets held in 1985 was reported to be some CFA
937,462; jewelry purchases accounted for 1 percent of the total, savings
for 23 percent, durables for 17 percent, automobiles for 16 percent,
housing stock for a substantial 47 percent, and debts for some -4 percent
of the total (overall, households in the CILSS were net debtors). Not
surprisingly, housing counted for nearly half of total personal assets
held.
Non-farm Family Enterprise Assets. These include unsold
inventories, buildings and land, business durables such as tools and
1/ Survey respondents were asked how much they would receive for each
durable item owned if they "were to sell it today."
2/ Data limitations required that we use an indirect method to estimate
the value of owned housing stock in Abidjan and other cities. The housing
stock in rural areas was attributed a zero asset value primarily due to
the lack of housing markets in these areas and even more severe data
constraints. In urban areas, we first obtained an imputed annual rental
value for the housing stock (see Annex I for details on how this was
done), and from this, assuming that rents represent a 12 percent return on
housing investments, imputed a capital value. Based on previous work (see
citations in Annex I), the 12 percent figure is likely low for poor
households (where rent-to-value ratios tend to be on a scale of 3-to-i or
4-to 1 in many cities of the developing world) and high for wealthier
households.
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equipment, and rental property. All values were reported in the
questionnaire except rental properties. For these, we had available only
an annual flow measure (e.g., income from property rented out). For
purposes of imputing capital values to rental stocks, we assumed that
reported rents represent a 25 percent annual return on the stocks. The
value is higher than that used for housing because (i) it is likely that
some of the rental capital is owned for speculative purposes and yields
high returns, and (ii) capital markets are imperfect and access is
limited, which means that capital can demand higher rents than under more
perfect market conditions. According to our survey, households own on
average CFA 761,827 in non-farm production capital; inventories account
for 3 percent, buildings and land used in production for some 7 percent,
tools, equipment, and machinery for 41 percent, and rental stocks for the
remaining 47 percent of total assets. The latter category could have been
included above in personal assets; however, it seemed more appropriate to
assume that rental stock is owned for productive purposes, that is, to
generate income, than as a personal asset used in the day-to-day
maintenance of household activities.
Farm Assets. These include land, stored crops 2", livestock,
handtools, and farm equipment. For the country as a whole, the average
value of farm assets per household was CFA 3,580,567. Land accounted for
3/ Crops in storage were measured in terms of the number of weeks they
would feed the household. Value estimates were derived by multiplying the
number of weeks by the cost of a week of consumption for the relevant food
category as reported in the expenditure section of the questionnaire.
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the vast majority of this; 95 percent of total farm assets were held in
the form of land I. The other categories account for roughly equal
shares of the remainder, with livestock having the highest share (1.5
percent) and farm equipment the lowest (.7 percent).
For the country as a whole, then, total physical and monetary
household assets are valued at CFA 5,264,821 per household, of which
personal assets comprise some 18 percent, non-farm business assets some 14
percent, and farm assets the remaining 68 percent. Average household
income is some CFA 1,600,000 per annum for the total country. Thus,
households in the C6te d'Ivoire maintain a stock of assets that is nearly
three and one-half times annual income, primarily tied up in farm land (65
percent), rental capital (7 percent), and a dwelling unit (8 percent).
Clearly the distribution of asset holdings will vary by region in
the COte d'Ivoire, depending on the spatial orientation of productive
activities. Table 3-1 shows composition of household assets for our
standard regional classifications, namely, Abidjan, other urban areas,
rural areas, and the country as a whole. In addition, averages are
computed for total households within appropriate regional categories and
for households in the lower 90 percent of the asset distribution; in
4/ Land was valued according to the households response to the question
"how much could you sell your land for today?" All but a few of the farm
households responded to this question. However, as nearly two-thirds of
farm households claimed they could not sell their land due to family,
social, or cultural constraints, one must wonder how land valuations were
made. The maximum "permitted" land value was assumed to be CFA 9,375,000
per hectare. Only a few households reported per hectare land value
greater than this, and were accordingly set to this limiting value.
Table 3-1
CMte dilvoire: Composition of Household Assets, By Region and Total
Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total Country
Type of Asset Total Lower 90% Total Lower 90% Total Lower 90% Total Lower 90%
Personal Assets (CFA)
Annual Jewellery purchases
Total personal savings
Present value of durables
Present value of automobiles
Estimated value of housing stock
Net debt position
Total
Non-Farm Family Enterprise Assets (CFA)
Unsold inventories
Value of buildings and land
Value of business durables
Value of rental property
Total
Farm Assets (CFA)
Estimated value of land holdings
Value of stored crops
Value of large livestock
Value of tools
Value of farm equipment
Total
Total Household Assets (CFA)
19,414
312,164
299,630
425,428
809,539
-163,370
1,702,805
23,484
30
1,228,032
1,064,751
2,301,631
317,136
131
16,189
3,227
1,240
337,923
13,968
123,684
183,678
187,186
746,246
-49,569
1,205,194
14,145
40
121,940
691,192
827,318
391,259
175
61
3,539
458
395,493
4,264,392 2,428,005
12,849
342,964
259,056
164,548
1,205,269
-64,992
1,964,694
54,295
26,434
164,049
528,410
773,188
1,410,245
9,606
33,639
24,183
5,635
1,483,308
9,807
331,418
223,740
108,815
1,335,434
6,674
2,015,889
57,671
18,380
148,964
290,202
515,207
1,403,246
10,234
37,511
26,542
6,360
1,483,892
4,221,190 4,014,998
5,459
125,449
73,918
49,666
17,792
272,283
15,281
85,630
27,383
57,965
185,990
5,319,900
71,674
80,142
51,308
41,191
5,564,216
5,164
115,521
72,013
37,715
23,375
253,788
13,876
77,050
17,071
38,145
146,142
5,177,271
71,830
78,827
50,959
35,766
5,414,652
6,022,488 5,814,582
10,010
211,551
161,476
154,365
438,564
-38,505
937,462
25,322
54,799
312,981
372,880
761,827
3,420,394
43,201
56,598
35,272
25,101
3,580,567
7,669
161,004
122,724
78,670
404,467
7,059
781,594
22,857
51,454
62,534
205,131
341,975
3,560,453
46,585
56,460
37,586
23,519
3,724,603
5,264,821 4,848,173
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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effect, the wealthiest households (in terms of total asset holdings) are
dropped from averages in the second column.
According to Table 3-1, households in Abidjan have assets valued
at an average of CFA 4,264,392 per household (for the total Abidjan
sample) and CFA 2,428,005 per household for those in the lower 90 percent
of the asset distribution; clearly, the distribution of assets is highly
skewed in the capital city. In terms of asset composition, some 40
percent of the total are personal assets, 8 percent agriculture assets,
and the remaining 52 percent non-farm business assets. The share of non-
farm business assets drops to 34 percent of the total for households in
the lower 90 percent of the asset distribution; some of the wealthiest
households evidently own a significant amount of production-related
capital.
Households in other urban areas have assets valued at CFA
4,221,190, which is roughly on a par with per household asset holdings in
Abidjan. Interestingly, deleting households in the upper 10 percent of
the asset distribution changes averages very little; the remaining
households report holding assets valued at an average of CFA 4,014,998 per
household, which suggests that assets are more evenly distributed in other
urban areas than in Abidjan. Some 46 percent of total assets are held in
the form of personal assets, 18 percent in non-farm business assets, and
the remaining 46 percent in farm capital, primarily land. These shares
clearly reflect an increasing orientation towards agriculture activities
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in lieu of non-farm enterprises as we move from Abidjan to the Cote
d'Ivoire's small and medium-sized cities and towns.
Households in rural areas report the highest asset levels on
average in the country (CFA 6,022,488), and land is the main component,
comprising some 88 percent of the total value. The remainder is split
evenly between personal assets and non-farm business assets. Note that
like households in urban areas outside Abidjan, rural households do not
evidence high skewedness in the distribution of assets. We return to
questions of distribution shortly.
First, there are several cross-regional differences worth noting
in Table 3-1. Most notably, the ratio of asset values to average incomes
is lowest in Abidjan (1.51) and clearly highest for rural households
(5.69). This is not surprising given the regional dispersion of
productive activities and the high degree of evident land intensiveness of
agriculture activities in the C6te d'Ivoire. One must view the capital
stock to flow ratio in rural areas with some caution, however; some two-
thirds of rural households cannot sell any of their major stock -- land --
which makes it an exceedingly illiquid asset. In addition, there is
little evidence that land is used as collateral for obtaining credit in
the Cote d'Ivoire. This may in part account for some of the high land
prices observed in the survey; the scarcity of land offered for sale may
artifically inflate market prices. However, rural households may tend to
maintain a smaller stock of liquid assets than their urban counterparts.
If we define liquid assets as (i) jewelry, (ii) savings, (iii) durables
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and automobiles, (iv) business inventories, and (v) stored crops, then
households in Abidjan have on average CFA 1,080,251 in liquid assets,
households in other urban areas have CFA 843,318, and rural households
have CFA 341,447. These absolute values are somewhat misleading: The
ratio of liquid assets to annual income in Abidjan is .38, in comparison
to .43 in other urban areas and .33 for rural households. Thus rural
households have high overall asset holdings, but a considerable proportion
of these tied up in very illiquid stocks. Interestingly, 46 percent of
total personal assets are in the form of cash savings in rural areas,
likely the most liquid of all kinds of household assets, in comparison to
only 18 percent in Abidjan and 17 percent in other urban areas.
It is often claimed that credit constraints seriously hamper
overall growth in developing countries. Estimates of the average net debt
position of Ivorian households lend some support to this view. For
example, households in Abidjan are heavily indebted in comparison to their
rural counterparts, particularly households in the upper 10 percent of the
asset distribution. In urban areas, wealthier (measured in asset
holdings) households are most indebted, which likely indicates that access
to credit is important in building up capital stocks. Further, households
in urban areas (including Abidjan) are more likely to be net debtors than
net creditors, clearly obtaining at least some funds from outside the
household sector. In comparison, rural households are net creditors on
average, which suggests that borrowing in rural areas is primarily within
the household sector. The CILSS includes a special section on borrowing
and lending which provides further evidence of urban/rural differences in
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credit activities. According to responses in this section, households in
Abidjan have outstanding debts of CFA 412,712 in contrast to outstanding
credits (money owed to them) of CFA 253,094 (they are net debtors);
households in other urban areas report outstanding debts of CFA 222,400
and credits of CFA 109,772 (likewise net debtors); and rural households
have net debts of CFA 37,067 in comparison to credits of CFA 55,237 --
they are in fact net creditors. (Note that this result may in part be
caused by rural sampling biases.) According to the survey, some 90
percent of rural households who borrowed money over the past 12 months
received loans from private individuals, in comparison to only 56 percent
of borrowing households in Abidjan. Clearly, the formal credit market is
neither extensive nor well-developed in the C6te d'Ivoire's rural areas.
To a great extent, regional classifications serve as proxies for
classification by the structure of production. For example, households in
rural areas have land assets because they are farmers, not because they
live in rural areas per se. Table 3-2 shows average asset levels per
household for five categories of households defined on the basis of
production attributes. These include: (i) households receiving all earned
income from wages, (ii) households receiving all earned income from on-
farm activities, (iii) household receiving all earned income from non-farm
self-employment or non-farm self-employment in conjunction with on-farm
activities, (iv) households receiving wages plus some form of self-
employment earned income, and (v) households receiving no earned income
5/from any source. -
5/ These are the same categories as are described in Chapter 1.
Table 3-2
C6te dlvore: Composition of Household Assets, By Income Source Category
Wage Income Farm Income Other Self-Employment Wage and Other No Earned
Only (N=260) Only (N=618) Income Only (N=407) Income (N=251) Income (N=27)
Personal Assets (CFA)
Annual jewellery purchases 22,141 4,718 9,282 12,365 3,417
Total personal savings 295,636 112,257 207,043 389,280 90,307
Durables and automobiles 789,044 96,732 302,709 411,203 85,704
Estimated value of housing stocks 423,328 115,372 625,962 896,583 900,044
Net debt position 
-298,198 24,943 30,688 -43,566 13,981
Total 1,231,952 354,023 1,175,685 1,665,866 1,093,454
Non-Farm Family Enterprise Assets (CFA)
Value of rental property 822,523 140,246 349,199 471,586 807,066
Business assets - - 1,435,320 120,753 -
Total 822,523 140,246 1,784,519 565,425 807,066
Farm Assets (CFA)
Estimated value of land holdings 4,019 5,402,820 3,669,498 2,042,241 0.0
Other farm assets 160 251,361 172,660 90,924 684.6
Total 4,179 5,657,181 3,842,158 2,133,164 684.6
Total Household Assets 2,058,655 6,151,451 6,802,361 4,267,638 1,901,205
Source: CItSS tabulations.
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The figures in this table bring out in a clearer way what was
evident in Table 3-1. Households who sell labor outside the household
(that is, do not own their means of production) have less physical assets
overall, and what assets they do own are different in composition than
evidenced by households that do not sell labor to outside capitalists.
From prior analyses, we know that wage-earning households receive high
incomes relative to others, and primarily reside in Abidjan. They own
substantial rental properties, durables and automobiles, jewelry, and have
much higher debts that households in other categories. In addition, they
have extensive savings, typically in formal savings institutions. In
contrast, households who receive earned income only from own-farm
agriculture activities have the bulk of their assets tied up in land, and
own very little else; they are an extreme version of the rural household
profile in Table 3-1. They are net creditors, have some savings (although
typically not in formal savings institutions), own some farm equipment and
tools, and seldom rent their property to others.
Households in the third category provide contrast to "pure" farm
households; they are, in combination with households in the fourth
category, the Cote d'Ivoire's entrepreneurs or petty capitalists. All
households that earn income from non-farm self-employment but do not
receive wages are in this category (including those that also receive farm
income). Their overall average asset levels are the highest amongst the
groupings; they own substantial amounts of land and substantial production
capital for non-farm family enterprises. In addition, their cash savings
are high compared to farm households, and they have invested extensively
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in housing. To characterize households in this category simply, they have
highly diversified asset portfolios. However, like households that only
receive income from farm activities, they are net creditors rather than
debtors.
Households in the fourth category are among the wealthiest (and
most diversified in terms of asset holdings) in our sample. They include
households who receive wage income and earned income from at least one
other source. The second source tends to be farm activities, although
some households also receive income from non-farm enterprises.
Interestingly, households in this category are net debtors, like those who
receive only wage income. This suggests some connection between having a
job outside the household (which means a steady source of income) and
borrowing, particularly borrowing from formal sources of credit outside
the household sector. Households in this category also have very high
levels of cash savings and are "heavily" invested in housing stock and
durables. Like other wage households, they own some rental stock and have
both business and farm capital -- in short, they have diversified their
asset portfolio in order to obtain income from various sources.
Only 27 households in a sample of 1564 did not receive earned
income in the 12 months preceding the CILSS. Although absolute numbers
are too few for extensive generalization, it appears that these households
own limited assets (with the exception of a dwelling unit and rental
stocks), and primarily subsist on rental income and public and private
transfer payments.
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Distribution of Assets
Gini coefficients were computed for various categories of
physical assets in the C6te d'Ivoire, and for "human assets", which are
defined in terms of years of formal education completed. Two measures of
the household-level stock of human assets are used; (i) aggregate years of
education across all household members aged 20 to 60 years old, and (ii)
years of education of the most educated person in the household in the
same age brackets. The first measure treats education as a sort of
aggregate stock that is augmented by each year acquired by a household
member. For example, a household with three persons each having 2 years
of education would have the same aggregate measure as a similarly sized
household with one member having six years of education and the other two
having none. The second measure treats education as a sort of household
public good having limited use within the household production process;
any one person can supply all required education inputs. Further, the
definition implicitly assumes that education is commensurate with
managerial ability and does not augment labor inputs directly. The second
measure is likely most appropriate in the analysis of self-producing
households, while the first measure might work best in analyzing
households who receive the bulk of their income from wage activities.
Past work has shown that a year of primary education typically
has different return than a year of secondary or tertiary education (for a
general review, see Psacharopolous, 1980). Accordingly, education was
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classified into three categories -- primary, secondary, and tertiary. 6
The education variables are measured in terms of years of schooling in the
relevant category. These variable definitions and classifications are
retained throughout the chapter.
Table 3-3 shows gini coefficients for selected asset categories
and education measures by region and country-wide totals. As suggested by
averages in Table 3-1, physical assets are much more highly concentrated
in Abidjan than in other regions; the gini coefficient for total assets
(excluding land and education) is .820 in Abidjan, .615 in other urban
areas, and .706 in rural areas. In contrast, and as expected given the
higher concentration of schools in urban areas, education tends to be less
highly concentrated in Abidjan than other regions; the gini coefficient
for the single individual, maximum education variable is only .227 for
primary schooling in Abidjan as compared to .715 for rural households, and
.515 for secondary education in Abidjan as compared to .927 for rural
households. The difference in the distribution of physical and human
assets in part reflects the higher dependence on wage income in urban
areas; many urban households sell labor and skills rather than goods they
produce. Returns to education are typically found to be highest in the
urban wage sector, and lowest in rural agriculture, although there is
still much debate on this subject. The household level production
6/ The Ivorian education system is similar to the French system. The
first 7 years of schooling are considered primary (JE, CP1, CP2, CEl, CE2,
CM1, CM2), the next 7 secondary (6E, 5E, 4E, 3E, 2E, 1RE, TER), and the
last 8 tertiary (Ul, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6, U7, U8).
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Table 3-3
Cbte d'Ivoire: Gini Coefficients for Selected Household Assets, By Region
Type of Asset Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total
Personal Assets
Total savings .852 .812 .839 .850
Value of durables and automobiles .752 .666 .798 .800
Value of housing .894 .709 - -
Non-Farm Family Enterprise Assets
Value of rental property .918 .939 .981 .963
Value of other business assets .988 .938 .988 .987
Farm Assets
Total land used .975 .816 .467 .651
Value of other agricultural assets .992 .844 .607 .745
Education
Total years of household members
- primary .458 .531 .686 .621
- secondary .609 .679 .917 .812
- tertiary .901 .959 - .972
Most educated person, 20-60 years old
- primary .227 .387 .715 .543
- secondary .515 .661 .927 .785
- tertiary .890 .959 - .968
Total assets, Excluding Land and
Education .820 .615 .706 .793
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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functions estimated for this research show significantly higher returns to
education for wage households than for farm households. However, rural
and urban entrepreneurs also evidenced quite substantial returns to
education investments.
The concentration of land holdings (measured in hectares per
household) is low in the C6te d'Ivoire's rural areas in comparison to
other LDC's. We estimated a gini coefficient of .467 for rural land, and
.607 for other agriculture assets in rural areas. Typical gini
coefficients for land distribution in other LDCs range from a low of .35
or .4 in some Southeast Asian countries to a high of .8 in parts of Latin
America.
Other gini coefficients indicate a high degree of concentration
of non-farm family enterprise assets and most personal assets. The
distribution of durables is less highly skewed than some other assets, but
an average gini coefficient of around .75 (by region) does not indicate a
notably even distribution of resources.
To summarize the findings in this section: most physical assets
are highly concentrated in the C6te d'Ivoire, with the possible exception
of rural land holdings and other farm capital. In contrast, human assets
(measured in terms of education) are not so highly concentrated,
particularly primary schooling in Abidjan. However, the distribution of
education is more skewed in rural areas than in urban areas, particularly
secondary and tertiary education. In fact, none of the 900 household
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sample of rural households reported a member over 20 years old having any
tertiary education. Note that education is somewhat concentrated in urban
areas outside of Abidjan, but not nearly to the degree evidenced in the
countryside.
3.3 Measuring Expected Income
If household income reflects the returns to household capital and
labor, then a basic model which relates levels of output (income) to
capital inputs and labor can be estimated to determine returns to various
input factors. Using this model, we hope to separate out returns to input
factors (which for convenience we call permanent income, although it is an
imperfect measure of "true" permanent income -- it might more
appropriately be labelled normal or expected income) from other (likely
transitory) income flows. Chapter 5 presents a general derivation of the
permanent income model. For present purposes, let us assume that current
income consists of a permanent component, call it yP, and a transitory
component, yt. Thus,
y = yP + yt (3.1)
Further, permanent (expected) income is produced according to some process
yP = f(LA) (3.2)
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where L represents households labor inputs and A represents production
capital measured in terms of household assets. This implies that
y = yP + yt = f(LA) + yt, (3.3)
so yt = y - f(L,A). (3.4)
What is the best model for permanent income? There are basically
two possibilities; a generalized household earnings function (similar to
those estimated in the labor supply literature), or a household production
function. The latter seems most appropriate in the present circumstances
for reasons of comparability with past work and adherence to theory.
There are numerous functional forms within the class of production
functions; we chose to estimate a modified Cobb-Douglas function rather
than one of the more flexible functional forms, again for reasons of
comparability and computational ease. Cobb-Douglas models have been used
extensively for this kind of household level analysis.
While it is clear how to introduce conventional measures of
household assets and labor into the model, it is less clear how to enter
human capital effects. Consider a Cobb-Douglas function of the standard
form
(a0 +6) a1 a
y = e L ('i A ) (3.5)
n n
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where L represents labor inputs,
Al,...,An represent household assets including land,
business and farm capital, and the like,
and e is a stochastic error term.
We could treat education as just another asset; however, it may be more
appropriately treated as a neutral factor, that is, one that enters the
model so as not to effect other output elasticities (see, for example,
Jamison and Lau, 1982, Moock, 1981). This implies a model of the general
form
y = g(E)f(L,A) (3.6)
where E represents human capital measured in terms of
education, and all other variables are as previously defined.
The relevant Cobb-Douglas specification for the general model is:
(a0 +E) a a n(a+ )E
y = e L (I A )e (3.7)
n n
The equation can be linearized by taking natural logs. Thus the
estimating equation becomes
iny = a + a ln L + E a In A + a E + e(
o 1 n n n n+l (3.8)
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In this specification, an+ 1  measures the percentage change in
output in response to a unit change in education, all other inputs held
constant, that is,
an+1 31n y/3E (3.9)
This is typically interpreted as a measure of returns to education.
The Cobb-Douglas model in (3.8) was used to develop a measure of
permanent or expected income. Clearly other specifications could have
been used. In particular, education might have been entered in the model
to affect shifts in the elasticities of other factor inputs. A simple
test of the neutrality hypothesis, which essentially just entails
introducing interaction effects into the basic model, is described at the
end of the section.
Consumption models analogous to the Cobb-Douglas production
models are also described in this section. Model structure and exogenous
variables are identical; total income has simply been replaced by
consumption on the left-hand side of the equation. The consumption
estimates provide a basis of comparison for the income estimates.
Estimation Results
Table 3-4 describes the variables used in the production
functions. All are measured in value terms (CFA) except land inputs
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Table 3-4
Description of Variables in Cobb-Douglas Production Functions
Annual Income
Business Assets
Personal Assets
Land Used
Other Farm Assets
Time Inputs:
Children
Men
Women
Experience of Head
Education
Men, Primary
Men, Secondary
Men, Tertiary
Women, Primary
Women, Secondary
Women, Tertiary
Total annual income net of annual production costs
Gross value of business assets including rental
capital
Value of savings and automobiles
Total land used measured in hectares
Value of farm assets net of land (tools,
equipment, crop in storage)
Estimated hours worked per year for children (less
that 15 years old)
Estimated hours worked per year for adult men
Estimated hours worked per year for adult women
Proxy for work experience, computed as (age-6-
years of schooling)
Years of education of most educated person (male
and female) 25-60 years old in the household,
entered as a spline variable in models:
Years of primary education, men, 25-60 years
Years of secondary education, men, 25-60 years
Years of tertiary education, men, 25-60 years
Years of primary education, women, 25-60 years
Years of secondary education, women, 25-60 years
Years of tertiary education, women, 25-60 years
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(hectares), labor inputs (estimated hours worked per year), experience of
the head of household (years), and education (years of education).
Education variables were described in the previous section; the second
measure, defined as the years of formal education of the most educated
person in the household aged 25 to 60 years, was used in household
production estimates.
Time Use and Education
Table 3-5 shows variable means for production/consumption
estimates, by region and production categories. While the asset variables
have been discussed previously, time and education variables appear here
for the first time and thus are accorded a brief description.
Regarding time use: it is generally difficult to measure
household time inputs in a conventional survey format, particularly for
farm and non-farm self-employment activities. First, there is a recall
problem; while a respondent may have a good idea of how he or she spent
his/her time today, and possibly yesterday and the day before, last week
or last month may not be remembered with much accuracy. The problem is
not severe if work patterns are roughly constant; for example, if the
respondent has a wage job and goes to work on a regular schedule.
Measurement problems are more severe, however, for work with seasonal
variation; farmers work many more hours around planting and harvesting
time than during slack periods. Time use is only reported over "the last
7 days" in the CILSS, which, while minimizing recall error, may yield time
use estimates that suffer from seasonal biases. While means are likely to
Table 3-5
Cbte d'lvoire: Variable Means for Household Production Function Estimates
Annual income (CFA)
Annual consumption expenditures (CFA)
Land used (ha)
Value of business assets (CFA)
Value of personal assets
(savings and automobile) (CFA)
Value of non-land agricultural assets
Annual hours worked
- children, <15 years
- Men, 15+ years
- Women, 15+ years
Years of experience (head of household)
Years of education (max. 25+ years old)
Males, primary
Males, secondary
Males, tertiary
Males, total years of education
Females, primary
Females, secondary
Females, tertiary
Females, total years of education
R e ins Household Production Categioriesg I _
Ab idjan
2,823,012
2,772,481
0.512
2,301,631
675,788
20,788
46.3
2462.5
1530.3
29.8
3.50
2.13
0.49
6.12
2.06
1.15
0.24
3.45
Other Urban
1,934,893
1,940,439
2.581
773,188
507,513
73,063
151.2
2949.9
1905.5
34.1
2.81
1.47
0.13
4.41
1.23
0.27
0.02
1.52
Rural
1,028,662
1,011,132
7.401
185,407
171,940
244,560
630.8
2854.9
2985.6
43.4
1.03
0.19
0.00
1.22
0.41
0.03
0.00
0.44
Wage Only
2,902,274
2,784,834
.011
822,523
693,830
161
13.6
2259.6
693.6
22.4
4.32
3.07
0.68
8.07
2.30
1.33
0.23
3.86
Agricultural Only
901,715
988,641
7.419
139,793
137,419
254,858
672.2
2867.7
2952.3
45.2
0.84
0.10
0.00
0.94
0.29
0.03
0.00
0.32
Self-Employment
On I y
1,496,964
1,429,640
5.60
975,424
359,907
172,749
389.5
2911.6
2928.8
41.4
1.41
0.38
0.02
1.81
0.82
0.14
0.02
0.98
Wage and Other
2,264,279
2,065,773
3.20
565,425
533,425
90,925
206.9
3236.8
2482.8
33.7
3.04
1.29
0.07
4.40
1.37
0.35
0.06
1.78
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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be unbiased estimates of annual values (assuming all seasons are
represented equally in the sampling cycle), time use variables will have
high variance, particularly for households reporting extensive farm and
other seasonally variable self-employment activities.
Regarding sample means of reported time use: rural children work
many more hours than their urban counterparts; children in Abidjan worked
an average of 46 hours annually per household, while those in rural areas
worked 631 hours per household (the average number of children per
household is 3.1 in Abidjan, and 3.9 in urban areas outside Abidjan and
rural areas, which slightly reduces differences on a per-child basis).
Child labor inputs are lowest for households who receive all earned income
from wages, and highest for farm households and households in the non-farm
or mixed self-employment category. Adult labor inputs, particularly those
of adult women, are significantly higher in rural areas than in urban
areas, and are likewise higher for households with high levels of self-
employment. For example, households in Abidjan report annual male labor
inputs of 2462 hours (1324 hours on average per male person, for a fifty
week average of 26 hours per person) while rural households report 2855
male hours per year (1622 hours on average per male person, for a fifty
week average of 32 hours per person). The contrast between women's time
inputs is more extreme; in Abidjan, women work some 1530 hours a year (805
hours per female person, 16 hours per week) in market activities (note
that this does not include work inside the home, which can be substantial)
while rural women work 2986 hours per year (1298 hours per female person,
26 hours per week). Like the case of children's time use, the urban/rural
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classification really reflects differences in the structure of production;
time inputs are lowest for households dependent on wages (who
predominately reside in the city) and highest for households dependent on
income from farm and non-farm family enterprises.
The experience-of-household-head variable in conjunction with
years of education indicates that urban households are (i) younger or (ii)
better educated (or both younger and better educated) than rural
counterparts. Means by production categories show that wage-earning
households are younger and/or better educated then households dependent on
self-employment income.
Similarly, means of education variables suggest that urban/wage
households are both younger and better educated than the typical rural
household. Overall years of education fall steadily for both men and
women, moving from Abidjan, 6.12 years (men) and 3.45 years (women), to
other urban areas, 4.41 years (men) and 1.52 years (women), to rural
areas, 1.22 years (men) and 0.44 years (women). According to category
classifications, households receiving all income from farm activities or
other self-employment report the lowest levels of education, while
households with at least one employee report the highest levels. Note the
negative correlation between education and time use; time inputs are
highest in households with low levels of education and lowest in
households with high educational achievement. Clearly time spent in
leisure activities increases with increasing implicit wage rates, or the
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income effect outstrips the price effect in household labor supply
decisions.
Production Functions
Table 3-6 presents parameter estimates of the basic household
production function for each of the three major regions in the Cote
d'Ivoire. For purposes of comparison, total consumption regressions are
presented as well. Note that time inputs are separated into adult male
and adult female categories (children's time inputs were not correlated
with household income in a statistically significant fashion, regardless
of model specification, and accordingly were dropped), and education is
likewise stratified by gender and level. Education is estimated as a
spline variable; for example, the "male, primary" coefficient represents
the returns to each year of primary education for men, while the "male,
secondary" variable is a similar estimate for each year of secondary
education. Thus the overall returns to education for an adult male,
living in an urban area outside Abidjan, who completed eight years of
education (6 years primary, 2 years secondary) is 61 percent -- 47 percent
(6*.079) for the first six years of primary education, and 14 percent
(2*.070) for two years of secondary education.
The model results are encouraging; the equations fit the data
reasonably well (R2 's range from .35 to .44) and parameters are generally
of the appropriate sign and magnitude. Somewhat surprisingly, given
measurement problems and the results of similar efforts in sub-Saharan
Africa (see, for
Table 3-6
CWte d'lvoire: Household Production Functions, By Region
Abidjan Other Urban Rural
Log (Inc.) Log (Expend.) Log (Inc.) Log (Expend.) Log (Inc.) Log (Expend.)
Physical Assets
Personal assets (CFA) .071 (5.9) .032 (6.1) .107 (6.3) .092 (7.9) .052 (5.3) .033 (5.8)
Non-farm business (CFA) .019 (1.7) -.003 (4.6) .125 (3.2) .011 (2.0) .044 (5.6) .020 (4.5)
Land holdings (CFA) 
.121 (0.9) .076 (1.4) -.024 (0.4) -.012 (0.3) .520 (8.6) .336 (9.7)
Other agricultural assets (CFA) 
-
- .033 (1.8) -.003 (0.3)
Time Inputs
Adult male (hours/year) 
.073 (3.4) .009 (0.9) .042 (2.1) .011 (0.8) .100 (5.1) .016 (1.4)
Adult female (hours/year) 
.038 (2.1) .007 (0.8) .052 (3.8) .002 (0.2) .069 (3.9) .019 (1.8)
Human Capital
Experience (age 6, education of head of household) .175 (1.3) .269 (4.7) -.003 (0.0) .197 (3.1) -.093 (1.0) -.009 (0.2)
Education (max. years completed, 25+ years old, spline)
- Male, 0-6 years (primary) .000 (0.0) .037 (2.8) .079 (3.6) .065 (4.4) .045 (2.3) .038 (3.4)
- Male, 7-13 years (secondary) .056 (1.6) .050 (3.3) .070 (2.5) 0.49 (2.6) .087 (2.3) .041 (1.8)
- Male, 14+ years (tertiary) 
.121 (2.2) .050 (2.1) .031 (0.4) .022 (0.4) - -
- Female, 0-6 years (primary) 
.074 (2.4) .038 (2.9) .039 (1.8) .048 (3.3) .036 (1.6) .048 (3.7)
- Female, 7-13 years (secondary) 
.045 (1.0) .038 (1.9) .028 (0.7) .013 (0.5) .068 (0.7) .065 (1.2)
- Female, 14+ years (tertiary) .029 (0.4) -.001 (0.0) .333 (1.4) .291 (1.8) --
Intercept 11.84 12.94 11.71 12.02 10.37 12.32
R 
.355 .451 .439 .464 .366 .331
- t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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example, Mueller, 1984), the coefficients on time inputs are significant
and positive for the income regressions, and tend to be insignificant and
positive for consumption regressions. This makes good sense; we expect
this year's income to be correlated with this years efforts (as measured
in time inputs), but not necessarily that this year's consumption be as
highly correlated with this year's efforts. Interestingly, we found that
the correlation between time and consumption levels was higher in rural
areas than in urban areas. This may be caused by rural liquidity
constraints which increase the correlation between current income and
consumption.
The actual magnitude of coefficients can be deceptive. For
example, the female time parameter is .038 in Abidjan and .069 in rural
areas. This does not necessarily mean that women produce twice as much
per unit of time in rural areas, but rather that the share of total output
accruing to women's labor (or the elasticity of output with respect to
women's labor) is higher in rural areas is higher than in Abidjan,
controlling for levels of education. The Cobb-Douglas specification
allows us to easily compute the marginal products of factor inputs. For
example, if L represents labor, A other assets, and a0 the model
intercept,
a a1 ny = a L (i A ) (3.10)o n
n
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then the marginal product of labor (MPL) is defined as
(3y/3L) = a a L 1 (7 A n) = a (y/L) (3.11)
o 1 n 1
Table 3-7 shows marginal products of labor by region in CFA per hour.
Implicit wages tend to be highest in Abidjan, and lowest in rural areas,
and higher for women than men in urban areas (although lower in rural
areas). Note that the MPL in Abidjan is significantly lower than the
average formal sector wage rate, which is some CFA 350 to CFA 400 per
hour. This may in part be due to the limited nature of the income measure
used -- it only represents monetary income, and not full income (e.g., the
value of leisure and work inside the household). However, the sizable gap
between actual wages and imputed household wage rates suggests that labor
markets are not perfect in the COte d'Ivoire, as in most developing
countries. Our analysis suggests that wages paid to employees are
significantly higher than the implicit wage for the urban self-employed.
A similar but lesser differential exists in rural areas of the
COte d'Ivoire, although the wage sector is too limited to obtain good
estimates of rural wage rates. A measure of typical daily wages for
agricultural laborers (by gender) was obtained from the CILSS community
questionnaires. If we assume a working day of 10 hours, average hourly
wages in agriculture are CFA 57.8 and CFA 48.5 for men and women,
respectively. These can be compared to estimated MPL's for men and women
in rural households of CFA 40.4 and CFA 22.3 respectively. Clearly
estimated wage differentials are lesser in rural areas than in urban
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Table 3-7
Cote d'Ivoire: Value of the Marginal Product of Labor, By Region
Adult Male Time Inputs
Adult Female Time Inputs
Source: CILSS tabulations.
Abidjan
(CFA)
83.7
Other Urban
(CFA)
27.5
70.1 52.8
Rural
(CFA)
36.0
23.8
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areas, which suggests that (i) our measure of rural income is closer to
full income than our measure of urban income, and/or (ii) the distribution
of wages is more skewed in Abidjan, and/or (iii) urban labor markets are
more "imperfect" than rural labor markets.
Returns to education are typically estimated from standard Mincer-
type earnings functions, which have the natural log of wages on the left
hand side of the equation and education, experience, and time inputs on the
right hand side. The unit of observation is the individual employee. Our
equations, estimated at a household level, yield lower estimates of the
returns to education than conventional individual-based earnings functions
(see van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1986) for the C6te d'Ivoire. There are
two reasons for this: First, earnings functions are typically estimated
for wage employees alone, as it is difficult to obtain individual wage
rates for farm and non-farm family enterprise workers. If labor markets do
not operate perfectly, payments to labor may be higher in certain sectors
than in others (for example, higher in the formal sector than in the
informal sector). Second, as noted in the previous paragraphs, the left-
hand side of the household level consumption function does not measure full
income -- the value of leisure and housework/childcare is omitted -- which
may downward bias the education coefficients. In essence, the left-hand
side variable in an earnings function is a closer approximation of
individual-level full income insofar as the model is only estimated over
individuals who have chosen to work and the reservation wage is assumed to
be the actual wage. In contrast, only income from market activities
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outside the household is included on the left-hand side of the household
production functions.
The full-income problem is not soluble within a household
production framework; any income imputation for housework and leisure time
will pre-define the very parameters we are attempting to estimate.
However, as a simple exercise, we estimated a more conventional production
function for non-farm family enterprises. The model is once again
specified as modified Cobb-Douglas, with gross revenues per household from
all family enterprises within the household on the left-hand side of the
equation, and family enterprise assets, variable inputs (both measured in
value terms), time inputs (total hours per year), and education (maximum
achieved by the most educated adult male and adult female working in a
household enterprise) on the right-hand side. The results of this model
are described in Table 3-8, which includes variable means and parameter
estimates. According to these estimates, the marginal product of labor
used for non-farm family enterprise activities is CFA 450 per hour
(controlling for education inputs), much more in line with reported average
wage rates, and education earns a return of.10.9 percent a year (computed
based on a model not described here that constrains education effects
across gender), likewise more in line with external estimates. It is
interesting to note that the returns to education for women are
significantly higher than returns for men in this sector. The difference
likely follows from the high levels of female participation in non-farm
family enterprise activities -- nearly two-thirds of the enterprises in our
sample were managed and primarily staffed by women. In particular, women
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Table 3-8
Cote d'Ivoire: Production Function and V15iable Means;
Non-Farm Family Enterprises "
Inputs
Business Capital
Other Annual Inputs
(utilities, wages, raw materials,
etc.)
Time Inputs (hours/year)
Human Capital (maximum education,
25+ years old)
Men
Women
Intercept
R 2
N of Cases
Dependent Variable
1/ t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
T
Parameters
.045 (3.9)
.398 (23.2)
.302 (9.2)
.053 (1.2)
.130 (2.6)
5.909 (24.7)
.704
520
Variable Means
541,751
2,846,451
2440
3.57
2.12
3,631,356
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dominated the informal food commerce sector, and controlled half of the
other commerce enterprises.
Returning to the full household level model: Past work has shown
returns to education to be highest for completion of primary school, and
to fall thereafter. According to our estimates, this is not the case in
Abidjan, nor, in rural areas for men, although it is generally the case
for women throughout the country. Annex Table 3.1 is shows similar
estimates to those in Table 3-6, but education is combined across
gender. Based on results in both tables, it is clear that a year of
secondary education (given, of course, that one has completed primary
school) generally elicits higher returns than a year of primary schooling
across all regions, and a year of university level education yields even a
higher payoff in Abidjan. These findings are consistent with van der
Gaag-Vijverberg's (1986) estimates within a conventional earnings function
framework.
Other variables in the model should be noted briefly. The
experience-of-household-head variable is not highly correlated with income
levels, although it is quite highly correlated with consumption levels.
Personal assets tend to influence output levels more than business assets,
and land is the dominant input factor in rural areas. In fact, the land
coefficient is large relative to other African rural productivity studies,
and rather more significant. This likely reflects the strength of cash
crop production (primarily coffee and cocoa) in the Cote d'Ivoire, and
relative homogeneity of cash crop cultivation techniques.
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Comparisons between income and consumption models are
enlightening; the parameters in the consumption models are generally lower
than those in income models, as might be expected given the hypothesized
relationship between "permanent" consumption and "permanent" income --
qp = yp + qt (see Chapter 5). Clearly if the marginal propensity to
consume out of permanent income is less than one, the value of the
consumption model parameters will be generally less than the value of
income model parameters. Most variables show similar effects across the
two models, with the exception of work experience (defined as age-
education-6), which has a significant and rather substantial effect on
consumption levels in urban areas (Abidjan and other urban), and time
inputs, which are significant in income equations and generally not
significant in consumption equations. The experience variable is likely
picking up life cycle and household size effects on consumption, which do
not directly impact income levels except through time input variables.
Tests of the Neutrality Hypothesis
A simple test is performed to determine whether education is
indeed factor neutral, that is, whether different levels of education
shift the output elasticities for selected physical inputs. In
particular, we are concerned about possible interaction effects between
labor inputs and schooling. Under the non-neutrality hypothesis, the
constant elasticity assumption is relaxed. The new form of the model
becomes (from 3.5)
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(a+e) (a +al1 nE) an(.2
y = e L (iA ) (3.12)
n n
which in log-linear form is
y = a + a lnL + a (ElnL) + Za InA + (3.13)0 1 n+1 n n n
New elasticities become
(y/L) = a1 + a 1 +n (E) (3.14)
which means that the change in income with respect to labor inputs is a
function of the estimated labor elasticity and the level of education in
the household.
Education-labor interaction variables were introduced for female
and male time inputs by the basic six education variables. The maintained
hypothesis is that the six added interaction variables do not
significantly change the explanatory power of the basic regional equations
described previously. F-tests performed on all three equations did not
allow us to reject the hypothesis of unchanged explanatory power at the 95
percent confidence level. 1/ Accordingly, the hypothesis of the factor
neutrality of education inputs seems empirically acceptable.
7/ Respective F-statistics are 1.3026 (df=6,312) for Abidjan, 1.4021
(df=6,311) for other urban areas, and 1.5268 (df=6,875) for rural
households. The critical value for the 95 percent confidence interval for
Abidjan and other urban areas is 2.13, and is 2.11 for rural areas.
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Production Functions by Sector
Household production functions were also estimated for the four
production categories used throughout the research. These results are
presented in Table 3-9. While similar to regionally-based estimates,
there are some notable differences between the sets of equations. First,
the coefficient for male time inputs is negative and insignificant for
households in the first two categories -- wage income only and farm income
only. In the case of the wage category, labor supply estimates for the
Cbte d'Ivoire have provided some evidence of a backward bending labor
supply curve in the wage sector (a stronger income than price effect in
labor supply decisions). Certain occupations (in particular, teachers,
some other government workers, and doctors) report high monthly earnings
and low time inputs. This creates a rather tenuous relationship between
hours worked and earnings when all wage earners are considered. The
insignificance of reported time inputs in generating farm income is common
in studies of this sort. It may be caused by two factors: (i) severe
problems in obtaining accurate measures of time inputs due to recall error
and seasonality effects, which would bias the coefficients downwards, and
(ii) the effect of sharecropping, prevalent amongst cash crop farmers,
which weakens the link between the farmer's efforts and his or her
realized output. Under sharecropping arrangements, the farmer gets a
fixed share of the crop regardless of his/her labor inputs into the
process. In contrast to variations in the level of significance of adult
male time inputs, women's efforts show a consistent, significant positive
Table 3-9
CWte d'lvolre: Household Production Functions: By Production Category
Business or
Wage Earnings Only Agricultural Earnings Only Business & Agricultural Wage & Self-Employment
(N=260) (N=618) Earnings (N=406) Earnings (N=250)
Log (Inc.) Log (Expend.) Log (Inc.) Log (Expend.) Log (Inc.) Log (Expend.) Log (Inc.) Log (Expend.)
Physical Assets
Personal assets (CFA) .055 (5.2) .012 (1.7) .040 (4.4) .009 (1.2) .072 (6.7) .051 (6.5) .042 (3.5) .032 (3.2)
Non-farm business (CFA) .036 (3.7) .004 (0.7) .035 (4.8) .025 (2.6) .053 (4.9) .034 (4.3) .049 (5.3) .032 (4.0)
Land holdings (CFA) - - .633 (12.1) .345 (8.6) .092 (1.8) .004 (0.1) -.016 (0.3) -.067 (1.5)
Other agricultural assets (CFA) - - .229 (7.3) .142 (5.9) - - -
Time Inputs
Adult male (hours/year) -.013 (0.5) -.058 (3.5) -.013 (0.8) .012 (0.8) .057 (3.1) .017 (1.2) .044 (1.5) .021 (0.8)
Adult female (hours/year) .031 (2.0) .012 (1.1) .031 (2.2) .020 (1.8) .062 (3.6) .012 (0.9) .027 (1.4) -.000 (0.1)
Human Capital
Experience (age 6, education of
head of household) .101 (1.1) .277 (4.5) .069 (0.8) .039 (0.5) .151 (1.3) .226 (2.7) .358 (3.4) .357 (3.9)
Education (max. years completed,
25+ years old, spline)
- Male, 0-6 years (primary) .072 (2.8) .079 (4.5) .040 (2.4) .038 (2.9) .019 (0.8) .044 (2.7) .077 (3.4) .067 (3.4)
- Male, 7-13 years (secondary) .085 (3.4) .072 (4.3) .043 (1.0) .039 (1.2) .105 (2.8) .047 (1.7) .075 (2.6) .060 (2.4)
- Male, 14+ years (tertiary) .078 (2.2) .051 (2.1) - - -. 513 (1.6) -. 096 (0.4) .238 (2.6) .113 (1.4)
- Female, 0-6 years (primary) .009 (0.4) .039 (2.6) .032 (1.4) .074 (4.3) .062 (2.7) .048 (2.8) .038 (1.7) .041 (2.1)
- Female, 7-13 years (secondary) .053 (1.7) .023 (1.1) .022 (0.3) -.029 (0.5) .009 (0.1) .040 (0.9) .060 (1.3) .061 (1.6)
- Female, 14+ years (tertiary) .009 (0.2) .010 (0.3) - - .514 (2.3) .231 (1.4) .079 (0.9) -.055 (0.7)
Intercept 12.70 13.24 8.46 10.78 10.90 11.93 11.15 11.94
R
2  
.546 .510 .466 .372 .337 .304 .478 .417
t-statistics are in parentheses.
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correlation with income levels across all sectors; further, output
elasticities vis-a-vis women's work time are roughly .03 for all sectors
except the non-farm/farm self-employment category. For this latter group,
which is dominated by female operated small businesses (predominately food
sellers and traders), the output elasticity is around .06.
The education parameters also show significant variation across
sectors; returns to formal education are clearly higher for households
participating in the wage sector (categories 1 and 4) than for farm
households, and possibly stronger (although variable) for households
dependent on income from self-employment activities outside (and inside)
the farm sector. Wage-earning households evidence returns to education of
roughly 8 percent a year, in contrast to farm households, where returns
appear to be about 4 percent a year for the first six years of schooling,
and not significantly different from zero thereafter. Households with
non-farm family enterprises exhibit minimal returns to male primary
education, and quite high returns (10.5 percent a year) to male secondary
education. In contrast, women's primary education shows a 6 percent
return, and women's tertiary education a 51 percent annual return for
households in the third category.
Concerning the relationship between income and consumption models
and education: With the exception of the non-farm self-employment sector,
income and consumption effects are much more similar in size than found in
the regionally segmented models. This suggests that the sectorally
segmented models may yield a higher correlation between consumption and
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permanent income than the region models, which implies a better estimate
of permanent income. Interestingly, women's secondary and tertiary
education has a stronger effect than primary education on output levels,
while women's primary education has a stronger effect on consumption
levels. This likely reflects the endogeneity of labor supply decisions in
determining permanent income and consumption levels.
Cbte delvoire:
ANNEX Table 3.1
Household Production Function for Urban/Rural Areas: Not Gender Segmented
Physical Assets
Personal assets (CFA)
Non-farm business (CFA)
Land holdings (ha)
Other agricultural assets (CFA)
Time Inputs
Adult male (hours/year)
Adult female (hours/year)
Human Capital
Education (max. years completed,
(20+ years old, spline)
0-6 years education
7-13 years education
14+ years education
Intercept
R2
1 t-statistics are in parentheses.
Abidjan
Log (Inc,)
.074 (6.2)
.023 (2.2)
.082 (0.6)
.074 (3.5)
.055 (3.1)
.025 (0.8)
.070 (2.2)
.147 (3.4)
12.36
.331
Log (Expend.)
.031 (5.7)
.005 (1.0)
.067 (1.1)
.018 (1.9)
.016 (2.0)
.037 (2.5)
.053 (3.5)
.053 (2.6)
13.77
.363
Other Urban
Log (Inc.)
.105 (6.2)
.026 (3.6)
-. 015 (0.3)
.054 (3.0)
.052 (3.9)
.093 (4.7)
.094 (3.7)
.071 (1.0)
11.58
.445
Log (Expend.)
.090 (7.6)
.015 (2.9)
.014 (0.4)
.018 (1.4)
.004 (0.5)
.071 (5.1)
.054 (3.0)
.019 (0.4)
12.62
.433
Rural
Log (Inc.)
.054 (5.5)
.043 (5.5)
.504 (8.5)
.032 (1.7)
.102 (5.3)
.069 (3.9)
.063 (3.8)
.089 (2.5)
10.02
.367
Log (Expend.)
.034
.020
.337
-. 004
(6.0)
(4.5)
(9.8)
(0.3)
.015 (1.3)
.020 (1.9)
.053 (5.5)
.047 (2.3)
12.28
.326
Source: CILSS tabulations.
I-.
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4. SAVINGS: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT
We use a single year cross-section of households from the C6te
d'Ivoire in this study, and so are limited by data availability in the way
we operationalize the study's savings concept. At best, we can provide an
estimate of household saving in the year of the survey (1985), based on
the measured residual between household income and consumption
expenditures. The accuracy of the estimate rests on the accuracy of both
income and expenditure estimates. Past work has shown that incomes are
difficult to measure in a standard survey format, particularly incomes
derived from farm and non-farm self-employment. In general, incomes are
underestimated in household surveys, which would tend to bias savings
estimates downward. However, efforts were made in the CILSS to measure
income as accurately as possible (and at a high level of
disaggregation). Note, however, that income from farm and non-farm self-
employment typically has a high transitory component, which will also
lower the correlation between current income and current expenditures in
any particular year.
Although we cannot have complete faith in the accuracy of
measured saving rates based on survey data, it should be possible to learn
something from them concerning the relative distribution of private
savings across sufficiently homogeneous segments of the population. For
example, past work has shown that farm income is measured with error, and
tends to be underreported, while the measurement of wage income is less
likely to be error-prone. If the underreporting is relatively consistent
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across farm households, then although actual saving rates will appear
unrealistically low, they will provide up with a means for comparing
relative propensities to save within each group. Thus, while claims such
as "employees save more than the self-employed" may be questionable given
our data sources, other sorts of claims such as "middle-aged farmers
evidence higher propensities to save than elderly farmers" are likely to
be more valid. In the former case, our classification variable is type of
income, which we suspect is measured with more or less error, depending on
its source. In the latter case, classification is effected through an
exogenous variable -- age of the individual -- and income source is
controlled for. In reality, many of the savings comparisons we present
will lie somewhere between these two extremes, and so must be interpreted
with care.
Note that household consumption may also be measured with error;
pride may cause poorer households to overstate consumption levels, while
caution causes wealthier households to understate said levels. Further,
it may be difficult to keep accurate accounts of consumption expenditures
in large households, and many in the C6te d'Ivoire are large in comparison
to Western standards. However, as with household income estimates, we can
only endeavor to use consumption estimates with care, and note carefully
where results may be reflecting measurement error rather than actual
economic behavior of households.
The first section of the chapter presents estimated residual
savings rates (computed as current income minus consumption, divided by
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current income) for households stratified by per capita income and
consumption deciles, and by age of the household head, main sources of
income (wage versus non-wage), and male labor availability. All estimates
are further stratified by the three major geograpic region (Abidjan, other
urban areas, and rural areas), as well as presented for the Cte d'Ivoire
in its entirety. These regional stratifications are used throughout the
research. In addition, estimates of the proportion of savers and
dissavers by per capita income and consumption deciles are described.
This section is closed by a description of food shares and income
composition by region and savings rates.
Due to data limitations, we cannot measure the possible extent of
reporting error in household income or consumption measures directly. We
can, however, estimate a general model of savings behavior that is
suggestive of the extent to which apparent savings (or dissavings) rates
are a product of measurement error. The model classifies households into
savings or dissavings categories using maximum likelihood techniques. It
also provide evidence concerning the applicability of the permanent income
hypothesis in the C6te d'Ivoire. The savings model and empirical results
are described in the second section of the chapter.
4.1 Household Saving Rates in the C6te d'Ivoire
Throughout this study, household savings are defined as the
difference between current income and consumption expenditures, and the
savings rate as the ratio of household savings to current income.
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Alternative measures such as the ratio of expenditures to income have been
used previously; however, measures of saving were chosen for reasons of
clarity and simplicity -- we might say, for example, that households in a
particular region save on average CFA 150,000 per annum out of an annual
income of CFA 2,000,000, with an implied savings rate of 7.5 percent (92.5
percent of current income is used for consumption purposes, and 7.5
percent is saved).
If we define savers as households reporting income greater than
1.025 times consumption expenditures, "light" dissavers as households
reporting income between .925 and .50 times consumption expenditures,
"heavy" dissavers reporting income less than .50 times consumption
expenditures, and the remainder as neither savers nor dissavers, some 35
percent of Ivorian households are identifed as savers in the CILSS, 59
percent as dissavers (22 percent light dissavers and 37 percent heavy
dissavers), and 6 percent as neither. These figures are in line with
previous survey findings (see, for example, Visaria, 1980). The
proportion of savers and dissavers varies significantly across different
subgroups in the population. Figure 4.1 shows the these relative
percentages by income and expenditure deciles for the total population.
Note that households who spend roughly what they earn in the current year
make up only a small percentage of households surveyed. They will not be
discussed in detail. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of households in
the lowest income deciles (96.4 percent in the lowest ten percent of the
income distribution, and 84.6 percent in the second decile) are
dissavers. In contrast, only slightly over a quarter of households in the
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Figure 4.1
Proportion of Savers By Per Capita Income
and Expenditure Deciles
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ninth decile and some 13 percent of households in the upper ten percent of
the income distribution report spending more than they earned in the
survey year.
The distribution of savers and dissavers by expenditure deciles
suggests that the likelihood of saving in a particular year has little to
do with relative levels of consumption, with the possible exception of
households at the very upper end of the expenditure distribution; these
households have a slightly higher proportion of savers than evidenced in
other expenditure groups. The lack of correlation between propensities to
save and level of total household expenditures lends credence to our (and
other's) hypothesis that consumption expenditures act as a proxy for
permanent income; if current income is inherently variable for most
households regardless of level of expenditures, and, if expenditures are
highly correlated with permanent income, then propensities to save or
dissave at a particular point in time should in general be independent of
permanent income levels.
There are, however, a number of factors which might affect the
relationship between long-run or permanent income and savings behavior in
the C6te d'Ivoire. The most important among these are (i) liquidity
constraints, which increase the correlation between current income and
consumption and decrease the correlation between permanent income and
consumption, and (ii) the necessity of (or indeed attractive returns
associated with) self-financing, which might decrease the correlation
between current income and consumption, particularly if future liquidity
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constraints are anticipated, and the household is not presently so
constrained. Table 4-1 shows the percentage of saving and dissaving
households by income and expenditure quintile and region (Abidjan, other
urban, rural). According to this table, "poor" households (in terms of
low expenditure levels) in Abidjan and to some extent other urban areas
are more likely to dissave than poor households in rural areas, likely due
to liquidity or credit constraints -- credit is generally more difficult
to obtain in rural areas, particularly to finance consumption
expenditures, than in urban areas. In addition, "rich" households (again,
in terms of high expenditure levels) are more likely to save in urban
areas than their rural counterparts. This is likely caused by relative
levels of wealth (there is greater income disparity in urban areas) and
income stability (a significant share of urban income is drawn from wages,
so the motive to self-invest is less apparent). It is important to note,
however, that examining savings and dissavings behavior per se does not
provide definitive evidence regarding the existence of liquidity
constraints in the population -- households are liquidity constrained only
if they would like to borrow and cannot. The higher proportion of
dissavers in urban areas (particularly Abidjan) merely suggests that it
may be easier to dissave in urban areas than in rural areas. A formal
test for liquidity constraints across regions is described in Chapter 6.
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Table 4-1
Percentage Savers and Dissavers by Income Quintile and Region
Quintile I Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total
EXPENDITURE QUINTILES
Abidjan
Savers
Equal
Dissavers
Other Urban Areas
Savers
Equal
Dissavers
Rural Areas
Savers
Equal
Dissavers
INCOME QUINTILES
Abidjan
Savers
Equal
Dissavers
Other Urban Areas
Savers
Equal
Dissavers
Rural Areas
Savers
Equal
Dissavers
31.8
6.1
62.1
37.9
4.5
57.6
41.0
3.4
55.6
3.0
1.5
95.5
3.0
1.5
95.5
6.7
0.6
92.7
25.8
9.1
65.1
37.9
9.1
53.0
30.3
4.5
65.2
10.6
4.5
84.9
18.2
9.1
72.7
17.4
3.4
79.2
19.4
9.0
71.6
40.3
9.0
50.7
29.8
8.4
61.8
23.9
11.9
64.2
43.3
10.4
46.3
26.4
8.4
65.2
37.9
6.1
56.1
51.5
4.5
44.0
36.0
7.3
56.7
47.0
12.1
40.9
63.6
6.1
30.3
46.1
10.7
43.2
Source: CILSS tabulations.
47.0
4.5
48.5
37.9
4.5
57.6
28.8
5.1
66.1
77.3
4.5
18.2
77.3
4.5
18.2
69.5
5.6
24.9
32.3
6.9
60.8
32.3
6.9
60.8
33.2
5.7
61.1
32.3
6.9
68.0
41.1
6.3
52.6
33.2
5.7
61.1
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Table 4-2 shows savings rates by per capita income and
expenditure deciles. Table 4-3 presents similar information by quintile
for each of the three regions in the Cbte d'Ivoire. Note that savings
rates are defined on the basis of group averages rather than the average
of individual rates, that is,
SAVEd = (z INCOMEi,d - EXPENDITURESi d)/Z INCOMEid (4.1)
ii ii ii
where: SAVE is the average savings rate,
i denotes households, and
d denotes deciles.
According to Table 4-2, households in the bottom 70 percent of
the income distribution dissave on average. According to the CILSS, the
overall savings rate in the population is 1 percent of annual income. In
all likelihood, the aggregate savings estimate is unrealistically low, for
reasons discussed earlier in the text. However, the fact that the lower
70 percent of the income distribution report negative savings rates is
consistent with numerous other studies of private savings behavior based
on survey data. For a long time, these results were interpreted to mean
that the poor (generally defined in terms of current income) did not
contribute to capital formation in developing economies. It is clear,
however, that current income is not a good measure of long-term well-
being. If we look instead at savings rates by per capita consumption
deciles, we find significantly less correlation between wealth and level
of household savings. According to Table 4-2, savers are grouped in the
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Table 4-2
Per Capita and Total Residual Savings Ratios
by Income and Consumption Deciles
Per Capita Income Per Capita Consumption
-3.54
-0.87
-0.72
-0.42
-0.49
-0.09
-0.11
0.03
0.19
0.38
0.01
0.21
0.12
0.12
-0.04
-0.08
0.01
-0.12
-0.07
-0.10
0.14
0.01
1 Defined as (Current Income
Source: CILSS tabulations.
- Consumption)/Current Income.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Decile
Decile
Decile
Decile
Decile
Decile
Decile
Decile
Decile
Decile
Total
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lower 30 percent as well as the upper 10 percent of the expenditure
distribution. The evident high propensity to save of the poor (defined in
terms of consumption levels) is a curious phenomena. It suggests that
there may be a number of households with a lesser "taste" for consumption
(or, alternatively, a stronger preference for saving); they evidently
prefer to consume at reletively low levels and save a significant share of
total income. However, one must be cautious in placing too much emphasis
on results that may be an artifice of the data or primarily caused by
measurement error.
In order to explore regional variations in savings rates,
estimates were made for each of the three regions by per capita income and
expenditure quintiles. These are presented in Table 4-3. Note that while
savings by income quintiles is fairly constant across regions,
expenditure-based savings rates vary rather substantially across
regions. In particular, the rate of household savings generally increases
with increasing levels of expenditures in Abidjan (although not so
dramatically as with increasing levels of income), while the rate of
household savings actually seems to fall with increasing levels of
consumption in rural areas. There are a number of possible reasons for
observed differences in savings rates, ranging from measurement problems
to real differences in economic behavior. In terms of measurement
problems: If the value of consumption of home produced goods is
understated, then measured levels of consumption for farm households may
be biased downwards, artificially inflating levels of savings in the
lowest quintiles. However, comparisons of consumption estimates from the
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Table 4-3
Residual Savings Ratios, by Quintile and Region
Income Quintiles Consumption Quintiles
Abidjan
Quintile 1 -1.87 -0.11
Quintile 2 -0.71 -0.15
Quintile 3 -0.16 -0.19
Quintile 4 0.04 0.16
Quintile 5 0.37 0.12
Other Urban Areas
Quintile 1 -1.18 0.12
Quintile 2 -0.52 -0.02
Quintile 3 -0.08 -0.03
Quintile 4 0.10 0.10
Quintile 5 0.32 -0.15
Rural Areas
Quintile 1 -2.02 0.15
Quintile 2 -0.50 0.16
Quintile 3 -0.23 -0.02
Quintile 4 0.04 0.00
Quintile 5 0.40 -0.09
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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CILSS with external sources indicate that CILSS estimates compare quite
favorably with other estimates for the survey year.
Mathematically, we would expect savings rates to fall with
consumption levels, which suggests that the relationship between savings
and consumption in Abidjan is more puzzling than that of households living
outside Abidjan. Some of the difference might be caused by differences in
souces of income and the structure of production between Abidjan and other
areas; the marginal propensity to consume out of total income is
significantly higher in Abidjan (where over half of total income is
derived from wage activities) than in outside of Abidjan, primarily due to
the necessity for many rural households to invest in own-production
activities. Differences in credit availability and interest rates may
also decrease the rate of savings exhibited by households at the lower end
of the consumption distribution. Households at the upper end of the
consumption distribution tend to live in Abidjan, are the wealthiest
households in the C6te d'Ivoire, and likely save for reasons of own and
outside investment.
Demographic Factors and Savings
Empirical research on savings and consumption behavior are often
based on the permanent income or lifecycle hypothesis. While different in
approach, the two generate very similar sets of hypothesis and empirical
models. We use a general lifecycle approach to examine additional
characteristics of savings behavior in the COte d'Ivoire. Stated
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simplistically, the life-cycle hypothesis predicts that savings will
follow a hump-shaped pattern over the life-cycle of a household. In early
years, earnings are low relative to future expected levels and asset
accumulation tends to be fairly minimal. At the household ages, earnings
increase to some maximum (empirical evidence has shown that earnings peak
between 45 and 55 years old) and begin to fall as the working adult(s) in
the household reach retirement age. Throughout this period, savings rates
are hypothesized to increase as the household accumulates assets to
finance consumption following retirement. In later years, savings rates
fall off steeply and for many households become negative as the household
lives off assets accumulated over the lifetime rather than income-
generating economic activities.
An implicit assumption of the life-cycle hypothesis is that
households are essentially nuclear -- that there is a generation of adult
workers who work for a period of time, accumulate assets, and later stop
working and live off the proceeds of past savings. Nuclear households are
the exception rather than the rule in many LDCs. In the C6te d'Ivoire,
for example, less than one-third of all households surveyed include no
more than a head, spouse(s), and their natural or adopted children. These
are classified as nuclear households. The remainder are laterally
extended (other relatives in parents or children's generation reside in
the household), horizontally extended (persons from other generations than
parents or children reside in the household, for example, grandparents or
grandchildren), or "fully" extended (both horizontal and lateral
extensions). The Cote d'Ivoire has a significant number of fully extended
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households and the relationships between people residing together are
complex and varied. Because of the complexity in household structure and
living patterns, as well as the existence of sometimes strong economic
links between sub-Saharan African households (Rempel and Lobdell, 1978,
Oucho and Mukras, 1983, Kaufman, 1982, Weisner, 1976), we may not find
clear evidence of life-cycle savings effects in the C6te d'Ivoire.
The best information we have to determine the vintage, if you
will, of Ivorian households is the age of the household head. Table 4-4
shows estimated savings rates by age of head head, for the country as a
whole and stratified by region. For the total country, households headed
by young individuals are clear dissavers (as the lifecycle theory might
lead us to expect). However, savings rates do not seem to be clearly
correlated with age in other age groups. The results are somewhat
different when dissaggregated by regions. In Abidjan, "young" households
are significant dissavers, "old" households are significant savers, and
the remainder show no clear pattern. Note that the high savings rates
evidenced by households in Abidjan headed by someone over 65 may be caused
by the titular nature of headship; out of courtesy to age and authority,
the eldest person in the household is often granted the title of head (and
indeed, control over many of the households resources), regardless of his
or her participation in economic activities. Savings patterns in urban
areas outside Abidjan are likewise undefinitive, except that "old"
households are clear dissavers. In contrast to those of other regions,
rural households show a savings pattern that is most suggestive of
hypothesized lifecycle effects -- savings rates of households headed by
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Table 4-4
Residual Savings Ratios, by Age of Head, Wage
Income Availability, and Male Labor Availability
Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total Country
Age of Head
5 24 years -0.37 0.13 -0.09 -0.12
25-34 years 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.04
35-44 years 0.00 -0.09 0.01 -0.02
45-54 years -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01
55-64 years -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03
> 65 years 0.39 -0.42 -0.04 0.02
Income Availability
Receive wage income? 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
No wage income -0.17 -0.14 0.01 -0.05
Labor Availability
No male in hh 15-64 years -0.50 -0.12 -0.15 -0.23
Male(s) in household 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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young individuals are lowest, rise gradually to reach a maximum for
households headed by an individual aged 55 to 64 years, and then once
again fall to become negative.
Table 4-5 shows residual savings ratios for nuclear and extended
households by the age of the household head. On a priori grounds, we
expect nuclear households to have higher saving rates. Reasons for this
include: (i) better income reporting due to the smaller number of
potential income sources, and (ii) risk adverse spending behavior --
extended families are often characterized by very diverse labor portfolios
that allow them to compensate for transitory shortfalls in income for one
member with another member's earnings. Evidence suggests, however, that
the expected savings pattern does not hold true in the Cote d'Ivoire;
according to our tabulations, nuclear households are consistent dissavers
across all age levels, while households with more extended memberships are
consistent savers. While it is not clear at this point why this might be,
it does seem that age of the head may not be a particularly good proxy for
household vintage or phase in family life cycle. Alternatively,
households in the Cte d'Ivoire may simply not organize their resources
according to the lifecycle hypothesis for a variety of reasons having to
do with imperfect markets, liquidity considerations, or social custom in
combination with economic factors.
The discussion up to this point is based on univariate rather
than multivariate analysis; certain of the apparent effects (for example,
high dissaving rates of nuclear households) may disappear when other
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Table 4-5
Residual Savings Ratios, by Household Structure
Age of Head Nuclear Households Extended Households
24 years -.47 .07
25-34 years -.02 .06
35-44 years -.16 .03
45-54 years -.10 .05
55-64 years -.07 .05
>65 years -.01 .03
Total -.10 .04
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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exogenous factors are controlled for. For example, if heads of nuclear
households tend to be older than heads of extended households, then what
appears to be a characteristic of nuclear households is in fact a
characteristic of "older" households. In such cases, the high levels of
dissaving evidenced by nuclear households will fall when the age of the
head is controlled for. Multivariate analysis of household savings
behavior is described later in the chapter. As a brief preview, the
positive relationship between having a nuclear structure and dissaving
does indeed disappear when other factors are controlled for.
Table 4-4 also shows savings rates by source of income (wage
recipient versus non-wage recipient households) and male labor
availability (the presence of at least one male person in the household
aged 15 to 64 years). According to our tabulations, households receiving
income from employment save significantly more than households receiving
only self-employment income. This may in part be caused by differential
errors in measurement; income from farm and non-farm self-employment is
typically underestimated in household surveys, regardless of the care
taken in measurement efforts and data tabulations. However, with few
exceptions, the wealthiest households in the CILSS derived most or all of
their income from employment activities, so that the apparent difference
in savings rates could in part reflect real differences associated with
levels of wealth.
Much has been said in recent years concerning the plight of
women-headed households in LDCs, and the disproportionate number of these
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households at the lower end of the income distribution. Headship is a
difficult concept to define, however, and, as mentioned earlier, may be as
much titular as effective (in terms of economic contribution to the
household unit). Accordingly, we used a slightly different concept of
effective headship rather than self-reported headship in examining the
economic behavior of women-headed households. All households having no
male between the ages of 15 and 64 were considered to be effectively
woman-headed so far as productive activities and income generation are
concerned. In total, some 12 percent of all households in the C6te
d'Ivoire are effectively women-headed (or male labor scarce). According
to Table 4-4, they dissave on average at a very high rate (23 percent of
total income) in comparison to other households, who evidence positive
savings rates of 3 percent of total income on average. Dissavings of male
labor scarce households are highest in Abidjan, and reletively equal in
other regions.
What explains this phenomena, and what does it suggest concerning
the economic well-being of male labor scarce households in the Cote
d'Ivoire? As no household can dissave consistantly over time, these
households must either be temporally suffering the absence of male labor,
or, receiving unreported income from outside sources. While both factors
may be affecting reported income levels, the latter may be more
important. An important policy finding falls out of this simple analysis;
while households that are effectively woman-headed may well be suffering
lower levels of welfare than their male-headed counterparts, using income
rather than consumption as a measure of welfare paints an even blacker
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picture of their quality of life than might actually be the case (although
a large share of these households are in the bottom third of the welfare
distribution as well as the bottom third of the income distribution).
Efforts should be made to determine real sources of income for these
households, the stability of the household structure, and the stability of
existing (but largely unknown) sources of income.
Income, Consumption, and Savings Rates
This section briefly presents selected income and expenditure
characteristics of Ivorian households by savings category. For purposes
of this analysis, we use six categories: (i) savers (households with
savings rates greater than 2.5 percent of total income); (ii) neither
savers nor dissavers (savings rates between 2.5 percent and -7.5); (iii)
"light" dissavers (savings rates between -7.5 percent and -50 percent);
(iv) "moderate" dissavers (savings rates between -50 and -100 percent);
(v) "heavy" dissavers (savings rates between -100 and -200 percent); and
(vii) "heaviest" dissavers (savings rates less than -200 percent). Note
that 35 percent of households spent less than they earned in the survey
year (were in category 1), 6 percent neither saved nor dissaved, 22
percent were light dissavers, 14 percent moderate dissavers, 13 percent
heavy dissavers, and the remaining 10 percent are in the heaviest
dissaving category.
Table 4-6 shows the average proportion of total expenditures
spent for food by savings category and region. If the permanent income
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Table 4-6
Food Shares, by Savings Group and Region in the C6te d'Ivoire
No. of Food Shares (percent
Cases of total expenditures)
Abidjan
Savings Rate >2.5% 109 35.2
-7.5 to 2.5 23 37.9
-50 to -7.5 67 39.6
-100 to -50 46 41.1
-200 to -100 47 46.7
<-200 41 43.2
Total 333 39.7
Other Urban
Savings Rate >2.5% 137 39.9
-7.5 to 2.5 21 37.7
-50 to -7.5 66 42.1
-100 to -50 33 41.2
-200 to -100 45 45.1
<-200 30 48.5
Total 332 41.7
Rural: Overall
Savings Rate >2.5% 301 60.2
-7.5 to 2.5 51 66.7
-50 to -7.5 215 67.3
-100 to -50 144 62.4
-200 to -100 113 60.1
<-200 71 58.6
Total 895 62.5
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hypothesis holds and no households are constrained satisfying consumption
needs by credit or liquidity constraints, then food shares should not
change systematically over the savings rate distribution. Interestingly,
food shares actually increase by some 10 percentage points in Abidjan as
the rate of dissaving increases, and increase by some 8 percentage points
in other urban areas. No discernible pattern is evidenced by rural
households.
What does the negative correlation between food shares and
savings rates in urban areas imply? The poor generally spend the bulk of
their income on food; as incomes rise, the food share falls. Thus a
higher proportion of income spent of food in general indicates a lower
level of overall welfare. The fact that food shares rise will levels of
dissaving suggests that the heaviest dissavers may be worse off than
households at the upper end of the savings distribution -- that in fact
"permanent" income levels are not realized by all households.
There are several other possible explanations for the correlation
between food shares and dissavings. First, the lower end of the savings
distribution may essentially consist of two types of households -- those
who are there due to transitory shortfalls in income and those who are in
some sense always there; a group of the hard-core poor, if you will, who
subsist through guile and the occasional generosity of family and
friends. The latter group will devote most available resources to food
consumption, while the former group's consumption behavior will not change
dramatically in comparison to consumption behavior in times of income
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excess. The combined effect between the two groups might well cause the
patterns in Table 4-6.
There is another possible explanation for the relationship
between food consumption patterns and savings behavior in Ivorian
cities: In times of income excess, households may be more likely to
purchase certain kinds of consumer goods (e.g., extra clothing,
entertainment, cosmetics and beauty aids), thereby reducing the share of
food costs in total expenditures. In times of income scarcity, however,
they may be less likely to purchase these goods, thereby raising food
shares. In short, the results in Table 4-6 might be in part caused by a
transitory income effect.
Why don't rural households seem to evidence the same savings/food
share correlations as urban households? Again, there are a number of
possible explanations. For example, rural households may be much poorer
than urban households and have stronger reasons to save for self-financing
(the vast majority of rural income is drawn from farm and non-farm self-
employment activities). Transitory excesses of income may be earmarked
for the farm or family business rather than frittered away on "luxury"
goods (i.e., less immediate necessities). Further, many rural households
obtain most of their earnings from tree crops such as coffee and cocoa,
which typically have three to five year gestation periods before newly
planted trees begin to bear fruit for market. In such case, relatively
large variations in income may be more typical (and thereby more easily
141
coped with by dint of appropriate planning) of the structure of production
in rural areas than the structure of production in urban areas.
Concerning the hard-core dissavers: If such a group exists, they
are far more likely to live in urban areas where opportunities for casual
employment are greater, land ownership (or lack thereof) is not a critical
determinate of income, and cultural norms may not be so rigid and likely
to exclude newcomers as in rural areas.
Table 4-7 shows selected components of income shares by savings
rate category and region. These results do not indicate a strong
relationship between earned income shares and savings rates, except for
savers and very heavy dissavers, both of whom draw a relatively large
proportion of total earnings from family enterprises. Unfortunately, we
suspect that this more likely indicates problems in measuring family
enterprise income than a strong correlation between levels of saving and
the share of income drawn from non-farm self-employment activities. Note
also that households reporting the highest savings rates in Abidjan
recieve a rather large share of income from family enterprises (some 26
percent of the total). Both effects (the positive and negetive
correlations) may be real rather than an artifice of the data; wealthy
households may be making significant profits from the businesses they
operate, while poor households may be struggling to acquire income from
very marginal enterprises. Unfortunately, it is not possible to judge the
strength of these findings given present data constraints.
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Table 4-7
Composition of Income By Saving Groups and Region in the C6te d'lvoire
No. of Wage Farm Family Ent. Private Rents & Pensions,
Cases Income Income Income Transfers Dividends Soc. Sec.
Abidjan
Savings Rate >2.5% 109 .50 .02 .26 .02 .11 .02
-7.5 to 2.5 23 .53 .02 .22 .01 .10 .04
-50 to -7.5 67 .52 -.01 .14 .03 .12 .06
-100 to -50 46 .57 .00 .20 .06 .03 .05
-200 to -100 47 .63 .01 .18 .02 .04 .03
<-200 41 .38 .00 .38 .06 .02 .06
Other Urban Areas
Savings Rate >2.5% 137 .51 .07 .26 .01 .05 .02
-7.5 to 2.5 21 .55 .14 .13 .01 .08 .01
-50 to -7.5 66 .44 .16 .13 .01 .04 .05
-100 to -50 33 .33 .11 .24 .01 .10 .03
-200 to -100 45 .27 .18 .17 .02 .06 .04
<-200 30 .19 .17 .26 .03 .01 .01
Rural Areas
Savings Rate >2.5% 301 .09 .68 .18 .00 .02 .00
-7.5 to 2.5 51 .05 .82 .10 .01 .00 .00
-50 to -7.5 215 .02 .89 .05 .01 .01 .00
-100 to -50 144 .03 .86 .05 .01 .01 .00
-200 to -100 113 .04 .82 .09 .02 .01 .00
<-200 71 .04 .70 .12 .04 .01 .00
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In contrast to households in Abidjan, households living in other
urban areas show a strong negative correlation between the share of income
from wages and savings rates. As savings rates fall, the share of income
acquired from farm and non-farm self-employment activities increases
dramatically. This is at least in part caused by the high variability of
self-employment income, and in part (possibly) by measurement error.
However, similar to Abidjan, households with the highest savings levels
receive a significant share of income (26 percent) from (formal) self-
employment activities.
The results for rural areas are consistent with those for urban
areas in that savers receive a larger share of self-employment income than
dissavers. An additional observation seems appropriate for rural areas,
viz., households with positive savings rates tend to have greater
diversification in earnings sources than dissavers, who are likely to
depend on farm and marginal non-farm self-employment activities.
Curiously, the pattern of heavy dissavers receiving relatively large
shares of total income from family enterprises is consistant across
regions. Upon reflection, it is not surprising that the relationship
between consumption and income would be most tenuous for households that
maintain businesses (both farm and non-farm) as profits must go to
maintain existing business capital and finance expansion as well as simply
to maintain the household.
Regarding other sources of income such as private transfer
payments, rents and dividends, and public transfer payments: heavy
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dissavers receive a higher share of income from private (and in Abidjan,
public) transfers than other groups. In addition, households with
positive savings rates in Abidjan tend to receive a substantially greater
share of rental income than do households in the heavier dissaving
categories.
4.2 A General Model of Savings Behavior
This section describes the empirical results derived from a
general model of savings behavior. The dependant variable in the model is
a qualitative measure of savings behavior based on the level of savings or
dissavings reported by the household. A wide variety of exogenous
variables are used to characterize households in specific savings (or
dissavings) groups within each region of the Cote d'Ivoire and for the
country as a whole. The models are estimated using maximum likelihood
techniques, and are formulated as multinomial logit (MNL) models.
Multinomial logit was chosen as the most tractable form when the dependent
variable is polytomous (multiple outcomes) rather than dicotomous (binary
outcomes).
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Derivation of the Model 1/
This section presents a very brief derivation of the MNL model.
It follows McFadden's general derivation of the so-called conditional
logit model. For a more extensive discussion, consult any of the general
texts cited in footnote (1).
In general, we assume that there is a relationship between some
underlying or latent response variable and a number of observed exogenous
variables, e.g.,
yi = f(xl, x2, ... , xn) (4.2)
where: yi is the underlying response variable for individual i,
and
xl, x2, '''' xn are exogenous variables.
Note that exogenous variables may be measured with respect to the
individual; however, for simplicity of exposition, individual specific
subscripts are not retained.
/ There is a small but growing literature on qualitative or discrete
choice models. Good general sources include seminal works of McFadden
(1973, 1976), Domencich and McFadden (1975), Ben-Akiva and Lerman
(1985), Train (1986), Hensher and Johnson (1981), and a recent text by
Maddala (1983).
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We do not typically observe the response variable. For example,
it could be (although it is not required to be) the level of indirect
utility or satisfaction that an individual obtains from a particular
situation. When confronted with a variety of situations (or outcomes)
denoted j (j=1,...,J), the individual is hypothesized to choose the one
that suits him or her best, or maximizes yi. While we can observe the
outcome of the decision, call it Y -i, we cannot observe the level of
satisfaction that the individual associates with that outcome, yi. The
outcome is necessarily introduced as a qualitative variable, which itself
becomes some function of the exogenous variables.
Y.,j = f(xl, x2' '''' Xn) (4.3)
Further, let us assume that
= if yi= max(y l,yi, 2 '''' i,J (4.4)
1,1 0 otherwise.
The indirect utility associated with each outcome is assumed to
have a known portion and a random portion, and the known portion can be
expressed as some parameterized function of the exogenous variables.
Y. . = a.X + e.(4.5)
1 9j j
The probability that an individual chooses a particular outcome is a
function of the probability that the utility associated with that outcome
is greater than the utility associated with any other outcome, e.g.,
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Pr(Y. . I =1X) = Pr(6.X+E. > a X+E , for all ked) (4.6)
or,
Pr(e k-. < 6.X - k X , for all keJ) (4.7)
If we assume the E's are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) Gumbel and the indirect utility function is linear in parameters,
then the model is multinomial logit. The probability that individual i
chooses outcome j out of the set J is defined as
(6.X)
Pr(Y. .=lIX) = e (4.8)
kEJ e(kX
If the e's were assumed to be i.i.d. normal, the model would be
multinomial probit. However, the multinomial probit is computationally
more complex and the expression for the probability that a particular
outcome is chosen cannot be derived in closed form. For simplicity, we
use the MNL form.
Although the above derivation follows McFadden's conditional
logit, it is not necessary to assume random utilities (or indeed utilities
at all) to obtain the same estimating equation (see Maddala, 1983). It is
only necessary to assume a linear-in-parameters probability function
having a known and an unknown or random portion. The assumption of random
utilities, or, the assumption of a very general function which
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discriminates between the characteristics of individuals based based on
the outcomes they have chosen is left to the discretion of the reader.
Model Estimation
For purposes of this exercise, we divide the sample into four
groups based on estimated savings rates: (i) savers (households with
savings rates greater than 2.5 percent of total income); (ii) neither
savers nor dissavers (savings rates between 2.5 percent and -7.5 percent
of income); (iii) light-to-moderate dissavers (savings rates between -7.5
percent and -50.0 percent of income); and (iv) heavy dissavers (savings
rates less than -50.0
rates may be measured
as a continuous varia
instead use estimated
categories. Thus the
and takes on a value
household falls into,
model is estimated to
of households in each
percent of income). Because we suspect that savings
with some error, we do not use the estimated savings
ble on the left-hand side of the equation, but
savings rates to construct qualitative savings
dependent variable is qualitative and categorical,
of one for the savings category (i) - (iv) that the
and zero otherwise. Using this variable, a MNL
characterize economic and demograpic characteristics
of the categories. If the estimation results make
sense and discriminating functions are fairly robust, it suggests that
measurement errors in savings may not be as serious a problem in the CILSS
(nor in this research) as we might have initially thought.
Table 4-8 shows the proportion of households in each of the four
savings categories by region and for the country as a whole. According to
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Table 4-8
Distribution of Savers and Dissavers in the C6te d'Ivoire,
by Region and Country Totals
Percent in Category
Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total Country
Savers (Savings Rate > 2.5%) 32.4 41.2 33.2 34.7
Neither (Savings Rate 6.9 6.3 5.7 6.1
-7.5 to 2.5%)
Light-to-Moderate Dissavers 20.2 19.9 24.2 22.4
(Savings Rate -50 to -7.5%)
Heavy Dissavers 40.5 32.6 36.9 36.8
(Savings Rate < -50%)
Total Households 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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this table, the proportion of savers is highest in urban areas outside
Abidjan (41.2 percent), and roughly equal in Abidjan (32.4 percent) and
rural areas (33.2 percent). The proportion of heavy dissavers is clearly
highest in Abidjan (40.5 percent) and lowest in other urban areas (32.6
percent). The high rate of dissaving in Abidjan may indicate that
households residing in the capital city have better access to sources of
credit and savings institutions than households residing outside the city.
For purposes of estimation, the second group (neither savers nor
dissavers) is dropped from the sample. These households constitute a
relatively small share of population (6.1 percent), and it is not clear
whether they should be categorized as savers or as dissavers -- potential
for mis-classification due to measurement error is high. However, we hope
that the majority of households classified as savers (group 1) are indeed
savers, and the majority classified as dissavers (groups 3 and 4) are
indeed dissavers.
A wide range of variables are included in the savings models.
These are described in Table 4-9. Means of those variables not previously
used in the permanent income models in Chapter 3 (see Table 3-5) are
presented in Table 4-10.
Perhaps the most interesting variable used in the models is a
measure of the shortfall (or surplus) in current income vis-a-vis
consumption needs of the household -- in effect, the difference between
permanent (or expected) income and current income. The larger this
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Table 4-9
Variables Used in Savings Models
Variable/Variable Type
Income Shortfalls
1. Current income shortfalls
2. Shortfalls due to illness
Potential Measurement Errors
1. Family enterprise income
2. Private transfer income
3. Private transfer expenditures
Description
in(expected income) -
in(current income)
no. days lost due to illness in
last 4 weeks (all hh members)
does hh receive money from non-
farm family enterprises?
does hh receive transfer income?
does hh remit income?
Value of Physical Assets and Cash Savings
1. Agriculture Assets value of agriculture assets
(mill. CFA)
2. Family Enterprise Assets value of business assets (mill. CFA)
3. Cash Savings value of cash savings (mill. CFA)
Education
1. Max. males education
2. Max. females education
Demographic Variables
1. Nuclear household
2. Male scare household
3. No. female children
4. No. male children
5. No. adult females
6. No. adult males
7. Age of household head
Regional Intercepts
1. Abidjan residents
2. Other urban area residents
years of education of best educated
adult male
years of education of best educated
adult female
is hh nuclear (head, spouse(s),
children of either or both)?
hh has no males 15-64 years old?
no. females 0-14 years old
no. males 0-14 years old
no. females 15 or greater years old
no. males 15 or greater years old
age in years of head of household
does hh reside in Abidjan?
does hh reside in other urban areas?
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Table 4-10
Selected Variable Means for Savers/Dissavers Indicator Function, by Region and Country Totals
Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total Country
Expected Income - Current Income (CFA) -572,583 -336,497 -193,925 -305,161
No. of working days lost due to illness in 10.9 14.8 20.5 17.2
last 4 weeks (total hh members)
Percent nuclear households 33.5 29.6 36.3 34.3
Percent hh with no prime working-aged 6.9 9.4 12.5 10.6
males (14-60 yrs)
Percent hh receiving private transfers 22.1 24.2 23.6 23.4
Percent hh sending private transfers 68.3 52.9 38.8 48.1
Age of hh head 41.7 44.5 50.3 47.3
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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difference, that is, the greater the shortfall in current income, the more
likely it should be that a household is dissaving (assuming problems with
measurement error are not severe). Several definitions of the variable
were used in early specifications of the models. The one that seems to
work best (and is retained here) is the difference between the natural log
(in) of estimated permanent income and the natural log of reported current
income. (Note that permanent income has been estimated from the permanent
income models described in Chapter 3.)
A measure of the total days of work lost over the past 4 weeks
due to illnesses of all household members is also included in the
models. We expect the number of sickdays to be positively correlated with
levels of dissaving -- the more illness in the household, the greater the
likelihood of unusually low levels of earnings, or income shortfalls. In
effect, illness is hypothesized to contribute to income shortfalls.
The previous variables introduce income shortfall effects into
the models. Other variables are used to control for the effects of
possible measurement error. In particular, a dummy variable for family
enterprise income (equal to 1 if the household receives income from a
family-operated enterprise and 0 otherwise) is introduced to control for
the possible underestimation of family enterprise income. If this income
is typically underestimated, we expect a positive correlation between the
level of dissaving and family enterprise earnings. We also hope that the
variable will control for measurement problems in estimating income
shortfall effects.
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It is often difficult to obtain good estimates of unearned
income, particularly private remittances and transfers. Income from these
"informal" sources has been found to be substantial and thereby important
in a number of sub-Saharan African countries, particularly for households
experiencing shortfalls in earned income. If transfer income is
underestimated (assuming that the incidence is not underreported) in the
CILSS, we expect a positive correlation between the likelihood of
dissaving and the availability of income transfers. This positive
correlation might also reflect a different aspect of the household
economy: If transfer networks function as informal credit markets,
households experiencing income shortfalls might be better able to dissave
if they have access to informal credit sources than if they do not. A
dummy variable is used in the models as an additional proxy for access to
informal credit (equal to 1 if the household makes a transfer payment and
0 otherwise), on the assumption that the simple fact of belonging to a
transfer network (indicated by receiving or remitting transfers)
represents access to informal credit markets, which would increase the
probability of dissaving when income shortfalls occur. Note also that
participants in transfer networks are likely to have less easily
identified household budgets and income sources (household membership may
not be well defined) and thus are more likely dissavers (assuming that it
is easier to identify expenditures than income) than households not
participating in transfer networks.
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Measures of the value of physical assets (family enterprise and
farm) and total cash savings are also included in the models. In general,
we expect assets to be negatively correlated with levels of dissaving;
households with high levels of business and farm assets likely receive
more income than households owning less assets, all other things being
equal. Cash savings serve as a proxy for liquid asset holdings; given
demographic and economic factors, a household which spends more than it
earns in a particular year is likely to have a smaller stock of liquid
assets at the end of that year than a household spending less than it
earns.
Education variables are introduced to control for differences in
so-called human assets. For reasons similar to those for physical assets,
we expect education to be negatively correlated with dissavings -- the
higher the level of education, the lower the probability of dissaving.
There is an additional reason to expect the negative correlation: Recall
that better educated individuals are more likely to work for wages or
operate large enterprises in the C6te d'Ivoire. As wage income is
generally less variable than income from other sources, we expect that
households wherein individuals have higher levels of education (and are
more likely to receive wages) will suffer less frequently from income
shortfalls and are thereby less likely to be dissavers (particularly
"heavy" dissavers).
A series of demographic variables are used to control for
differences in household size and structure, as well as lifecycle
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effects. Earlier bivariate tabulations show that nuclear households have
higher dissaving rates than non-nuclear households. We find this
surprising; one generally expects nuclear households to be more risk
adverse and have fewer working members than extended households, thereby
tending to decrease the likelihood of dissaving at any particular point in
time. At the very least, we would expect both nuclear and extended
households to have the same propensities to save For purpose of model
estimation, a dummy variable for nuclear households (equal to 1 if the
household is nuclear, and 0 otherwise) is introduced to determine whether
the nuclear effect on savings remains when other factors are controlled
for. In addition, a dummy variable is included for households without
prime working-aged male members (1 if the household has no male members
between the ages of 15 and 64, and 0 otherwise); on a priori grounds, we
expect these households to be dissavers.
Household size and composition effects enter the models through
four variables -- the number of female children, the number of male
children, the number of adult females, and the number of adult males in
the household. We have no a priori expectations regarding signs or
magnitudes of coefficients for these variables. In contrast, we include
the age of the household head in the models to attempt to control for
lifecycle effects. To the extent that it does (and to the extent that
some form of the lifecycle hypothesis holds in the C6te d'Ivoire), the age
of the head and the probability of dissaving should be positively
correlated.
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Empirical Results
Model results are presented in Table 4-11, by region and for the
country as a whole. The most notable finding in Table 4-11 is the strong
and very significant 2 correlation between our measure of income
shortfalls (the difference in the logs of permanent and current income)
and the probability of a household falling into one of the two dissavings
categories. Further, the income shortfall effect is significantly greater
for heavy dissavers than for light-to-moderate dissavers, which is exactly
what we would expect if some form of the permanent income hypothesis holds
in the Cbte d'Ivoire. These results indicate that households appeal to
some longer run concept of income when making consumption decisions.
Many of the other coefficients behave as expected -- ill health
(as measured by the number of work days lost due to illness) increases the
probability of dissaving in rural areas (although not noticably in urban
areas) and asset levels and education tend to be negetively correlated
with dissavings levels. The results are different across regions. In
Abidjan, for example, education coefficients are generally significant at
the 95 percent level, as are coefficients on business assets and cash
savings for the group of heavy dissavers. The number of years of
schooling for females has a particularly strong, negative effect on
2/ Note that the standard error is underestimated for this variable as
the measure is obtained from the permanent income equations. No
correction has been derived as yet to correct the standard error for
the predicted value from a regression model when used in a logit
equation.
Mhhle 4-11
tveWsh =er Tm. hdntor 1ouctim I/, by RhMr and (mbtry btals
(parnmeters estimted with respect tD savers 1be)
Abidjan
Light Dissavers Heavy Dissavers
Other Urban Areas Rural Areas
Light Dissavers Heavy Dissavers Light Dissavers Heavy Dissavers
Total (Muntry
Light Dissavers Heavy Dissavers
Household Resides in Abidjan?
fbusehold Resides in Other
Urban Areas?
loge Expected Income -
loge Current Income
No. of working days lost due to
illness in last 4 weeks
(all household members)
Receive Income from Norn-farm
Family Rterprise
Receive private transfer payments?
Make private transfer payments?
Total Value of Agriculture Assets
(000 000 CFA)
Total Value of business Assets
(000 000 (WA)
Total Cash Savings (000 000 CFA)
Max. yrs education, male hh mneber
Max. yrs education, female hh
--- 
- .739 (3.0) 1.428 (4.9)
-- - - .182 (0.9) .333 (1.6)
1.045 (3.1) 2.641 (7.1) 2.023 (5.6) 3.561 (8.3) .674 (4.6) 1.866 (11.3) .894 (7.4) 2.151 (16.0)
-. 013 (1.0) .015 (1.2) -. 007 (0.7) -. 006 (0.6) .011 (2.4) .011 (2.4) .006 (1.6) .009 (2.5)
-1.511 (3.4) -1.342 (3.1) -1.442 (3.6) -1.474 (3.5) -1.125 (4.9) -1.036 (4.7) -1.064 (6.4) -. 885 (5.4)
.534
.053
.154
-. 125
-. 118
-. 079
-. 069
member
household is nuclear? .189
Household has no prime working-aged .007
males?
No. females 0-14 yrs old
No. males 0-14 yrs old
No. females 15 yrs old
No. Males 15+ yrs old
Age of household head
Intercept
Ing-likelihood (zero slopes)
LAg-likelihood at convergence
Chi-squared statistic
.318
-. 077
.087
-. 089
.060
(1.2)
(0.1)
(1.2)
.540
.458
.097
(1.1)
(1.1)
(0.7)
(1.7) -. 550 (2.7)
(0.7)
(2.0)
(1.7)
(0.4)
(0.0)
(2.2)
(0.5)
(0.5)
(0.6)
(3.0)
.529 (1.4) .174 (0.4) -. 249 (1.0) -. 113 (0.5) .079 (0.5) .080 (0.5)
.101 (0.3) .919 (2.2) .133 (0.6) .222 (1.1) .013 (0.1) .213 (1.4)
-. 015 (0.5) -. 025 (0.6) -. 013 (1.2) -. 010 (1.0) -. 020 (2.1) -. 013 (0.5)
-. 064 (0.7) -. 300 (1.5) -. 191 (0.5) .016 (0.3)
-4.339 (3.8) -. 171 (0.6) .033 (0.4)
-. 047 (1.1) -. 076 (1.9) -. 146 (3.1)
-. 170 (3.4) -. 081 (1.5) -. 241 (3.0)
-2.366 (2.9) -1.308 (2.3)
-. 078 (1.8) -. 057 (1.4)
.024 (0.3) .053 (0.8)
-. 055 (1.3) -. 219 (2.3)
-.193 (0.4) -.108 (m.)
-. 073 (3.6) -. 096 (4.6)
-. 051 (2.0) -. 136 (4.7)
.569 (1.2) .451 (1.0) -. 210 (0.4) -. 045 (0.2) .063 (0.3) .059 (0.3) .095 (0.5)
.718 (0.8) .571 (0.8) 1.272 (1.5) -. 137 (0.4) .527 (1.5) -. 126 (0.4) .483 (1.7)
.407
-. 168
.141
-. 238
.052
-1.486 (1.5) -. 534
-326.9
-215.9
221.81
(2.7)
(1.1)
(0.7)
(1.5)
(2.5)
(0.5)
-. 001
.024
.314
.015
.002
(0.0)
(0.2)
(2.4)
(0.1)
(0.1)
.159 (1.5)
.222 (1.9)
-. 077 (0.5)
.016 (0.1)
.047 (2.6)
-. 130 (0.1) -1.603
-328.0
-223.3
209.39
(1.6)
-. 084
.020
-. 019
-. 019
-. 002
(1.3)
(0.3)
(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.3)
.017
-. 092
-. 042
-. 165
-. 006
.700 (1.5) 1.194
-908.1
-749.8
316.60
(0.3)
(1.5)
(0.5)
(1.6)
(0.8)
(2.6)
-. 036
.022
.056
-. 035
.007
(0.8)
(0.5)
(1.0)
(0.5)
(1.0)
.080
-. 024
-. 041
-. 101
.008
(1.7)
(0.5)
(0.7)
(1.4)
(1.3)
-. 021 (0.1) .096 (0.3)
-1568.3
-1265.7
605.17
'U
Notes:
Y t-statistics are In parentheses.
Categories of Dependent Variable
Savings rate - current income - expenditures
current income
(1) Savers are defined as all households reporting a savings rate greater than 2.5 percent.
(2) Light dissavers are defined as all households reporting a savings rate less than -7.5 percent and greater than -50 percent.
(3) Heavy dissavers are defined as all households reporting a savings rate less than -50 percent (e.g., households spending at least half again as much as they earn).
Variables
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dissavings levels in urban areas. In contrast, education has a less
significant discriminating effect in rural areas, as is also the case for
the value of business and farm capital. Increased levels of cash savings
do, however, significantly decrease the probability of dissaving in rural
areas.
Several other results deserve brief mention: First, income
transfers seldom have much effect in discriminating between savers and
dissavers, with the exception of transfers out (!) on the probability of
being in the heavy dissaver category. This suggests that it is difficult
to identify discrete domestic budgetary units in the Cote d'Ivoire, and
that a great deal of informal resource exchanges occur. Second, all
things being equal, households receiving non-farm family enterprise income
are far less likely to be dissaving than households not receiving family
enterprise income. Third, nuclear households are no more likely to be
dissaving than non-nuclear households when other demographic and economic
factors are controlled for. "Male-scarce" households are, however,
somewhat more likely to be dissaving than others, particularly in areas
outside of Abidjan. Finally, the probability of dissaving tends to
increase with the age of the household head in urban areas, while there is
no significant effect for households residing in the countryside. In
short, there is some evidence of lifecycle effects occuring in urban
areas.
In general, all of the models have good discriminatory power, as
evidenced by chi-squared statistics and the values of the likelihood
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function at convergence. This, in combination with the intuitively
appealing signs and magnitudes of model coefficients lead us to believe
that a significant share of households in the C6te d'Ivoire are in fact
spending more than they earn in the survey year -- that calculated levels
of dissaving are at least indicative of actual levels in the country. It
further appears that many dissavers are experiencing transitory shortfalls
in income, which suggests that households dissaving this year may not be
dissaving next year. Availability of the CILSS panel data will allow us
to examine this issue more directly over the upcoming months. Finally,
although our results are consistant with there being a group of hard-core
poor who always consume more in value terms than the little they earn,
there is no way of testing for the existence of such a group within the
confines of data availability and model specification. We made an effort
in the CILSS to measure all sources of earned and unearned income; to the
extent that we were successful (and many of the results described in this
research suggest that we were more successful than is generally the case),
we would not expect to find households who are typically spending more
than they "earn" (when "earn" is defined so as to include both earned and
unearned income). What would be useful to examine, however, are the
living conditions of household who primarily depend on unearned income to
satisfy consumption needs. These households may well form a group of
hard-core poor who have little control over resources and virtually no way
to increase welfare levels.
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5. CONSUMPTION AND SAVINGS BEHAVIOR
The traditional or Keynesian consumption function is based on two
key assumptions: (i) current income is the relevant concept in examining
savings and consumption behavior, and (ii) the share of current income
devoted to consumption (or, the average propensity to consume) declines
with increasing levels of income. The consumption models described in the
first section of this chapter reflect these assumptions. More recently, a
host of competing theories have arisen, which are generally subsumed under
the rubric of permanent income-lifecycle theories (Friedman, 1957,
Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954). This more recent work shifts the relevant
income concept from current to so-called permanent income, and assumes a
strict proportionality between permanent income and permanent
consumption. The new theories have spawned a host of tests and counter
tests of empirical validity, most generally supporting the first
assumption -- that permanent income is a stronger determinate of
consumption than current income -- and not supporting the hypothesis of
strict proportionality between permanent income and permanent
consumption. (Note that the strict form of Friedman's permanent income
theory predicts a MPC equal to one for the permanent component of income,
and a MPC of zero for the transitory component). Consumption models based
on permanent or expected income are presented in the latter half of the
chapter. These are preceeded by a brief discussion of the permanent
income hypothesis.
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Clearly, the notion that consumers have a sense of long term
income expectations when determining today's consumption levels has
intuitive appeal; for many individuals, income admits of a high degree of
temporal variability, and, in a period of relative scarcity (for example,
when coffee or cocoa has been planted recently), the knowledge that income
levels will shortly rise (the trees begin to bear fruit three to four year
after initial planting) is sufficient to maintain consumption at levels
above those dictated strictly by current income. However, permanent
income is clearly difficult to measure from the analyst's perspective, and
perhaps equally difficult to predict for the individual. Measurement
problems differ depending on whether one approaches the problem using
aggregate time series data or cross-sectional survey data; in the former
case, permanent income is typically measured using some form of lag
structure in income and (possibly) consumption. However, recent work in
the rational expectations school has shortened the relevant lag period to
a single year (see, for example, Hall, 1978) and shifted the focus from
permanent/transitory to anticipated/unanticipated income (for a good
review of recent work in this genre, see Blinder and Deaton, 1985).
Deriving a measure of permanent income based on cross-sectional
data is more complex and can only be done satisfactorily using multi-
period panel data (Bhalla, 1979, Hall and Mishkin, 1982, Leviatan, 1963),
group averages with the groups defined along dimensions correlated with
permanent income but not with transitory income (Eisner, 1958, Modigliani
and Ando, 1960, and Mayer, 1966), or using an alternative simultaneous
equations approach to modelling the structural consumption and income
163
equations (Musgrove, 1974, 1979, Attfield, 1976). This latter approach
was judged to be beyond the scope of the present work. As the group means
technique is not very satisfactory, and we do not as yet have panel data
from the C6te d'Ivoire, we used yet another technique which, under fairly
unrestrictive conditions, will yield consistent estimates of marginal
propensities to save out of permanent income (Muellbauer, 1983, Attfield,
1980, 1981, Musgrove, 1978). Permanent income derivations were described
in Chapter 3. Even if these conditions are not met, the direction of the
bias is such that the estimated MPS will set a lower bound on the actual
MPS, and as such may indicate something about the relevance of the
permanent income hypothesis in the C6te d'Ivoire, and differences between
the MPS out of current and permanent income.
Alternative measures of savings are used in the third and final
section of the chapter to derive aggregate savings propensities out of
permanent and transitory incomes. The aggregate savings measure is the
estimated change in the stock of farm and business assets over the twelve
month survey period. Note that the survey was not designed to capture
full changes in.stocks, so the alternative aggregate savings estimate is
at best a partial measure of household savings activities. Cash savings
is derived from Section 15 of the CILSS questionnaire, and represents the
stock of (cash) liquid assets owned by the household at the time the
survey was administered.
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5.1 Keynesian Consumption Functions
Table 5-1 shows consumption function estimates based on current
income for the total CILSS sample (1564 households). These use a variety
of conventional functional forms: (i) simple linear, (ii) simple linear
using per capita / measures of income and consumption, (iii) semi-log
(log transformation of income) using per capita measures of income and
consumption, (iv) log-log model using per capita measures of income and
consumption, (v) quadratic, and (vi) quadratic using per capita income and
consumption measures. Annex Table 5.1 shows variable means for income and
included demographic variables, by region and for the sample as a whole.
In general, the quadratic specifications seem to have the best explanatory
power, and yield sensible results, although the simple linear and log-log
models also work well for many segments of the population.
Counts of the number of female and male children and adults were
included in the equations to control for household size in the standard
models and size-related scale effects in the per capita models. The
coefficients of.the demographic variables reflect the fixed cost of
maintaining each household member, given marginal propensities to consume
i/ In all cases where per capita measures are used, household size, the
denominator, is constructed as the weighted average of the number of
people in the household times the number of months each was present over
the past 12 months. Thus, a two person household in which both members
were present for 12 months over the past year is given a weighted size of
2.0 while a similarly sized household in which one member was present for
6 months and the other for the full 12 months is given a weighted size of
1.5.
Table 5-1
Household Consumption Functions, Total Country
Number of Children Number of Adults
Income Income-Squared Female Male Female Male Intercept R2
(1) Linear model .445 - - - - - 871741 .511
(40.2) (28.0)
.418 - 50068 -5703 26586 83370 617083 .528
(37.2) (3.0) (0.4) (1.4) (3.9) (13.2)
(2) Per capita linear model .679 - - - - - 101993 .416
(33.3) (7.8)
.658 - -8331 -11314 -11216 -15608 197993 .426
(31.7) (1.1) (1.5) (1.3) (1.6) (8.5)
(3) Per capita semi-log 222714 - - - - - -2343623 .176
model (18.2)
208009 - -11757 -11438 -20774 -24731 -2035058 .197
(16.7) (1.3) (1.3) (2.1) (2.1)
(4) Per capita log-log .583 - - - - - 5.19 .539
model (42.6) (31.9)
.542 - -.025 -.057 -.048 -.015 5.97 .592
(40.9) (2.6) (5.9) (4.4) (1.2) (36.7)
(5) Quadratic model .677 -1.527 E-08 - - - - 613680 .576
(36.9) (15.5) (18.4)
.648 -1.452 E-08 43633 -12336 18712 64594 438424 .586
(34.5) (14.8) (2.8) (0.8) (1.1) (3.2) (9.6)
(6) Per capita quadratic .874 -3.652 E-08 - - - - 62175 .431
model (23.5) (6.2) (4.3)
.842 -3.374 E-08 -6595 -7969 -9947 -17271 151044 .438
(22.2) (5.7) (0.8) (1.1) (1.2) (1.8) (6.2)
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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out of current income. A Fisher F-test performed on the linear, per
capita linear, and quadratic specifications indicates that including the
demographic variables significantly improves the explanatory of all three
models at a one percent level of significance. 2/ Accordingly,
demographic variables are retained in all current income-based consumption
models described in this section.
Table 5-2 presents consumption function estimates for each major
region (Abidjan, other urban, and rural) in the Cote d'Ivoire, and Table
5-3 enumerates estimated marginal propensities to save (computed as 1-MPC)
at three income levels -- the mean income for the lowest, middle, and
highest income quintiles -- for each region and the country as a whole.
These estimates are based on current income coefficients in Tables 5-1 and
5-2. Note that linear and log-log specifications require propensities to
save to be invariant across income levels, while the semi-log and
quadratic specifications allow for changes in savings propensities with
income.
In general, results were fairly consistent between per capita and
total consumption/income specifications, although some regional variation
exists. Per capita estimates tend to explain less of the variation in
2/ The F-statistic has 4, 1546 (or 1547 for the quadratic specification)
degrees of freedom, which yields critical values of 2.37 (5 percent
significance level) and 3.32 (1 percent significance level). The
estimated test statistic for the linear specification is 11.67, for the
per capita linear specification is 4.09, and for the quadratic
specification is 9.30.
Table 5-2
Household Consumption Functions, by Region
Number of Children Number of Adults
Income Income-Squared Female Male Female Male Intercept R2
Abidjan (N=334)
(1) Linear model
(2) Per capita linear model
(3) Per capita semi-log
model
(4) Per capita log-log
model
(5) Quadratic model
(6) Per capita quadratic
model
Other Urban Areas (N-332)
(1) Linear model
(2) Per capita linear model
(3) Per capita semi-log
model
(4) Per capita log-log
model
(5) Quadratic model
(6) Per capita quadratic
model
.343
(17.0)
.851
(13.3)
349571
(7.2)
.417
(17.8)
.663
(17.6)
.250
(1.7)
.441
(15.3)
.484
(24.0)
289329
(12.3)
.534
(19.4)
.702
(10.0)
.871
(18.1)
-1.52 E-08
(9.7)
1.61 E-07
(4.6)
-3.54 E-08
(4.1)
-4.81 E-08
(8.7)
167841
(3.2)
-10941
(0.3)
-19332
(0.5)
-. 027
(1.4)
190761
(4.1)
-22720
(0.7)
58296
(2.0)
-18174
(1.8)
-15063
(1.1)
-. 040
(2.4)
44782
(1.5)
-10669
(8.7)
23935
(0.5)
-26817
(0.7)
-42409
(1.0)
-. 089
(4.3)
14778
(0.3)
-39496
(1.1)
43717
(1.5)
-13615
(1.4)
-6881
(0.5)
-. 037
(2.3)
47329
(1.7)
-5882
(0.7)
143158
(2.7)
-26708
(0.8)
-69115
(1.8)
-. 057
(3.0)
104217
(2.2)
-21332
(0.6)
53177
(1.7)
-22457
(2.0)
-36671
(2.4)
-. 059
(3.3)
42867
(1.4)
-16169
(1.6)
36853
(0.6)
-54621
(1.5)
-59481
(1.4)
-. 053
(2.3)
29693
(0.6)
-55347
(1.6)
95461
(2.7)
-12086
(1.0)
-21622
(1.3)
-.014
(0.7)
79852
(2.3)
-10399
(1.0)
1152854
(8.2)
339753
(3.3)
-3473344
(5.4)
-.080
(4.0)
686573
(5.2)
555248
(5.0)
563284
(5.9)
313398
(9.2)
-3002107
(10.0)
6.18
(17.6)
369254
(3.5)
162680
(4.6)
.562
.408
.210
.636
.660
.444
.530
.688
.412
.643
.552
.747
I-
01%
-4
Table 5-2 (continued)
Household Consumption Functions, by Region
Number of Children Number of Adults
Income Income-Squared Female Male Female Male Intercept
Rural Areas (N=898)
(1) Linear model .277 - 27010 40506 41995 39798 422839 .422
(17.6) (2.0) (3.0) (2.6) (1.9) (11.0)
(2) Per capita linear model .275 - -7176 -8422 -6469 -2691 166549 .133
(9.2) (1.6) (2.0) (1.2) (0.4) (12.3)
(3) Per capita semi-log 312604 - 37466 39725 55373 39340 -3501081 .361
model (14.0) (2.6) (2.8) (3.3) (1.8) (12.2)
(4) Per capita log-log .401 - -.034 -.045 -.031 -.022 7.37 .423
model (21.2) (2.8) (3.9) (2.2) (1.2) (33.3)
(5) Quadratic model .486 -2.15 E-08 23881 38321 46010 29398 294675 .460
(15.8) (7.9) (1.8) (3.0) (2.9) (1.5) (7.3)
(6) Per capita quadratic .507 -1.11 E-07 -6929 -7767 -5077 -3829 137244 .155
model (9.0) (4.9) (1.6) (1.8) (1.0) (0.6) (9.3)
Notes:
t-statistics are in parentheses under relevant coefficient.
Per capita specification includes income and consumption divided by the number of people in the household weighted by the number
of months they were resident over the past 12 months.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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consumption with respect to income than household level estimates. As
frequently found in similar studies, the cost of adding additional
household members increases at a decreasing rate, that is, there are
positive economies of scale with respect to household size over
consumption. Thus the average consumption per capita falls with
increasing household size as the coefficients on demographic variables in
per capita specifications are negative.
The demographic coefficients in the country-wide consumption
models in Table 5-2 suggest a rather curious bias towards the consumption
of female children and a (perhaps less curious) bias towards the
consumption of adult males over male children or adult females. In
essence, given income, the fixed cost of consumption for female children
is significant and positive, while the fixed cost of consumption for male
children is insignificant and negative on average. The fixed cost of
consumption for adult males is some two-and-one-half to three times the
cost of consumption for adult females. The findings vis-a-vis female
children contradicts both the folk wisdom in the field and various
empirical studies regarding the cost of child-rearing; one typically finds
a bias towards male children in allocating consumption within the
household. However, estimation by regional subgroups (Table 5-2) shows
that female children "cost more" only in Abidjan; expenditures in other
urban areas are roughly equal (depending on how the model is specified),
and expenditures in rural areas are actually higher for male children.
The country-wide findings of a spending bias towards female children are
borne out by other analyses of the CILSS data (van der Gaag, n.d.), which
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suggest the results are real rather than an artifice of a particular
estimation technique. The apparent willingness of households to pay more
for female children deserves further study, but is beyond the scope of the
present work. We suspect that this revealed preference for female
children likely reflects household demographic structure, and the often
fluid composition of West African households.
According to Table 5-3, marginal propensities to save out of
current income range from a high of around .75 in rural areas, to a low of
around .15 in urban areas, depending on the model specification.
Returning to the results presented in Table 5-2, the simple
linear models require that a constant proportion of incremental income is
saved regardless of the total level. With some exceptions, linear savings
models fit the data quite well, yielding relatively high explanatory power
and fairly precise estimates of income parameters (estimated t-statistics
ranged from 40.2 for the total sample to 15.3 in other urban areas). The
per capita specification of the simple model gives different results from
the aggregate household specification only in Abidjan, where current
income is most widely distributed and the population quite heterogeneous.
The per capita log-log specification generally provides better
results than linear models; there are clearly non-linearities in the
relationship between income and consumption. However, the log-log models
assume a constant MPS across income levels. This assumption is relaxed in
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Table 5-3
Estimated Marginal Propensities to Save Out of Current Income,
by Region and Selected Income Levels
Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita
Linear Linear Semi-Log Log-Log Quadratic Quadratic
Model Model Model Model Model Model
Abidjan
Quintile 1: CFA 640,343 .657 .149 .454 .583 .356 .543
Quintile 3: CFA 2,237,140 .657 .149 .844 .583 .404 .030
Quintile 5: CFA 7,069,707 .657 .149 .951 .583 .549 -1.526
Other Urban Areas
Quintile 1: CFA 605,216 .559 .516 .522 .466 .340 .187
Quintile 3: CFA 1,906,523 .559 .516 .848 .466 .432 .312
Quintile 5: CFA 3,725,169 .559 .516 .922 .466 .559 .487
Rural Areas
Quintile 1: CFA 226,583 .773 .725 -.376 .599 .523 .543
Quintile 3: CFA 720,897 .773 .725 .566 .599 .544 .653
Quintile 5: CFA 2,402,921 .773 .725 .870 .599 .615 1.026
Total Country
Quintile 1: CFA 291,525 .582 .342 .286 .458 .360 .177
Quintile 3: CFA 1,142,872 .582 .342 .815 .458 .384 .233
Quintile 5: CFA 4,081,392 .582 .342 .995 .458 .466 .427
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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the semi-log models, which provide very sensible results, predicting a
high sensitivity of savings to current income levels and quite high
savings rates for the wealthiest households. Unforturnately, goodness of
fit measures are lower for semi-log specifications than for other
specifications, suggesting an inability to fit extremes in current income
levels.
The quadratic models provide a more general functional form by
introducing a second income term (income-squared) to allow for differences
in marginal propensities to consume across income levels. In general,
they evidence higher explanatory power than simple linear specifica-
tions A' and yield intuitively sensible results. With one exception (the
per capita specification in Abidjan), marginal propensities to save were
found to increase with rising levels of income, as one might expect.
An important measure of the appropriateness of the quadratic
specification is the point at which the model predicts that all income is
saved, that is, the point at which the MPS becomes greater than or equal
to one. Difficulties arise when income levels increase past this point,
as the model then predicts (clearly unrealistic) savings propensities of
greater than one. It is encouraging to find that, with the exception of
3 F-statistics have critical values of 3.86 and 6.76 for the 5 percent
and one percent significance levels, respectively. Estimated test
statistics are 91.09 for households in Abidjan, 14.49 for other urban
households, and 61.72 for rural households. Clearly we cannot reject the
hypothesis of significant improvements in explanatory power for any of the
three regions.
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per capita specifications for rural areas and for Abidjan, marginal
propensities to save out of current income are still well below one when
evaluated at mean income levels for the highest quintile in each of the
regions. In fact, the MPS would be one in Abidjan at an annual income
level of CFA 30.9 million per annum, in other urban areas at CFA 14.6
million per annum, and in rural areas at CFA 23.1 million per annum. As
these values are well beyond the range of income reported in the sample
for all but one or two households, the quadratic consumption
specifications provide sensible results at sample extremes. Note that the
models predict very similar savings rates for Abidjan and other urban
areas (households in the lowest quintile save on average one-third of
total income out of the marginal "dollar", while household in the highest
quintile save on average some 55 percent of income at the margin), and
slightly higher savings rates for households in rural areas (52 percent of
income at the margin is saved in the lowest quintile, as compared to 62
percent in the highest quintile).
Consumption and Sources of Income
Our prior expectation is that the correlation between consumption
and current income will be lowest for households deriving most or all of
income from self-employment activities. The results presented in Table
5-3 show this to be the case; regardless of specification, marginal
savings rates are higher in rural areas, where some 88 percent of all
earned income is drawn from farm and non-farm self-employment. The
hypothesis that propensities to save out of current income are affected by
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the source from which income is derived (or, alternatively, the underlying
production process which generates income and the liquidity and investment
requirements of that process) can be tested more directly, however. Table
5-4 shows basic consumption functions estimated for four mutually
exclusive (and collectively exhaustive in terms of earned income sources)
groups of households: (i) those receiving earned income only from
employment outside the household; (ii) those receiving earned income only
from agriculture activities; (iii) those receiving earned income from non-
farm self-employment, agriculture activities, but not from employment; and
(iv) those receiving income from employment and at least one form of self-
employment. Households who do not receive earned income are excluded from
the table. Annex Table 5.2 presents variable means for the estimates
presented in Table 5-4, and Table 5-5 presents marginal propensities to
save derived from these estimates, evalutated at the income mean and
median for the group.
At first glance, marginal propensities to save do not seem to
differ a great deal across income source sectors, and there is no
consistent support for the hypothesis that income from self-employment
more likely to be saved than income from wage activities. For example,
using the quadratic specification of the consumption function, households
receiving income from employment only or employment plus other sources
have a MPS of .380 and .326, respectively, at the median income level,
while households receiving only income from agriculture have a MPS of .397
at the median income level. In contrast, households receiving non-farm
self-employment income, possibly in conjunction with farm income, have a
Table 5-4
Household Consumption Functions, by Source of Income
Number of Children Number of Adults
Income Income-Squared Female Male Female Male Intercept R
Wage Income Only (N=260)
(1) Linear model
(2) Per capita linear model
(3) Per capita semi-log
model
(4) Per capita log-log
model
(5) Quadratic model
(6) Per capita quadratic
model
Farm Income Only (N=618)
(1) Linear model
(2) Per capita linear model
(3) Per capita semi-log
model
(4) Per capita log-log
model
(5) Quadratic model
(6) Per capita quadratic
model
.424
(15.9)
.473
(22.6)
350821
(12.7)
.468
(17.1)
.711
(11.3)
.691
(16.8)
.347
(17.4)
.310
(5.6)
369270
(13.1)
.430
(18.8)
.634
(17.0)
.563
(5.7)
-2.349 E-08
(5.0)
-3.062 E-08
(6.0)
-2.763 E-09
(8.9)
-1.863 E-08
(3.1)
194850
(3.3)
-22791
(1.4)
-25373
(1.1)
-. 038
(1.7)
195455
(3.5)
-13215
(0.9)
23510
(1.6)
-9174
(1.6)
30147
(1.9)
-. 037
(2.9)
18966
(1.3)
31218
(0.5)
-41145
(2.5)
-33184
(1.5)
-. 072
(3.2)
16304
(0.3)
-29134
(1.8)
22665
(1.5)
-10739
(1.8)
23992
(1.4)
-. 056
(4.1)
22640
(1.6)
-8138 -9783
(1.4) (1.7)
125814
(2.1)
-33363
(2.0)
-63524
(2.8)
-. 062
(2.7)
111162
(1.9)
-30234
(1.8)
57787
(3.0)
-7966
(1.1)
57848
(2.7)
-. 031
(1.9)
40354
(2.2)
60766
(1.0)
-22912
(1.4)
-22848
(1.0)
-. 054
(2.3)
41026
(0.7)
-21801
(1.4)
34465
(1.5)
-1813
(0.2)
32080
(1.3)
-. 030
(1.6)
12077
(0.6)
-7638 -2003
(1.0) (0.2)
LUn
916629
(6.3)
490415
(10.9)
-3648586
(9.8)
7.37
(19.9)
546641
(3.5)
351263
(7.3)
388148
(8.3)
173299
(8.7)
-4193151
(11.8)
7.09
(26.6)
287301
(6.3)
145041
(6.6)
.583
.740
.521
.677
.620
.773
.454
.097
.364
.477
.517
.110
Table 5-4 (continued)
Household Consumption Functions, by Source of income
Number of Children Number of Adults
Income Income-Squared Female Male Female Male Intercept R
Non-Farm Self-Employment Income
only, Farm + Non-Farm Income (N=408)
(1) Linear model
(2) Per capita linear model
(3) Per capita semi-log
model
(4) Per capita log-log
model
(5) Quadratic model
(6) Per capita quadratic
model
.317 -
(12.4)
.456 -
(17.5)
452112
(10.0)
.432
(14.6)
.445 -1.374 E-09
(7.4) (2.4)
.380 1.724 E+08
(7.2) (1.7)
Wage & Self Employment Income (N=251)
(1) Linear model .314 -
(14.0)
(2) Per capita linear model .431 -
(16.0)
(3) Per capita semi-log 1127866
model (13.3)
(4) Per capita log-log .454
model (3.9)
(5) Quadratic model .720 -1.566 E-08
(14.3) (8.7)
(6) Per capita quadratic .582 -4.763 E-08
model (10.1) (2.9)
61189 4462
(2.2) (0.2)
-5648 -10983
(0.8) (1.6)
73385 8046
(2.5) (0.3)
-.024 -.050
(1.2) (3.2)
63340 7744
(2.2) (0.3)
-6099 -12231
(0.8) (1.7)
73326
(1.5)
-13020
(2.0)
21569
(0.4)
.242
(0.5)
54026
(1.3)
-12845
(2.0)
-1365
(0.0)
-14291
(2.3)
-56688
(1.2)
-. 227
(0.8)
-51829
(1.3)
-12712
(2.1)
Source: CILSS tabulations.
.431
.481
.370
.442
.439
.484
28620
(1.0)
-7659
(1.0)
54473
(1.7)
-. 038
(1.8)
30251
(1.0)
-7772
(1.0)
124346
(2.4)
-5032
(0.7)
104662
(2.0)
-. 256
(1.2)
100894
(2.3)
-5425
(0.8)
101231
(2.5)
-9613
(0.9)
83471
(2.0)
.020
(0.7)
96191
(2.4)
-8588
(0.8)
113483
(2.1)
-8597
(1.2)
82155
(1.5)
.039
(0.2)
59244
(1.2)
-8505
(1.2)
576420
(7.6)
201655
(9.3)
-5195363
(8.7)
7.14
(19.9)
457923
(5.1)
217553
(9.2)
643857
(4.2)
235400
(10.4)
-14243393
(12.5)
8.04
(5.3)
308268
(2.2)
201508
(8.0)
.543
.553
.522
.603
.653
.569
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Table 5-5
Estimated Marginal Propensities to Save Out of Current Income,
by Source of Income and Selected Income Levels
Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita Per Capita
Linear Linear Semi-Log Log-Log Quadratic Quadratic
Model Model Model Model Model Model
Wage Income Only
Mean Income CFA 2,902,273 .576 .527 .879 .532 .423 .487
Median Income CFA 1,987,087 .576 .527 .823 .532 .382 .428
Agriculture Income Only
Mean Income CFA 892,290 .653 .690 .586 .570 .415 .470
Median Income CFA 586,066 .653 .690 .350 .570 .397 .458
Non-Farm Self-Employment Income,
With or Without Farm Income
Mean Income CFA 1,498,418 .683 .544 .698 .568 .559 .672
Median Income CFA 959,839 .683 .544 .529 .568 .558 .653
Wage and Self-Employment Income
Mean Income CFA 2,264,278 .686 .569 .501 .546 .351 .634
Median Income CFA 1,459,736 .686 .569 .227 .546 .326 .557
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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MPS of .558 at the median level of income. This suggests that farmers may
not save as intensively out of current income as we had anticipated.
However, it is important to discriminate between income effects on savings
and behavioral aspects; ignoring possible price differentials, median
income for agriculture households is one-third to one-quarter that of
households with members in the wage labor force, and a little more than
half that of households receiving some non-farm self-employment income.
In short, farmers are a great deal poorer than households in other income
sectors, so it is not surprising that their savings at the margin are
around the same as their wealthier counterparts in other sectors. In
reality, this means that they are consuming much less overall than
households in other sectors and still managing to save the same share of
earnings at the margin. Clearly, however, private savings generated per
household are less in the agriculture sector than other sectors of the
economy.
Households receiving non-farm self-employment income evidence
high savings rates in comparison to other sectors, in spite of relatively
lower levels of mean and median incomes in comparison to the wage
sector. This is as anticipated. Many of these households reside in rural
areas, which explains the high rural marginal propensities to save cited
in Table 5-4; clearly the bulk of savings (both at the margin and in
aggregate) are not drawn from agriculture.
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Consumption Propensities by Source of Income
Models of MPS by source of income within households are presented
in Table 5-6 (see Houthakker, 1960, or Koskela and Viren, 1984, for
similar estimates). The table presents a simple linear model and a
quadratic model of consumption using the full sample, but allowing
parameters to vary across income categories. Previous specifications
constrained the coefficients to be the same across income categories
within each income source sector. Not surprisingly, coefficients are very
different across categories; the MPC out of income having a relatively low
transitory component (wages, public transfers such as social security and
pension payments) is higher than the MPC out of income with a higher
expected transitory component (income from self-employment and farming,
rents and dividends). For example, using a mean income level of CFA 1.5
million per annum, the marginal propensity to consume wages is .55 (.65 in
the quadratic specification) and the marginal propensity to consume public
transfers is .63 (.39 in the quadratic specification). In contrast, the
marginal propensity to consume either farm income or non-farm family
business income is around .26 (.36 and .38, respectively, in the quadratic
specifications) and rents and dividends some .32 (.78 in the quadratic
specification). In addition, the MPC out of private transfers was quite
high (.73 and 1.07 in the linear and quadratic specifications,
respectively), reflecting the welfare orientation of interhousehold
support networks (Kaufman, 1982). It is interesting (and indeed
encouraging) to note that most of the coefficients have low standard
errors and are thus very precisely estimated; t-statistics range from 4.8
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Table 5-6
Propensities to Consume Out of Different Types of Income
Quadratic Model MPC
Source of Income Linear Model Linear term Squared term (sample means)
Wages 0.550 (29.4) 0.744 (21.1) -3.26 E-08 (7.1) 0.65
Agriculture 0.266 (11.7) 0.397 (9.9) -1.24 E-08 (3.3) 0.36
Non-farm businesses 0.261 (11.5) 0.415 (11.6) -1.22 E-08 (4.8) 0.58
Rents and Dividends 0.323 (6.1) 1.226 (13.1) -1.48 E-07 (10.3) 0.76
Social Security, Pensions 0.625 (4.8) 0.558 (2.1) -5.906 E-08 (0.5) 0.31
Private transfers 0.731 (5.2) 2.232 (7.9) -3.88 E-07 (5.6) 1.05
Other (includes imputed 1.03 (15.3) 1.590 (13.2) -1.26 E-07 (5.3) 1.21
rents and durables)
R2 .576 .653
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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for public transfer income to 29.4 for wage income in the linear
specification, and are similarly robust in the quadratic specification.
There are some obvious problems with the income differentiated
model in Table 5-6; the MPC out of "other" income was greater than one in
both the linear and quadratic specifications, and the MPC from private
transfers was greater than one in the quadratic specification when
evaluated at the mean of current income. The latter suggests that private
transfer income is underestimated in the CILSS sample. The former is
caused in part by the inclusion of durables and imputed rents on both
sides of the equation, that is, in both consumption and income measures.
Both measures fall into the "other" category, and both implicitly have a
coefficient of one in the equation.
To summarize the results of this section, the consumption
functions we estimated based on current income evidenced good explanatory
power and intuitively sensible results. Marginal propensities to save are
highest for the wealthy and the self-employed, and lowest in general for
the poor, regardless of the source of their income. Farm households
evidence savings capacity that is roughly equal to wage earning households
at the margin, despite large differences in current income levels. There
is some empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the marginal
propensity to save out of current income is higher for households whose
incomes have a large transitory component than for households having a
smaller transitory component. However, this will be tested more
rigorously in the next section, where estimates are made of permanent and
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transitory income, and the basic consumption functions are re-estimated
using these measures in place of current income.
5.2 Savings Propensities and Permanent Income
This section describes consumption functions estimated using
permanent income estimates in place of current income. For purposes of
expositional clarity, the discussion of empirical results is preceeded by
a brief derivation of the permanent income hypothesis. Permanent income
estimates are derived from the models presented in Chapter 3.
The Permanent Income Model
If y is annual income and q is annual consumption expenditures,
then the following equations describe the permanent income model:
y = yP + yt (5.1)
q = qP + qt (5.2)
E(yt)=0 E(qt)=0
E(yPy t )=0 E(qPqt)=0
E(ytqt)=0
where: yP and yt, qP and qt are permanent and transitory
income and consumption, respectively.
This section draws on Bhalla (1976, 1979), Musgrove (1974, 1976), and
Muellbauer (1983).
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In general, the transitory components of income and consumption are
treated as the residual, or measurement error in a model relating current
income to permanent income. The expected value of the residuals is
assumed equal to zero across households, and the correlation between
residuals as well as the correlation between permanent and residual
components are likewise assumed to be zero.
According to the permanent income theory, permanent income and
consumption are systematically related to each other by some fixed factor
k, so that
qP = kyP (5.3)
The fixed factor depends on a variety of things such as individual tastes,
interest rates, and composition of assets, but is independent of the level
of permanent income, and is therefore invariant across the range of
permanent income. This implies a unitary elasticity between permanent
income and consumption, which in natural logs is expressed as
QP = k + YP (5.4)
where: Q is ln(q), and
Y is ln(y).
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In estimation, an additional parameter y is typically estimated to allow
for for an elasticity of less than one:
QP = k + yYp (5.5)
Both forms (5.3 and 5.5) of the permanent income model are typically used;
however, note that the two models make different assumptions concerning
the impact of errors in the measurement of income components (for a
discussion of this see Bhalla, 1979). The differences are not critical to
the findings presented here.
For purposes of estimation, we assume a stochastic relationship
between permanent income, which is itself unobservable, and some
observable set of variables denoted X, so that
yP = ax + E (5.6)
where E(Ey )=0 and E(eq t)=0 , that is, the error term e is uncorrelated
with either the transitory component of income or of consumption. This
implies that
y = yP + yt = (x + 6) + yt (5.7)
so that q can be defined as
q = qP + qt = a + k(aX + e) + q (5.8)
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for the linear model, and
Q = QP + Qt = k + y(aX + E) + Qt (5.9)
for the log specification.
If the error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables
(X's) in (5.7), then y (or k in the linear case) can be estimated by
obtaining fitted values Y = SX from (5.7) and then using these values as
an estimate of permanent income in (5.8) or (5.9). In addition, the
residuals from (5.7), Y - Y, can be used as an estimate of the transitory
component of income (if we believe that the MPC out of transitory income
is greater than zero). Thus, the estimating equation becomes
q = a + k (y) + k (y - y) + q (5.10)
p t
However, there is a problem of identification in equation (5.7).
Practically speaking, it is not possible to separate out the effects of
c from the total residual in the equation, that is, we obtain only
(E + y t) This means that measurement error in the permanent income
equation cannot be separated from residual or transitory income effects.
If c is positively correlated with those variables in X that are
positively correlated with income, a will be biased upwards, and
estimates of k (or p) accordingly biased downwards.
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The problem could be solved in a number of ways. For example,
multiple observations of the same individual over a sufficiently long
period of time would allow us to isolate individual effects (Leviatan,
1963; Bhalla, 1979), or the structural model could be identified as in
Musgrove (1974, 1979) and Attfield (1976, 1980, 1981). More recently,
Muellbauer proved that p can be estimated consistently, regardless of
possible violations of the independence assumption, by using standard 2SLS
(or instrumental variables) regression techniques. However, if there is
some degree of dependence between the x's and s, estimates of the S's will
not be consistent.
In keeping with Muellbauer (1982), estimation is done in a two
step process; first, (5.7) is estimated and fitted values used to
construct instruments for permanent and transitory incomes. Note that
transitory income is simply assumed to be the residual between actual and
permanent income for present purposes. This is clearly incorrect, but is
the best we can do under present circumstances. Accordingly, transitory
income results must be viewed with caution. These variables are then used
in estimating (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10). The two step estimation procedure
yields correct standard errors for the coefficient on transitory income,
but underestimates standard errors for the coefficient on permanent
income. (Pagen, 1984, Deaton, 1985). Correct standard errors are
estimated for the log specification using a single-pass 2SLS approach, but
similar corrections were not performed for the linear and quadratic
specifications. Note that both the two-step and single-pass yield
consistent and unbiased estimates of consumption propensities; the only
187
difference lies in estimates of the standard errors. Previous work has
shown that corrected errors differ very little from uncorrected errors in
cross-sectional analysis of this sort.
Savings Propensities and Permanent Income
Regional and sectoral household production functions were used to
construct measures of permanent and transitory income, which were
themselves used to re-estimate household consumption functions.
Performing the analysis in two separate OLS steps gives the same results
as using single-pass 2SLS techniques; the first approach allows more
flexibility in the specification of the consumption function. This
section describes the resulting consumption function estimates.
For purposes of comparison, Table 5-7 shows simple linear,
quadratic, and log-log consumption functions estimated on current income
for the total sample, each region, and the four production-based
categories. Note that household size variables are excluded from these
models for reasons of expositional simplicity. Table 5-8 presents similar
models with current income replaced by fitted values ( y = 6x
representing permanent income) and residual values ( y-y representing
transitory income) from the household production functions. Separate
estimates are described for the total sample and for households stratified
by the three major regions in the country. Table 5-9 presents similar
models, but households are stratified by production categories. The
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Table 5-7
C6te d'Ilvoire: Base Household Consumption Functions;
By Region, Income Source Category, and Total Country
Total Country
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Abidjan
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Other Urban Areas
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Rural Areas
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Wage Income Only
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Farm Income Only
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Other Self-Employment Income Only
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Wage and Self-Employment Income
(1)
(2)
(3)
Income Income-Squared R
2
.435 (39.4)
.665 (36.1)
.370 (18.4)
.692 (18.1)
.292 (14.4)
.480 (16.0)
.743 (10.5)
.536 (21.8)
.335 (22.5)
.548 (17.8)
.317 (20.5)
.460 (16.7)
.780 (11.9)
.485 (17.9)
.396 (20.6)
.693 (19.9)
.484 (23.2)
.345 (14.2)
.526 (8.8)
.450 (16.7)
.343 (13.7)
.735 (14.9)
.661 (21.7)
-1.48 E-08 (15.0)
-1.55 E-08
-3.70 E-08
-2.22 E-08
-2.66 E-08
-3.03 E-08
-1.98 E-08
-1.58 E-08
(9.5)
(4.1)
(7.8)
(5.3)
(9.9)
(3.3)
(8.7)
.499
.563
.505
.611
.384
.437
.463
.591
.362
.403
.320
.518
.567
.555
.409
.490
.467
.332
.350
.411
.478
.600
.655
Source: CILSS tabulations.
Linear specification
Quadratic specification
Log specification
Table 5-8
Cate d'Ilvoire: Household Consumption Function with Estimated Permanent and Transitory Income; By Region and Total Country
Estimated Permanent Estimated Transitory
Permanent Income Income-Sq. Transitory Income Income-Sq. Intercept R
Abidjan
(1) Linear specification .482 (13.6) - - 1676454 .358
.468 (15.3) - .294 (11.0) - 1543133 .530
(2) Quadratic specification .829 (9.7) -2.99 E-08 (4.4) - - 1224382 .394
.848 (12.1) -2.97 E-08 (5.4) .484 (11.6) -1.29 E-08 (5.7) 11474 .603
(3) Log specification 491 (12.6) - 7.621 .326
Other Urban Areas
(1) Linear specification .666 (14.7) - - 868471 .397
.700 (17.2) - .320 (9.1) - 709729 .518
(2) Quadratic specification .989 (9.9) -5.34 E-08 (3.6) - - 562926 .420
.887 (9.8) -2.28 E-08 (1.6) .385 (8.0) -3.11 E-08 (2.5) 538863 .534
(3) Log specification .680 (17.4) - - 4.679 .479
Rural Areas
(1) Linear specification .216 (14.7) - - 827961 .194
.383 (24.1) - .291 (17.7) - 634996 .400
(2) Quadratic specification .551 (17.0) -9.17 E-09 (11.4) - - 580737 .297
.575 (20.1) -8.56 E-09 (4.2) .413 (15.0) -2.44 E-08 (16.1) 486059 .464
(3) Log specification .512 (18.3) - - 6.769 .274
Total Country
(1) Linear specification .563 (30.5) - - 918449 .374
.554 (36.8) - .331 (23.3) - 774252 .536
(2) Quadratic specification .849 (24.2) -2.87 E-08 (10.3) - - 647768 .414
.852 (28.6) -2.37 E-08 (9.9) .419 (22.1) -1.03 E-08 (7.2) 505766 .581
(3) Log specification .629 (28.0) - - 5.353 .335
The production models provide an estimate of Eliny]. To obtain an estimate of Elyl, it is necessary to use the following transformation:
2 2
2 y ) + 1/2s ) 1/2s
if yf InNO,s ), then Ele I = e y = e * e y
y
Parameters estimated with 2SLS to obtain correct measures of standard errors.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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Table 5-9
Cote d'livoire: Household Consumption Functions with Estimated Permanent and Transitory Income; By Production Category
Estimated Permanent Estimated Transitory 2
Permanent Income Income-Sq. Transitory Income Income-Sq. Intercept R
Wage Income Only
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Farm Income Only
(1) Linear specification
(2) Quadratic specification
(3) Log specification
Non-Farm Self-Employment Income
Only, or Non-Farm and Farm Self-
Employment Income
(1)
(2)
(3)
Wage
(1)
(2)
(3)
Linear specification
Quadratic specification
Log specification
and Self-Employment Income
Linear specification
Quadratic specification
Log specification
.474 (12.1)
.500 (14.7)
.903 (10.1)
.806 (9.9)
.578 -(15.4)
.791 (22.8)
.742 (22.6)
.656 (7.9)
.692 (9.2)
.614 (18.4)
.609 (12.4)
.561 (12.2)
.796 (8.6)
.762 (8.8)
.622 (12.8)
.581 (13.6)
.511 (12.8)
.911 (9.6)
1.105 (13.6)
.746 (16.6)
-3.96 E-08 (5.3)
-2.89 E-08 (4.3)
3.46 E-08 (1.8)
2.55 E-08 (1.5)
-2.37 E-08 (2.4)
-2.23 E-09 (2.4)
-2.52 E-08 (3.9)
-4.66 E-08 (8.1)
.397 (9.4)
.358 (6.9)
.214 (9.5)
.428 (12.2)
.244 (8.1)
.428 (7.7)
.228 (7.2)
.466 (8.5)
2.09 E-09 (0.2)
-3.02 E-08 (7.8)
-3.49 E-08 (4.0)
-1.102 E-08 (3.7)
Source: CILSS tabulations.
'-0
1586685
1372000
963017
940361
6.288
414886
412785
478026
416997
5.428
753538
711236
600609
546689
5.383
1007886
1033247
583838
236579
3.693
.362
.526
.423
.558
.480
.457
.526
.460
.570
.357
.276
.378
.286
.407
.289
.427
.526
.460
.632
.528
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results from Tables 5-8 and 5-9 are summarized in Table 5-10, which
presents calculated marginal propensities to save out of current income
and estimated permanent income. Coefficients from the quadratic
consumption models are used in deriving the measures in Table 5-10, and
savings propensities are evaluated at category or regionally-based sample
means for current income and permanent income.
Several econometric issues should be noted regarding these
estimates: First, the t-statistics on the permanent income coefficients
for both the linear and quadratic models in Tables 5-8 and 5-9 are not
strictly correct (Johnston, 1972, Pagan, 1984), although the OLS standard
errors for transitory (or residual) income parameters are correct. The
source of error lies in the fact that the income variable has been
replaced by an instrument which has equal or less variance than the
measured variable. This causes the standard errors for the instrumental
variable to be underestimated if the model is estimated using a two step
OLS approach, which upward biases reported t-values. 2SLS was used to
generate correct standard errors for the log-log specification, but it is
not feasible to use the same approach for the linear and quadratic
models. In any case, changes in error estimates were fairly minimal,
as is typically the case for correction techniques applied to instrumental
variables estimates. While it would have been possible (although
5/ Practical constraints are imposed by the fact that permanent income is
estimated using a Cobb-Douglas production function (the natural log of
total output is used on the left-hand side). The best linear estimator of
Q (or any transformation of Q) is not necessarily a simple transformation
of lnQ.
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Table 5-10
C6te d'lvoire: Marginal Propensitites to Save - Out of Current and
Permanent Income; By Region, Income Source Category, and Total Country
Total Country
Base Income: CFA 1,600,743
Abidjan
Base Income: CFA 1,600,743
Mean Income: CFA 2,823,011
CFA
Other Urban Areas
Base Income: CFA
Mean Income: CFA
CFA
Rural Areas
Base Income:
Mean Income:
CFA
CFA
CFA
Wage Income Only
Base Income: CFA
Mean Income: CFA
CFA
2/
2,231,813
1,600,743
1,934,893
1,608,834
1,600,743
1,022,597
833,672
1,600,743
2,902,273
2,526,691
Farm Income Only
Base Income: CFA 1,600,743
Mean Income: CFA 892,290
CFA 718,194
Other Self-Employment Income Only
Base Income: CFA 1,600,743
Mean Income: CFA 959,839
CFA 1,082,892
Wage and Self-Employment Income
Base Income: CFA
Mean Income: CFA
CFA
1,600,743
1,459,736
1,821,278
Current Income
.382
.358
.396
.376
.400
.523
.497
.305
.374
.404
.361
.537
.512
.316
.311
Estimated Permanent
Income
.243
.267
.304
.182
.183
.478
.464
.224
.297
.233
.294
.280
.255
.170
.181
Estimated Transitory
Income
.557
.557
.531
.715
.635
.665
.596
.641
.642
.668
.583
.684 3
.599 3
.569 3
.542 3
Based on quadratic consumption models, evaluated at the sample mean income of CFA 1,600,743 and
average income in category.
Means for current and permanent income.
Mean of estimated permanent income is above mean of current income. For expositional purposes,
transitory income is assumed to be 40 percent of self-employment current income, and 25 percent of
wage and self-employment current income.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
Marginal Propensity to Save
1 /
3/
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difficult) to calculate corrected standard errors for the latter
equations, the parameter estimates were deemed sufficiently robust not to
justify the extra effort, given the anticipated minimal gain. Note,
however, that the bias in estimated standard errors for permanent income
prevents us from performing formal statistical tests for parameter
equality within or between equations. Note also that R2 measures should
not be compared between log-based and linear consumption estimates, as the
log-transformation necessarily smooths out the effects of extreme residual
values in the data; on a priori grounds, we expect log-based models to
evidence higher R2 measures, totally apart from the effects of
specification.
The results of the permanent income corrected consumption
estimates are encouraging; propensities to save out of the permanent
income proxy are consistently lower than propensities to save out of
current income. For example, according to Table 5-10, the estimated
marginal propensity to save out of current income evaluated at the sample
mean for households in Abidjan is .396, while the MPS out of permanent
income (estimated at the mean of expected or permanent income) is .304.
In contrast, the MPS in other urban areas is .400 and .183 out of current
and permanent income, respectively. Rural estimates do not evidence as
great a change as in other regions; the MPS out of current income is
calculated at .497 and the MPS out of permanent income is .464. Note,
however, that the point on the income distribution where we evaluate the
MPS determines the final value; the lower the level of income, the greater
the difference in measured savings propensities. Propensities to save by
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production categories show a similar and more accentuated pattern than
regional groupings; savings propensities drop from .374 to .297 (wage
households), .361 to .294 (farm households), .512 to .255 (non-farm self-
employment households), and .311 to .181 (wage + non-farm self-employment
households). Thus, while our models do not yield savings propensities of
zero for permanent income, there is nonetheless convincing evidence that
households tend to save less out of permanent or expected income in the
C6te d'Ivoire than out of current or measured income. In short, sources
of income do matter in predicting savings behavior; households use a
longer time frame than a year when making decisions regarding resource
allocation; households appear to respond differently to short term changes
in income than to more permanent changes.
It is useful to look at the actual consumption models in Tables
5-8 and 5-9 to examine the form of the relationship between income and
savings, as well as transitory income effects. In general, the estimates
provide convincing evidence of basic non-linearities in savings behavior
vis-a-vis household income. At the lower end of the income distribution
where the quadratic term has minimal impact, marginal propensities to
consume out of expected income are very high -- they are in fact close to
1.0. This is particularly true for urban (Abidjan and other urban areas)
households, and for households receiving at least some income from wage
activities. The effect is less pronounced for households who operate a
farm or other family enterprise; for them, non-linearities in savings
propensities are less, and the MPS out of permanent income is relatively
constant across the income distribution. This is particularly true for
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farm households, where the MPC actually increases as income levels rise.
This suggests that households who are dependent on their own resources to
generate income (they are market producers as well as consumers) are more
likely to be saving at least some of expected factor earnings, regardless
of output levels. We anticipated such results in earlier parts of the
study.
The log-log specification provides a different way of handling
non-linearities in savings propensities. Comparisons with current income-
based MPS show similar effects (by production category) as found using the
more flexible quadratic specification; according to log-log estimates,
households dependent on wages have an MPS out of current income of .515
and an MPS out of permanent income of .422. For farm households, the
relevant values are .516 and .614; for self-employed households values are
.550 and .378; and for wage and self-employed households the MPS out of
current and permanent income are .339 and .254, respectively.
Residual (or transitory) income effects also look reasonably
good; while we do not find a MPC out of transitory income of zero (as the
strict form of the permanent income theory requires), they are, however,
substantially lower than MPC's out of permanent income, and usually lower
than MPC's out of current income. Table 5-10 includes a column for
estimated MPS out of transitory income. These are consistently some two
to three times as high as MPS out of permanent income.
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To summarize our results: There is convincing evidence that
households consume more at the margin out of expected income and save more
out of unexpected or transitory income. Unfortunately, our estimates of
permanent and transitory income are not ideal and may be contaminated by
individual effects and other measurement error. However, our estimate of
marginal propensities to save out of current and transitory income
components should be consistent estimates of true values, given our
assumptions and the estimation techniques employed. Use of panel data
would improve the estimates substantially; unfortunately, the CILSS panel
in the Cote d'Ivoire will not be available for some time. When the full
data set becomes available it will be interesting to compare these
estimates with panel estimates.
Until this point, we have basically ignored the role of liquidity
constraints or borrowing constraints in determining consumption and
savings behavior. Clearly the existence of such constraints will increase
the correlation between current income and consumption, while decreasing
the correlation between permanent income and consumption. This latter
effect becomes obvious when one considers one of the basic tenets of the
permanent income-life cycle hypothesis -- that households make consumption
decisions based on expected life time earnings. This assumption
presupposed that individuals can borrow and lend as much as they require
to meet "permanent" consumption requirements at a market rate. To the
extent that the assumption does not hold (for example, to the extent
households are liquidity constrained), present consumption levels will be
less than permanent income dictated levels. In effect, this would bias
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our estimate of y downwards, to the extent that some households are
constrained in borrowing and lending behavior. Thus, liquidity
constraints may provide a partial explanation of why estimated MPC out of
permanent income are relatively low for certain groups in the population
-- specifically farmers and some of the non-farm self-employed. The next
chapter describes a formal test for liquidity constraints in each of the
three major regions in the C5te d'Ivoire, and examines the role of
liquidity in household welfare and savings behavior. First, however, we
present some alternative savings models in the third and final section of
Chapter 5.
5.3 Alternative Models of Savings Behavior
Throughout the thesis, we use the residual of annual income as a
measure of private savings. It would be preferable to measure household
savings directly as the change in stocks over the survey period; however,
we do not have sufficiently detailed asset information in the CILSS to do
so. We do obtain reasonably good measures of changes in the stock of so-
called productive assets, however -- capital inputs into farm or non-farm
household production activities. This section describes a simple
"savings" model which has the change in the value of productive assets on
the left hand side, and a variety of economic, demographic, and existing
values of other asset measures on the left hand side.
In addition, models are described in the latter part of this
section which explore the determinates of the stock of cash savings (the
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most liquid form of household assets) in urban and rural areas. As with
the stock adjustment model, a wide range of economic, demographic, and
asset measures are used as explanatory variables.
Determinates of Changes in Productive Asset Stocks
According to the permanent income hypothesis, changes in the
stock of productive assets should be more highly correlated with
transitory incomes than with permanent incomes. If some households are
liquidity constrained, the correlation between transitory income and stock
adjustments may be exacerbated -- households will expand capital stocks
primarily when they have sufficient "surplus" income to do so. If credit
is generally unavailable, a household may have to save for a period of
time to amass sufficient resources for a capital purchase. This suggests
that, all other things being equal, a household which has recently
increased its stock of productive assets will have less cash savings than
a household which has not done so; in short, there will be a negative
correlation between cash savings and the change in the value of the stock
of productive assets. To test both hypotheses, a measure of permanent
income, transitory income, and the value of cash savings are included in
the stock adjustment model.
In addition, the model includes a variety of demographic
variables which have been used throughout the thesis. Among these are the
number of children and adults living in the household, stratified by
gender, the age of the household head, nuclear and male labor-scarce dummy
199
variables, and regional intercepts. The value of stocks of selected
personal assets are also used in the model, which include the cash value
of recent durable purchases, the household net debt position, and the
maximum years of education for adult men and adult women. All of these
variables have been used previously, so descriptive statistics are not
included here.
Table 5-11 presents stock adjustment estimates for the country as
a whole. Note that parameter values are primarily driven by households
living in Abidjan; models estimated for rural households and those living
in other urban areas did not have much explanatory power. These regional
results are not surprising when one realizes that the vast majority of
household investment activities occur in Abidjan; few households outside
the capital city reported changes in their stocks of productive assets.
According to Table 5-11, stock changes are quite significantly
correlated with levels of transitory income, and not significantly
correlated with levels of permanent income. Based on our estimates, a one
CFA increase in transitory income results in a .237 CFA increase in the
value of productive stocks. These results are gratifying, not only
because of a priori expectations, but also because they provide some
evidence that the residual-based transitory income measure is a reasonably
good proxy for "actual" transitory income.
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Table 5-11
Changes in Stocks of Productive Assets; Total Country
Variable l/ Parameters
"Permanent" Income (CFA)
"Transitory" Income (CFA)
Max. education of males in hh (yrs)
Max. education of females in hh (yrs)
Value of Cash Savings (CFA)
Value of durables purchased since
January, 1984 (CFA)
Net debt position (CFA)
Is household nuclear?
Is household male labor-scarce?
Age of household head (yrs)
No. female children, 0-14 yrs
No. male children, 0-14 yrs
No. adult females, 15+ yrs
No. adult males, 15+ yrs
Does household live in Abidjan?
Does household live in other urban areas?
Model Intercept
.0361
.2373
4612.8
-821.0
-. 0638
-. 0483
.0810
56589.5
-299013.0
2865.5
28156.4
-23373.3
122805.9
-66098.0
-193577.7
-290596.1
-113470.9
.089
F-statistic 9.36
1/ t-statistics in parentheses.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
(1.0)
(10.1)
(0.4)
(0.1)
(1.3)
(0.6)
(1.9)
(0.6)
(2.0)
(0.8)
(1.1)
(0.9)
(3.8)
(1.7)
(1.7)
(2.8)
(0.6)
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The cash savings parameter is also of the correct sign, although
not highly significant. According to the model, a one CFA increase in the
value of productive stocks is associated with a .064 decrease in the value
of cash savings. This result suggests that asset purchases may be
influenced by credit constraints -- all things being equal, households run
down cash savings in order to purchase productive assets.
We find a positive and significant correlation between the
household's net debt position and stock changes -- households who have
lent out more than they are owed are more likely to increase productive
asset stocks, while households with outstanding debts are more likely to
decrease productive asset stocks. Also, male labor-scarce households
(those without working-aged male members) report an average of CFA 299,014
less in asset increases than households with working-aged male members.
In short, these households may be divesting themselves of important
productive assets simply in order to survive.
There is a curious correlation between the number of adult males
and females in the household and changes in the stock of productive
assets. According to our estimates, stocks increase with the number of
adult women in the household, and decrease with the number of adult men.
Recall that women are the primary operators of non-farm family businesses
in the city; the positive correlation (each adult women increases
productive stock adjustments by CFA 122,806) is likely the result of the
self-employed/informal sector orientation of Ivorian women. The negative
correlation for adult males (each adult male decreases productive stock
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adjustments by CFA 66,098) is likely caused by the wage sector orientation
(where physical capital does not play an important role) of Ivorian men.
Determinates of Changes in Levels of Cash Savings
The cash savings models include roughly the same set of variables
as the previously described stock adjustment model. However, note that
the dependent variable is a measure of the present stock of cash savings,
in contrast to the change in stocks measure used above. Because of this,
many of the parameters will reflect wealth effects -- wealthier households
are simply expected to save more than less wealthy households, all things
being equal -- as well as other factors.
The strong correlation between permanent income and cash savings
found in Table 5-12 provides one example of this. For the country as a
whole, a one CFA increase in permanent income is associated with a .278
CFA increase in cash savings, while a one CFA increase in transitory
income carries with it only a .069 CFA increase in savings. In Abidjan,
however, the relative effects between the two sources of income are much
more similar than in the rest of the country -- a one CFA increase in
income is associated with a .168 CFA and .127 CFA increase in cash savings
for permanent and transitory income, respectively. This likely reflects
the fact that savings institutions are much more readily available in the
capital city, interest rates are likely higher, and househholds may not
have good competing investment alternatives if they are primarily
dependent on labor force activities to generate income.
Table 5-12
Permanent Income Determinants of Cash Savings in the Cote d'lvoire, by Region and Total Country
Parameters
Variable Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total Country
"Permanent" Income (CFA) .1683 (5.8) .4774 (4.9) .3322 (17.5) .2779 (13.6)
"Transitory" Income (CFA) .1274 (6.9) -.0107 (0.2) .0665 (5.3) .0693 (5.2)
Max. education of males in hh (yrs) -12887.9 (1.3) -58445.9 (2.9) -5252.1 (0.9) -17755.9 (2.8)
Max. education of females in hh (yrs) 9533.1 (0.9) -49504.6 (1.9) -18345.7 (1.8) -27848.4 (3.4)
Ha, of land used 42106.6 (3.0) 1352.7 (0.1) -6273.2 (2.3) 2599.8 (0.7)
Value of business assets (CFA) -.00638 (0.6) -.00055 (0.0) -.00321 (0.5) .00093 (0.1)
Estimated value of dwelling unit (CFA) .00030 (0.0) -.0528 (1.1) - - -.0287 (1.7)
Value of durables purchased since January, 1984 (CFA) -.0161 (0.3) 1.8851 (10.3) .3351 (3.7) .2945 (6.5)
Net debt position (CFA) .0445 (1.8) .2824 (3.1) .1263 (2.5) .0952 (4.1)
Is hh nuclear? -118133.0 (1.1) 71026.4 (0.4) 7810.3 (0.2) -7033.1 (0.1)
Is hh male labor-scarce? -92513.0 (0.5) 225680.5 (0.8) 87002.2 (1.6) 144439.8 (1.8)
Age of household head (yrs) 4697.5 (1.1) 4462.7 (0.7) 380.4 (0.3) -627.4 (0.3)
No. female children, 0-14 yrs 6275.5 (0.2) -12277.1 (0.3) 9296.0 (1.0) 15682.8 (1.1)
No. male children, 0-14 yrs -3277.3 (0.1) -10690.4 (0.3) -12190.0 (1.3) -10055.4 (0.7)
No. adult females, 15+ yrs -111611.3 (3.1) -45042.1 (0.8) -15081.0 (1.2) -42224.8 (2.4)
No. adult males, 15+ yrs -33203.4 (0.9) 122598.1 (2.1) 8793.5 (0.6) 70513.5 (3.4)
Does hh live in Abidjan? - - - - - - -124650.0 (1.8)
Does hh live in other urban areas? - - - - - - 91997.2 (1.4)
Model Intercept -54199.2 (0.3) -542778.3 (1.7) -115206.0 (1.7) -127627.1 (1.4)
R2 .336 .378 .519 .193
F-value 9.88 11.92 62.86 184.9
1/ t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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In general, we expect to find a negative correlation between the
value of other asset stocks and the stock of cash assets -- in fact, they
represent competing uses of scarce household resources. However,
liquidity constraints and investment complimentarities may reverse the
direction of the correlation. For example, education is generally
negatively correlated with the value of cash savings, given permanent
income levels and other demographic factors. This likely is caused by
lifecycle effects not captured by the age-of-household-head variable.
Given permanent income levels, households with higher levels of education
are typically younger than their less educated counterparts, and thereby
have had less time to amass resources. In addition, households who have
invested in education are likely to have lower stocks of other sorts of
assets.
Regarding other assets: Land (as measured in ha.) is negatively
correlated with the value of cash savings in rural areas (a somewhat
surprising result), and positively correlated with cash savings in
Abidjan. The value of recent durable purchases, which are themselves a
relatively liquid form of assets, tend to be positively and fairly
strongly correlated with cash savings for households residing in other
urban areas, and negatively correlated for households in Abidjan and rural
areas. The sign of the coefficient could be expected to go in either
direction -- households likely to hold liquid assets may do so in the form
of cash or easily sold durables whose values may be increasing in real
terms. At the same time, some households may view durable purchases as a
competing form of investment of scarce liquid resources. Housholds owed
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money tend to have higher cash savings than households in debt; we
interpret this primarily as reflecting wealth effects.
Demographic effects are not strong in the cash savings models.
There is some tendancy for male labor-scarce households to have higher
levels of cash savings than other households, particularly in rural areas,
where these households have on average CFA 87,002 more saved than
households with prime-aged male members. Note, however, that the
correlations between the number of adult males and females and savings is
just the opposite of the stock adjustment model -- each additional adult
female member reduces the level of cash savings by some CFA 42,224 while
each additional adult male member increases savings by CFA 70,516 for the
country as a whole. The effect of adult females is clearly strongest in
Abidjan, and relatively weak in other areas.
Table 5-13 describes models similar to those in Table 5-12,
except that transitory income has been replaced by measures of total
annual income by source, which include wages, business profits, farm
profits, private transfers, rents and dividends, pensions, social security
and other forms of forced savings, and other income. Thus, these models
show the effect of another unit of wage income (for example) on cash
savings, given permanent income levels.
Not surprisingly, the strongest effects are found for households
residing in Abidjan. In the capital city, wage effects are nil, farm
profits are strongly and significantly correlated with cash savings (CFA
Table 5-13
Current Income Determinants of Cash Savings in the Cote delvoire, by Region and Total Country
Parameters
Variable Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total Country
"Permanent" I ncome .0355 (1.2) .3757 (3.9) .2570 (17.4) .2165 (11.2)
Wage income (CFA) -.0058 (0.2) -.1729 (2.6) .0773 (1.8) -. 0572 (2.4)
Agriculture income (CFA) .5440 (8.8) -.0991 (0.7) .0738 (4.8) .1112 (4.4)
Family enterprise income (CFA) .1268 (5.5) .0193 (0.2) -.0613 (2.4) .0573 (2.7)
Private transfer income (CFA) .3425 (3.1) -.4381 (0.3) .4106 (0.6) .1467 (1.2)
Rents and dividends (CFA) .3489 (3.2) 1.3601 (5.6) .9581 (6.8) .5158 (7.9)
Pensions, social security, etc. (CFA) .1766 (1.3) .1300 (0.3) -.1065 (0.3) .0790 (0.6)
Other income (CFA) .1810 (3.2) .3417 (1.2) .0443 (0.5) .1271 (1.7)
Max. education of males in the hh (yrs) 3789.7 (0.4) -40323.4 (1.9) -6679.7 (1.1) -4770.4 (0.7)
Max. education of females in the hh (yrs) 17663.9 (1.7) -37028.3 (1.5) -18037.7 (1.9) -23592.8 (2.9)
Ha. of land used 6063.4 (0.4) 10990.6 (0.6) -7395.5 (2.6) -1224.6 (0.3)
Value of business assets (CFA) -.0477 (2.2) -.0517 (1.7) -.0240 (3.1) -.0425 (4.4)
Estimated value of dwelling unit (CFA) -.0074 (0.4) -.0688 (1.4) - - -.0524 (3.0)
Value of durables purchased since January, 1984 (CFA) .0222 (0.5) 1.8234 (10.4) .2576 (2.8) .3317 (7.4)
Net debt position (CFA) .0130 (0.6) .2947 (2.3) .2662 (4.7) .1033 (4.4)
Is hh nuclear? -89827.8 (1.0) -72557.3 (0.4) 10535.3 (0.3) -21890.7 (0.4)
Is hh male labor-scarce? -85296.7 (0.5) 161247.9 (0.6) 61096.0 (1.2) 157771.6 (2.0)
Age of household head 1700.2 (0.4) -2312.7 (0.4) 407.9 (0.3) -1328.6 (0.7)
No. female children, 0-14 yrs 22758.1 (0.8) -23917.0 (0.6) 7761.2 (0.8) 10873.0 (0.8)
No. male children, 0-14 yrs -6269.7 (0.2) -23348.4 (0.6) -15739.0 (1.7) -8254.9 (0.6)
No. adult females, 15+ yrs -95199.6 (2.8) -39889.9 (0.7) -12121.9 (1.0) -47740.9 (2.8)
No. adult males, 15+ yrs -24220.5 (0.7) 112837.8 (2.0) 5114.3 (0.3) 65587.4 (3.2)
Does hh live in Abidjan? - - - - - -82362.9 (1.2)
Does hh live in other urban areas? - - - - - - 175749.5 (2.8)
Model Intercept 83443.3 (0.4) -33566.2 (0.1) -88728.0 (1.4) -89345.5 (0.9)
R2 .465 .448 .554 .284
F-value 12.15 11.35 51.34 25.21
1/ t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
C)
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profits are likewise significantly but less strongly correlated with cash
savings (CFA .127 for every one CFA). As anticipated, there is little
correlation between pensions and social security income and cash savings
as most recipients of this type of income are retired and not highly
motivated to save. Finally, the remaining categories of income all
evidence positive and significant correlations with cash savings (.347 for
rents and dividends, .342 for private transfer payments, and .180 for all
other sources of unearned income).
Households living in other urban areas were found to have a
strong correlation between permanent income and cash savings and a
reletively weak correlation between transitory income and cash savings.
Not surprisingly, only two of the new income measures were found to be
significant -- wages are negatively correlated with the stock of savings
(one CFA in wages reduces cash .544 in cash savings for every one CFA of
farm income), and business savings by CFA .173), and rents and dividends
are positively correlated (one CFA of rent and dividend income increases
savings by an average CFA 1.360!).
For rural households, income correlations were often significant,
but of a much smaller magnitude than in Abidjan. This reflects the lower
overall levels of savings reported by rural households. For example, one
CFA derived from agriculture increased cash savings by CFA .074, one CFA
of income from wages increased cash savings by CFA .077 (curiously similar
to the farm income savings rate), and one CFA of income from non-farm
business activities actually decreased cash saving rates by CFA .061.
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This latter result may reflect the fact that rural households who have
diversified sources of self-emloyment income are more entrepenuerial and
thereby more likely to invest cash surpluses rather than hold them in the
form of cash. Note also that most rural households have limited access to
formal savings institutions, and are more likely to keep cash under a
mattress than to deposit it in a formal institution at attractive interest
rates. Rural households have much greater access to informal savings
institutions, however, which are called "tontine" savings clubs in the
C6te d'Ivoire. In terms of unearned income, rents and dividends show a
strong and significant correlation with the stock of cash savings
maintained by the household; according to our estimates, some CFA .958 of
savings result from every one CFA of income from rental capital and
dividends. It is important to note that dividends are themselves likely
derived from cash savings, so that the positive effect is not surprising.
Other parameters in the cash savings models described in Table
5-13 are fairly similar to those described in Table 5-12, although the
negative correlation with selected asset values increase in some cases.
As a general comment on the models presented in this section; the
results are (perhaps surprisingly) robust, and most coefficients have the
expected signs and are of a reasonable magnitude. We feel that the
results provide somewhat reassuring evidence that permanent and transitory
income estimates are generally adequate, as well as shed light on some
interesting aspects of savings behavior in the Cote d'Ivoire.
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Annex Table 5.1
Variable Means for Consumption Functions, by Region
Abidjan Other Urban Rural Total Country
(N=334) (N=332) (N=898) (N=1564)
Annual Income (CFA) 2,823,011 1,934,893 1,022,597 1,600,074
Per Capita Income (CFA) 538,375 370,652 148,027 278,646
Annual Expenditures (CFA) 2,772,481 1,958,942 1,012,610 1,588,088
Per Capita Expenditures (CFA) 589,536 361,387 158,311 293,509
Number of females 0-14 years 1.65 1.90 1.85 1.82
Number of males 0-14 years 1.43 1.94 2.04 1.89
Number of females 15+ years 1.92 2.24 2.30 2.21
Number of males 15+ years 1.86 2.03 1.75 1.84
Individual counts are weighted by the number of
household over the past year.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
months the individual has been present in the
Annex Table 5.2
Variable Means for Consumption Functions, by Source of Income
Agriculture Non-Farm Self-Employment Wage and Farm or Non-Farm
Wage Income Income Income, Farm & Non-Farm Non-Farm Self-Employment
Only (N=260) Only (N=618) Income (N=408) Income (N=1564)
Annual Income 2,902,273 892,290 1,498,418 2,264,278
Per Capita Income 679,561 127,188 243,750 270,230
Annual Expenditures 2,784,834 982,945 1,431,546 2,065,773
Per Capita Expenditures 626,342 154,085 244,440 270,747
Number of females 0-14 years 1.45 1.81 1.96 2.08
Number of males 0-14 years 1.42 1.98 2.00 2.07
Number of females 15+ years 1.64 2.29 2.41 2.34
Number of males 15+ years 1.71 1.81 1.77 2.21
Individual counts are weighted by the
household over the past 12 months.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
number of months the individual has been present in the
I-.
211
6. THE EFFECTS OF LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS ON
CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR
According to the permanent income-lifecycle hypothesis, consumers
act as if they maximize a lifetime utility function, subject to a lifetime
budget constraint. For this to occur, capital markets must operate
perfectly; individuals must be able to borrow and invest as much as they
wish at equivalent interest rates. Transitory shortfalls in income can be
smoothed by dissaving, either in the form of borrowing or by liquidating
present stocks of assets. If some individuals are constrained by
imperfect capital markets, that is, if they are liquidity (or credit)
constrained, then they may be forced to consume at levels comensurate with
current income, and below desired consumption levels. In essence,
liquidity constraints would act to increase the correlation between
current income and consumption, but decrease the correlation between
estimated permanent income and consumption. This latter effect caused by
credit constraints limiting individual's ability to "realize" expected
permenant income levels.
This chapter describes a relatively simple test for liquidity
constraints in the COte d'Ivoire. It begins with a brief discussion of
the problem based on principles of intertemporal welfare optimization It
then describes the methodology used to perform formal statistical tests.
The final section in the chapter describes empirical results, and
discusses the potential influence and severity of liquidity constraints on
consumption behavior in different segments of the Ivorian population.
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6.1 Theoretical Overview 1/
Consider a situation in which the individual is attempting to
optimize his or her lifetime level of welfare. The lifetime utility
function of a representative consumer is given by
U = u(xl, x 2 ' ''', xT, AT+l/P) (6.1)
where: xt is consumption at time (age) t,
A T+1 represents assets at the end of a consumers
lifetime, which are bequested to others,
P is the lifetime price index across all goods.
Periods are linked by between period transfers of assets, which may be
negative or positive. If an individual begins his/her life with an
initial endowment A0, assets at the end of each period are defined in
terms of within period exogenous income, expenditures, and the asset
endowment at the end of the previous period.
At = (1+rt )A t- + Yt - ptxt (6.2)
where: rt is the interest rate in period t,
Y is income in period t,
pt t is consumption expenditures in period t, and
all other variables are as previously defined.
This section draws on Deaton, 1980, and Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980.
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The intertemporal budget constraint is given by
dI x + d *P(A /P) (6.3)
t
or
A + d *Y (6.4)
t t t
where: dt are discount factors determined by
dt = 1/(1+rl)(1+r 2) ... (1+r ), and all other
variables are as previously efined.
Thus, the intertemporal utility function (6.1) is maximized subject to the
condition that total consumption is equal to the sum of consumption across
periods plus bequests (6.3), which is itself equal to initial endowments
plus the sum of the discounted stream of income across periods (6.4).
In this simple formulation, we assume that capital markets
operate perfectly, that is, that the timing of consumption is completely
independent of income, so long as total consumption does not exceed
lifetime income plus inital endowments. For reasons cited earlier, this
assumption may be unrealistic in many parts of the developing world.
Consider the role of the boundary conditions stated in (6.2).
First, savers are characterized by the condition Yt> ptxt, and dissavers
by the condition Yt < ptxt. Dissaving can occur in two ways: (i)
liquidation of existing assets, or (ii) borrowing. Is there a binding
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constraint on the extent of dissavings allowed in any particular period?
We might assume that the stock of assets could never be negative, that is,
that the value of assets in any year are sufficient to cover dissavings:
(1+rt)At- Y t-ptt. According to the model, the constraint on stocks is
not necessary so long as the budget constraint is satisfied and lifetime
consumption does not exceed initial endowments plus lifetime earnings.
Practically speaking however, borrowing typically depends on collateral,
and the availability of collateral requires that the present value of
assets (both physical assets and human assets) in a paticular period be
positive. Thus, the non-negativity of stocks constraint adds realism to
the model. It is important to note that credit may only be available at
high interest rates, or selectively, regardless of the availability of
collateral -- in short, collateral does not quarantee funds.
What else might constrain consumption in a particular period?
Assuming that current income is not sufficient to obtain desired
consumption levels, and the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied,
the potential dissaver could liquidate assets in lieu of borrowing. Let
us further assume that she/he possesses two distinct kinds of assets, one
for which markets function well (AL, or liquid assets) and another for
which markets are limited or nonexistent (ANL, or nonliquid assets). What
are the conditions for liquidation financing of consumption? Clearly one
can most profitably and easily dispose of liquid assets, particularly cash
holdings and consumer goods. Sales of productive assets -- land,
buildings, and equipment -- may have a long-term effect on future streams
of income, and as such is clearly not desirable. In addition, sales of
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costly capital stocks under duress seldom yields favorable returns. It is
also important to note that capital transactions, particularly land market
transactions, may be limited or even disallowed in rural areas of many
developing countries due to sanctions imposed by government, local
authorities, or social custom.
Disposal of so-called nonliquid assets -- for example, human
capital or pension funds -- may only be possible at a considerable loss
relative to their expected value at some later time or use value in
productive activities. In the C6te d'Ivoire, human capital, pensions and
social security, and rural land are the major types of nonliquid stocks
maintained by households. Education in particular (considered as part of
the stock of human capital) yields tremendously high returns in productive
activities. Households who decide not to invest in education because of
current or expected income shortfalls may be placing themselves at a
serious future disadvantage. Rural land likewise yields high returns, and
in many cases (some 65 percent of CILSS households) cannot be sold in the
C6te d'Ivoire. Further, many Ivorian farmers grow tree crops, which have
long gestation periods followed by longer periods of production. Improper
maintenence or delayed replanting of the stock due to temporary cash
shortages may cause substantially lower returns than under other
investment regimes.
Let us consider the role of liquidity constraints within a
particular time period more systematically. As before, assume that
households have liquid and nonliquid assets at the start of a period, AL
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and ANL, and receive an exogenous stream of income within the period,
Yt. Actual consumption is xtpt, while desired consumption (which is
greater than or equal to actual consumption) is c *. Liquid assets can be
further stratified into those assets which directly contribute to
production, APL, and those which do not, ANPL. On this basis, we can
identify six distinct savings/dissavings regimes:
For Yt 2c :
1.
2.
For Yt < c :
3.
4.
5.
6.
Yt > c (savers)
Yt = c (neither dissavers nor savers)
(dissavers)
(c" - Yt < ANP,L
(c" - Yt < (ANPL + AP,L), but > ANP,L
(c" - Y < (ANP,L + APL + ANL), but > (ANP,L + AP,L)
(c" - Y > (ANP,L + AP,L + ANL)
In regime 1, the household consumes c and increases total asset
holdings by the difference Yt-c during the period. In regime 2, the
household likewise consumes c*, but evidences no net change in asset
holdings. Stocks of assets likely fall for households operating in
regimes 3 through 6, depending on decisions regarding desired versus
actual consumption levels.
Households operating in regime 3 must liquidate some non-
productive liquid assets to achieve desired consumption levels.
Households in regime 4 cannot subsidize consumption out of non-productive
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assets alone, but must either sell or borrow against other assets --
likely productive assets will serve as better collateral than non-liquid
assets. If borrowing is possible, then desired consumption levels can be
meet. However, if credit is not available, then households will have to
sell productive assets in order to achieve desired consumption levels.
Assume cmin represents minimum feasible consumption levels. Households
operating in this regime have a series of choices: if credit is
available, then households who can borrow against APL will do so to
achieve c*. If credit is either unavailable or limited, households can
either sell some of their productive assets or decrease consumption up
until level cmin, at which point they must begin to disinvest in
productive assets. The likelihood of consuming below desired levels is
even greater for households operating in regime 5; the value of nonliquid
assets is certain to be highly idiosyncratic, depending on the timing of
attempted sales and market conditions. For example, a household which has
use rights to a plot of rural land, but no sales rights may be able to
rent the land for a short time, or allow other lineage members to use the
land in return for various kinds of support. A household with relatives
working in the city may be able to obtain temporary help from them on the
basis of kinship. In any case, the level of consumption will almost
certainly drop. The same is true of households operating in regime 6,
where the present income shortfall outstrips even the present value of
total household assets.
How is the simple intertemporal optimization solution changed by
the existence of imperfect capital markets, which is implied by the
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seperation between liquid and non-liquid assets? First, the lifetime
stream of income from holding such assets will be greater than the income
from sales, so permanent income will fall if liquidation is necessary. If
the household later attempts to repurchase nonliquid assets, they may or
may not be available on the market, the price at which they are available
may bear little relation to the price at which the household was forced to
sell them, transactions costs may be significant and asymetrical, and the
household still confronts the problem of amassing considerable resources
to make a capital purchase under highly constrained credit conditions --
the same conditions that forced them to sell in the first place.
Portfolio effects are important as well. For example, households
throughout the developing world make large sacrifices in order to educate
their children -- that is, in order to increase stocks of human capital.
Our previous analyses suggest that the returns to formal education range
from 4 to 5 percent (in real terms) a year in the agriculture sector to 10
to 12 percent a year in the wage sector. In addition, small-scale
entrepreneurs likewise evidence high returns to investments in education;
our results suggest that they may be as high as 12 percent per year of
formal education completed. Further, returns to education increase with
increasing levels of education -- for example, the returns to investment
in secondary education are generally higher than similar returns for
primary schooling. What does a household do when faced with the choice of
disinvesting in illiquid physical assets or not investing in human
capital? If capital markets are imperfect, then investments in education
cannot be smoothly substituted for investments in physical assets; a
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change in the asset portfolio may incur substantial transaction costs, and
a loss in long-term wealth relative to the levels of wealth which would be
expected if capital markets functioned better.
Interestingly, there is evidence of uneven patterns of school
attendance in the Cote d'Ivoire -- children frequently drop out of school
for short periods of time, and later return to complete their education.
This phenomenon may well be caused by liquidity constraints in conjunction
with frequent transitory shifts in household income. Rather than
liquidating productive assets, households may delay schooling until more
resources become available. This suggests that the loss in future income
caused by delayed education is less than the cost of obtaining funds for
schooling in the present, either by borrowing at high interest rates (if
credit is available) or liquidating stocks of assets.
Considerable theoretical work and some empirical work has been
done in an attempt to identify the impact of possible liquidity
constraints on savings and consumption behavior (Wiseman, 1975, Zellner,
Huang, and Chow, 1965, Pissarides, 1978, Hall and Mishkin, 1982, Flavin,
1984, Hayashi, 1985), with only some degree of success. However, all of
the cited empirical studies use data from industrialized countries, where
one might expect financial systems to be best developed and imperfections
in capital markets to have relatively little effect on household
savings. Their findings suggest (essentially via a refutation of the
permanent income hypothesis) that liquidity constraints may influence
consumer behavior, but only to a small extent in absolute terms. We
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suspect that liquidity considerations may well have a stronger influence
on savings behavior in developing areas.
The next section describes an approach for testing whether some
households within selected segments of the Ivorian population are
liquidity constrained. The technique was developed by Hayashi (1985).
His empirical work uses data from the U.S.
6.2 Methodology for Liquidity Constraints Tests
In Chapter 3, we specified the household's optimal consumption
rule in a general sense -- permanent income was assumed to be generated by
physical and human assets in combination with family labor inputs, and
consumption (in Chapter 5) was assumed to be a function of permanent
income, transitory income, and demographic factors (in this case,
household size). No effort was made to address questions of the
endogeneity of family labor inputs, primarily for reasons of data
limitations. The measurement of permanent income and specification of an
optimal consumption rule for the household is seriously complicated if
future labor inputs are assumed to be stochastic. In this section, we
introduce a more general reduced form model of consumption which does not
specify a particular consumption rule for the household. We do so in part
for computational simplicity, and in part to make the test for liquidity
constraints more powerful; we want a test of consumer behavior and not a
test of consumer behavior conditioned on specification. A failure in
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terms of specification may not be distinguishable from a failure in terms
of behavior.
As stated in the previous section, the household attempts to
maximize its lifetime utility function subject to a lifetime budget
constraint. This is only possible if there are no constraints on
borrowing, that is, if the household can borrow or invest (lend) as much
as it wants at a single interest rate. What if there are borrowing
constraints in the present period? In such case, an additional constraint
must be added, e.g., the household behaves as if it maximizes its lifetime
utility function subject to a lifetime budget constraint and a borrowing
constraint. Following Lucas (1980) and Hayashi (1985), let us assume that
the borrowing constraint applies within each period so that consumption
cannot exceed some exogenously given level k. Thus:
ct s k (6.5)
where t denotes a time subscript for each period. If k is sufficiently
large, the problem reduces to the standard permanent income-lifecycle
hypothesis (see Lucas, 1980, for a formal statement of the model). Note
that k is specific to the individual household, and not observed.
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As before, let us assume that the desired level of consumption is
3/c" in the present period. - Actual consumption would then be represented
by
ct = min(c *,k) (6.6)
The basic question, then, is whether ct is less than c", which implies
that the household cannot borrow as much as it would like to meet desired
consumption levels, or whether ct is equal to c *, which implies that
available credit is equal to or greater than desired levels. To state the
model formally,
c if k > c , and (6.7)
= k otherwise.
Unfortunately, we only observe c" for households that are not
liquidity constrained; for other households, we observe the maximum
consumption which could be acheived under the household-specific borrowing
constraint. However, there is no a priori way to know whether we are
observing c" or ct because we do not know which households are liquidity
constrained and which are not. Nonetheless, we can determine whether some
Note that c* may be affected by future liquidity constraints insofar
as these are reflected in a households decision rule concerning
consumption, but it is not affected by present period borrowing
constraints -- it reflects the amount the household would like to consume
if the borrowing constraint is not binding (e.g., c"<k ) According to
Hayashi, "c' solves the fictitious intertemporal optimization problem
where the future borrowing constraints are present, but the current
borrowing constraint is not" (1985, p. 189).
223
households appear to be liquidity constrained using the following
approach.
We observe current income and current consumption for all
households. Some households are savers in the present period -- that is,
they consume significantly less than current income flows -- and some
households are dissavers or neither dissavers or savers -- they consume at
levels comensurate with or greater than current income flows. Households
consuming sufficiently less then current income are extremely unlikely to
be liquidity constrained in the present period. This implies that k is
not a binding constraint. How much is "sufficiently less"? While any
rule of this type is arbitrary, we chose to partition the sample according
to
k > .85(Yt + .40(Cash Savings)) (6.8)
Thus any household consuming less than 85 percent of the sum of current
income plus 40 percent of reported cash savings was assumed not to be
constrained in consumption behavior, that is, to be consuming at c*.
(Note that the .85 and the .40 multipliers simply provide an extra safety
margin; for purposes of the planned statistical tests, it is important
that only households which are not currently liquidity constrained be
included in appropriate group). The remaining households may or may not
be constrained in consumption behavior. If all of them are not, then we
expect their consumption behavior to be statistically indistinguishable
from the clearly unconstrained group's. If at least some households in
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the group are liquidity constrained (but not necessarily all of them),
then their consumption behavior will differ from the unconstrained group's
behavior.
Table 6-1 shows how the sample selection rule in (6.8) paritions
households in each of the three regions of the C6te d'Ivoire. For reasons
which will become apparent later, the group determined by ct<k are
referred to as non-limit observations, and the group determined by ct>k as
limit observations. According to Table 6-1, some 28.8 percent (443 cases)
of household in the CILSS sample are in the non-limit group, that is, are
assumed to be not currently liquidity constrained. The shares are roughly
similar across regions -- 28.3 percent of the sample population from
residing in Abidjan, 34.6 percent in other urban areas, and 26.8 percent
in rural areas. In all cases, there are sufficient observations in both
limit and non-limit groups for application of the formal statistical test.
There are several ways to test for similarities across the two
groups in the sample population. Perhaps the most simple is the standard
Chow-test (1960). Regressions are estimated for the pooled sample and
each subgroup. The maintained hypothesis is parameter equality across the
subgroups. The test statistic is computed as
(RSS - RSS.)/(E-1)K
F(V V ) (6.9)l'V2 RSS./(N-E*K)
1
where: RSS is the residual sum of squares of the pooled
regression;
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Table 6-1
Limit and Non-Limit Observations, By Region
ct < k ct > k
(Non-Limit (Limit
Observations) Observations) Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Abidjan 93 28.3 236 71.7 329 100.0
Other urban 114 34.6 216 65.5 330 100.0
Rural 236 26.8 644 73.2 880 100.0
Total Country 443 28.8 1096 71.2 1539 100.0
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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RSS. is the residual sum of squares of each subgroup
regression;
N is the total number of cases;
K is the number of parameters;
E is the number of equations;
Vi is degrees of freedom equal to (E-1)K;
V2 is degress of freedom equal to (N-E*K).
The test requires homogeneity of the error variances among subgroups,
which can be tested with a Bartlett-test. In interests of brevity, this
latter test was not performed here. Note that if the homogeneity
assumption does not hold, the Chow-test statistic is only an
approximation to the true test value.
Chow-tests are carried out to test for parameter equality across
savings sub-groups classifed by region (Abidjan, other urban, and
rural). These are described in the next section. In performing these
tests, we use the full permanent income specification described in Chapter
3 (e.g., we specify an optimal consumption rule for the household), and
estimate the consumption function parameters by 2SLS for the log-log
specification, which yields correct estimates of standard errors for the
derived variable.
Hayashi (1985) suggests a somewhat more interesting test for
liquidity constraints which provides consistent estimates of consumption
function parameters that are not adulterated by borrowing constraints.
Following Hayashi, let us assume a general consumption function that is a
linear function of a set of independant variables:
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c = aX + E, E(E|X) = 0 (6.10)
The independent variables might include a wide range of effects associated
with consumption levels -- current income, physical assets, education, and
demographic factors -- and transformations within the effects (squared and
interaction terms). Again, recall that our intention here is to specify a
very general and non-restrictive form of the consumption function.
Consider again our sample selection rule, defined previously as
k > .85(Yt + .40(Cash Savings)). Define T = .85(Yt + .40(Cash Savings))
as the threshhold value which seperates households into a subsample within
which c is observed (c t<T) and a subsample within which c* may or may not
be observed (ct >T). A truncated, limited dependant variable can be
defined as
c* if ct<T (6.11)
y =
T otherwise
Clearly this implies that
( X + E if ct<T, and (6.12)
U otherwise
In standard terminology, households that satisfy the sample seperation
rule (ct<T) are called nonlimit households, while those that do not are
called limit households.
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We can obtain consistent (although not necessarily efficient) and
asymptotically normal estimates of the a's if we estimate (6.12) using a
Tobit procedure, even if some of the limit households are liquidity
constrained. Under the alternative hypothesis, namely, that none of the
households in the sample are liquidity constrained (ct=c*), we can obtain
efficient and asymptotically normal estimates if we estimate the general
consumption function by OLS across the entire sample population:
Ct a2 + CE2 (6.13)
The question, then, is whether the two procedures yield the same
results. If the null hypothesis that none of the households are liquidity
constrained is correct, then the results should be statistically
indistinguishable. If, on the other hand, if we can reject the null
hypothesis, at least some of the limit households must evidence different
consumption behavior than the non-limit households. By reason of
experimental design, we interpret these differences as evidence of current
liquidity constraints affecting some segements of the Ivorian
population.
A Hausman specification test (1978) is used to test for
differences in consumption behavior between limit and nonlimit
households. This requires estimation of a Wald-type statistic of the
form:
-L1H(d) = (6 - 6 )(V - V ) (6 -6 ) (6.14)
Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS
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where: d represents degrees of freedom;
aTobit and 6 are the parameter estimates from
the Tobit and OLS procedures, respectively; and
VTobit and VOLS are the sample size adjusted estimates
of the respective asymptotic variance matrices;
The statisic is distributed chi-square with degrees of freedom (d) equal
to the number of parameter constraints, that is, to the number of
coefficients in the model.
A useful feature of the Tobit parameters is that they provide
consistent estimates of true population values regardless of the existence
of liquidity constrained households in the total population, so long as
none of the nonlimit households are liquidity constrained. Tobit
parameters can be used to construct consistent estimates of preferred
consumption, c , which can be measured as TobitX. The
difference (a X-c ) or c represents the shortfall in consumption dueTobit t
to liquidity constraints.
The next section describes the empirical results of both the
Chow-test and the Hausman specification test. As will be seen, there is
evidence of substantial liquidity constraints in all three regions of the
Cote d'Ivoire, as well as within several selected subgroups of the
population.
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6.3 Empirical Results of Liquidity Tests
The estimation sample is partitioned similarly for both the
pooled sample Chow-test and the Tobit-based Hausman specification test.
Table 6-2 shows means and standard deviations by region for the variables
used to perform both tests. As many of the variables have appeared
previously in the household production function and basic consumption
function estimates, we present sample statistics for limit and non-limit
groups only, and do not show aggregate sample statistics.
From Table 6-2 we see that households partitioned into the non-
limit group tend to be substantially wealthier on average than those in
the limit group, regardless of the wealth criterion used. This is
particularly true for households residing in Abidjan, where limit
households earn on average CFA 1,600,848 annually as compared to CFA
5,960,274 for non-limit households. As expected, the difference in annual
expenditures is not as large (CFA 2,513,019 as compared to CFA
3,385,764). However, non-limit households have much higher levels of
savings and total assets, and somewhat more secondary and tertiary
schooling.
Differences between limit and non-limit households in other urban
and rural areas parallel those in Abidjan, but exist to a much lesser
degree. For example, in other urban areas, households in the limit group
spend on average CFA 1,858,097 per year on consumer goods, in contrast to
CFA 2,085,951 for the non-limit group. Income differences are large,
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Table 6-2
Sample Statistics for Two Subsamples
Limit Observations Non-Limit Observations
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Abidjan
Annual expenditures (CFA) 2,513,019 1,674,935 3,387,764 2,253,740
Annual income (CFA) 1,600,848 1,357,279 5,960,247 5,591,160
Household savings (CFA) 108,809 291,653 753,557 1,655,930
Total assets (CFA) 1,292,553 3,250,301 7,792,367 35,006,150
Total household members
Men, 15+ years 1.95 1.41 2.22 1.68
Women, 15+ years 2.03 1.59 2.17 1.81
Children, 0-14 years 3.31 2.56 3.18 3.07
Education (max yrs completed, 20+ years,
spline function)
0-6 years of education 4.55 2.49 4.88 2.33
7-13 years of education 2.54 2.63 4.22 2.90
14+ years of education 0.25 1.02 1.65 2.59
Total years of education 7.34 - 10.75 -
Other Urban Areas
Annual expenditures (CFA) 1,858,097 1,229,510 2,085,951 1,283,376
Annual income (CFA) 1,276,757 1,106,522 3,226,521 1,967,864
Household savings (CFA) 162,837 357,150 689,836 2,570,067
Total assets (CFA) 1,909,072 4,213,539 4,006,119 11,552,718
Total household members
Men, 15+ years 2.07 1.54 2.55 1.92
Women, 15+ years 2.45 2.07 2.51 1.79
Children, 0-14 years 4.04 3.34 4.38 3.28
Education (max yrs completed, 20+ years,
spline function)
0-6 years of education 3.42 2.89 4.17 2.72
7-13 years of education 1.65 2.41 2.67 2.76
14+ years of education 0.08 0.48 0.27 0.94
Total years of education 5.15 - 7.11 -
Rural Areas
Annual expenditures (CFA) 985,917 719,378 1,076,877 1,006,860
Annual income (CFA) 642,943 518,341 2,140,791 2,399,200
Household savings (CFA) 54,900 146,383 325,859 1,164,280
Total assets (CFA) 5,082,641 9,944,323 11,437,937 47,524,300
Total household members
Men, 15+ years 1.84 1.24 2.19 1.78
Women, 15+ years 2.34 1.61 2.83 2.76
Children, 0-14 years 3.91 2.96 4.97 4.90
Education (max yrs completed, 20+ years,
spline function)
0-6 years of education 1.53 2.45 2.16 2.73
7-13 years of education 0.24 0.91 0.66 1.67
14+ years of education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total years of education 1.77 - 2.82 -
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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however (CFA 1,276,757 as compared to CFA 3,226,521). Differences in
sample means for assets and household savings appear large as well, but
within group variability is large as well (as evidenced by large standard
deviations), so they are not significantly different (in a statistical
sense) from one another. In rural areas, consumption levels are similar
for the two subsamples (CFA 985,917 for limit households and CFA 1,076,877
for non-limit households), while income levels are significantly different
(CFA 642,943 compared to CFA 2,140,791, for limit and non-limit
households, respectively), as are levels of household savings (CFA 54,900
compred to CFA 325,859, limit and non-limit households, respectively).
However, neither levels of education nor asset holdings are significantly
different between households in the two subgroups.
To briefly summarize the sample statistics in Table 6-2: Limit
and non-limit households are relatively similar in rural and other urban
areas (or at least not statistically dissimilar), except along the
dimensions upon which the sample was subdivided (income and cash savings
as a proxy for liquid assets). In contrast, the groups are rather more
dissimilar in Abidjan, although between group differences in consumption
levels are not significant. The degree of similarity between limit and
non-limit subgroups is encouraging; we are more willing to believe
differences in consumption patterns between groups are caused by liquidity
constraints rather than some other (excluded) effects if the groups appear
relatively similar along important economic dimensions.
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Pooled Sample Comparisons
Households that are currently liquidity constrained are less able
to consume at levels commensurate with permanent income (or alternatively,
long-run expected income levels) than households that are not currently
liquidity constrained. As a result, we expect that the correlation
between permanent income and consumption to be lower for liquidity-
constrained households than for non-constrained households. Further, if
the permanent income hypothesis holds in its strict form, the marginal
propensity to consume out of permanent income should be equal to one for
non-constrained households. We found earlier that the MPC was
significantly less than one for the total sample. The limit/non-limit
classification allows us to discover whether inappropriate sample
aggregation, namely, combining households that can realize permanent
income levels with those that cannot, is in part responsible for the low
value.
Table 6-3 shows log-log permanent income based consumption
functions for each of the three regions and for the limit/non-limit
groupings within each region. Models are estimated using 2SLS to obtain
correct estimates of standard errors. Two sets of estimates are provided
in Table 6-3, one using per captia income and consumption (to adjust for
important demographic effects) and one using aggregate income and
consumption. The measure of permanent income is derived from household
production functions, as described in Chapter 3. Annex Table 6.1 shows
Table 6-3
Log-Log Consumption Models By Region, Limit/Non-Limit Categories, and Per Capita Adjustment
(Within Group Permanent Income Estimates)
Per Capita 1/ Aggregate Household 2/
Permanent Income Intercept R2  Permanent Income Intercept R2
Abidjan
Limit observations .548 (6.3) 6.202 (5.8) .141 .530 (8.7) 7.216 (8.5) .241
Non-limit observations .976 (22.8) -0.153 (0.3) .852 .892 (19.9) 1.168 (1.7) .815
Pooled sample .518 (10.6) 6.425 (10.5) .255 .491 (12.6) 7.621 (13.7) .327
Other Urban Areas
Limit observations .825 (13.2) 2.601 (3.5) .449 .739 (16.7) 4.082 (6.7) .563
Non-limit observations 1.015 (17.6) -0.646 (0.6) .735 1.083 (14.3) -1.676 (1.5) .647
Pooled sample .757 (14.9) 3.163 (5.1) .403 .681 (17.4) 4.679 (8.5) .479
Rural Areas
Limit observations .271 (4.1) 8.714 (11.9) .025 .531 (14.9) 6.682 (14.5) .254
Non-limit observations .859 (16.0) 1.128 (1.7) .523 .905 (20.8) .753 (1.2) .649
Pooled sample .325 (7.1) 7.989 (15.2) .053 .512 (18.3) 6.769 (18.2) .274
Notes:
1/
- F-statistics for Chow-test are 31.9, 63.2, and 34.1 for Abidjan, other urban areas, and rural areas, respectively.
-F-statistics for Chow-test are 19.5, 56.5, and 27.5 for Abidjan, other urban areas, and rural areas, respectively.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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the underlying aggregate (not based on per capita estimates) production
functions by region for the limit and non-limit household groupings.
The results in Table 6-3 strongly support the hypothesis that
liquidity constraints limit some households' ability to consume at levels
commensurate with permanent income. Across all regions, the marginal
propensity to consume out of permanent income for households we identify
as not currently liquidity constrained is significantly higher than the
MPC for households in the potentially constrained group. Further, the MPC
for the non-constrained households is not significantly different than one
for those residing in Abidjan and other urban areas (.976 and 1.015,
respectively for per capita models, and .892 and 1.082, respectively, for
aggregate models), and very close to one for households residing in rural
areas (.859 and .905 for per capita and aggregate models, respectively).
In addition, model intercepts are not significantly different from zero at
the 95 percent confidence interval. The magnitude of the coefficients in
combination with high explanatory power for non-limit group consumption
functions lend rather strong support to a stricter form of the permanent
income hypothesis.
In contrast, consumption functions for the limit households
evidence comparably low MPC's out of permanent income, high intercepts,
and low explanatory power. The differences are most noticable for
households in Abidjan and rural areas; households in other urban areas
evidence more similar consumption behavior between the sample subgroups.
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For purposes of comparison, consumption estimates are included
for the pooled sample in each region (which simply includes all households
in the region). Note that the estimated MPC out of permanent income for
the pooled model is roughly the same as that estimated for the potentially
constrained group of households, and the R2 indicates relatively poor
explanatory power. Both factors are indicative of a non-homogeneous
population in the pooled estimation sample (or, alternatively,
inapproprate parameter constraints across different segments in the
population).
Chow-tests were performed on both per capita and aggregate
consumption models, by region, using the F-statistic described in the
previous section. Calculated test statistics are given in the notes at
the bottom of Table 6-3. The critical value for the test statistic is 3.0
at the 95 percent confidence interval; thus, based on Chow-test results,
we reject the hypothesis of parameter equality between limit and non-limit
households for both specifications in all three regions.
There are problems which could affect the permanent income
estimates for limit households, and artificially (in terms of our
maintained hypothesis) create the results shown in Table 6-3. Some limit
households may be suffering temporarily low levels of income (recall that
we specifically choose these households on the basis of low income and
savings relative to consumption levels), which would downward bias our
estimates of the household production function parameters. In effect,
returns to input factors will appear lower than in a more typical year.
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Further, it is our sense that reported income is more likely to be
reported below the norm than above the norm, which means that the expected
value of the error term will not necessarily be equal to zero in the
production equation. The measurement error in permanent income will act
to decrease the correlation between permanent income and consumption --
the very results found in Table 6-3.
How can we determine whether these results are real (in the sense
of reflecting actual liquidity constraints in the economy) or an artifice
of data reporting and model structure? While we know of no rigorous
statistical technique to use in this case, the following approach may help
to clarify our findings. In performing the pooled sample test, income was
assumed to be endogenous and determined by a set of instruments for each
subgroup in the sample. This can be formally stated as follows:
Y =a 1Z + 1 (6.15)
Y2 2 a 2
where: groups 1 and 2 are limit and non-limit households,
respectively,
the Z's are the instruments or exogenous variables, and
Y1 and Y2 represent income for limit and
non-limit groups, respectively.
If Y does not represent "normal" returns to factor inputs denoted Z1 (and
further, are off by more than just a scale factor), then predicted income
for limit households will underestimate typical factor incomes. In
effect, the parameter vector a will be downward biased.
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If we assume that income estimates for the non-limit group are
more likely to represent expected returns to input factors than income
estimates for the limit group, a natural solution presents itself. If we
also assume that factor returns should be the same between the subgroups
(e.g., a
=
a =a2 ), then a better estimate of expected income from limit
households' productive activites can be obtained by
substituting a2 for a1 in constructing permanent income estimates. In
essence, we hypothesis that production parameters are downward biased for
limit observations, but are correct for non-limit observations.
Accordingly, we replace the biased estimates ( a 's ) with unbiased
estimates ( a2 's ). Note that the replacement is only acceptable if
factor markets are assumed to operate perfectly and factor incomes are
either low (for some of the limit group) or normal (possibly for some of
the limit group and by assumption for all of the non-limit group).
Table 6-4 presents re-estimates of log-log permanent income
models in which permanent income is defined as a 2Z for limit households
and a2Z2 for non-limit households. Aggregate estimates only are
presented (in contrast to aggregate and per capita estimates) in interests
of brevity. The results are extremely interesting. For households in
Abidjan, the MPC out of permanent income for limit observations is
essentially unchanged by the redefinition of permanent income -- the
4/ Note that standard errors are uncorrected in Table 6-4 as the models
were estimated via a two-step process. Thus, reported t-statistics are
higher than actual (i.e., corrected) values.
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Table 6-4
Log-Log Consumption Models By Region, Limit/Non-Limit Categories
1/2Permanent Income - Intercept R
Abidjan
Limit observations .508 (9.5) 7.025 (8.9) .278
Non-limit observations .892 (12.0) 1.410 (1.3) .617
Other Urban Areas
Limit observations .989 (11.3) -0.215 (0.2) .372
Non-limit observations 1.083 (11.3) -1.677 (1.2) .535
Rural Areas
Limit observations .778 (15.2) 2.816 (4.0) .260
Non-limit observations .905 (12.6) .754 (0.7) .406
Note:
Permanent income estimates based on
non-limit group of households.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
production parameters estimated for
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correlation between permanent income and consumption is still much stonger
for non-limit observations than for limit households, which supports the
hypothesis of liquidity constraints in the sample populaiton. However,
the MPC out of permanent income increases dramatically in other urban
areas; under the maintained hypothesis a=a=a 2 there is no real evidence
of liquity constrained behavior amongst households living in urban areas
outside Abidjan. The MPC out of permanent income also increases over
previous levels in rural areas; however, the value is still significantly
less than one for limit observations and not significantly different than
one for non-limit observations. In short, our results are still
indicative of the existence of liquidity constraints in Abidjan and rural
areas, but not in other urban areas. Further, there is clear indication
that at least some (primarily those residing outside Abidjan) of the limit
observations are managing to shift consumption patterns over time and
obtain some (although not necessarily as much as desired) additional
income to adjust for transitory income shortfalls.
Hausman Specification Test
As described in Section 6.2, a very general consumption model is
estimated for each region using OLS and Tobit to obtain consistent
estimates of consumption function parameters. A Hausman specification
test is used to compare the results. This section describes the empirical
estimation and test results.
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The general form of the consumption model includes standard
variables, squared variables, and various interaction terms. Standard
variables include: (i) current income; (ii) liquid assets (defined as cash
savings alone); (iii) other assets, including other personal assets,
business assets, and farm assets; (iv) value of owned housing stock; (v)
household size (number of men, women, and children); and (vi) years of
education completed (spline variable, 0-6 years, 7-13 years, 14 or more
years). Squared terms are included for (i) current income, (ii) liquid
assets, and (iii) other assets. Interaction terms include (i) household
size * current income, (ii) education * current income, (iii) household
size * other assets. In total, the models have 23 parameters (including
the intercept) for urban households, and 20 parameters for rural
households. Variable means and standard deviations by region were
reported previously in Table 6-2.
Tobit estimation requires that the error term be homoskedastic.
Inspection of model residuals if we estimate a standard linear equation of
the form
ct = a+ E
where: X represents the vector of exogenous variables
described in the preceeding paragraph, and
ct is current consumption;
shows that the variance of the error term increases with increasing levels
of income for all regions, a typical finding in this kind of work. In
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addition, Breusch-Pagen statistics were computed for each region to check
for heteroskedasticity; in all cases, evidence of significant
heteroskedasticity was found. 5 We performed two levels of corrections
in an attempt to obtain homoskedastic residuals. First, the models were
transformed by using the natural log of consumption in place of normal
consumption on the left hand side. As a result of this transformation,
Breusch-Pagen statistics dropped to 21.7, 67.0, and 33.7 for Abidjan,
other urban areas, and rural areas, respectively. In addition, we divided
all variables in the model by the square root of the log of income, on the
assumption that the variance of the residuals is proportional to the
natural log of current income. A plot of model residuals after the two-
tiered correction indicates that the heteroskedasticity problem is
corrected by these adjustments.
After corrections, the estimating equation for each region
becomes
log (c t eog ) = X/log e(Y t) + E (6.16)
The statistic is distributed chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal
to the number of model parameters minus one. The Breusch-Pagen statistics
for the three subsamples (Abidjan, other urban, rural) are 232.0, 651.1,
and 106.4, respectively. The critical value for the 95 percent confidence
interval (df=23) is 33.92 and (df=20 for rural households) 31.41. The
critical value for the 99 percent confidence interval is (df=23) 40.29 and
(df=20) 37.57.
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The empirical results of both Tobit and OLS estimations are
presented in Tables 6-5 through 6-7 for Abidjan, other urban areas, and
rural areas, respectively. Note that all economic variables are expressed
in million CFA, that is, they are scaled by a factor of CFA 1,000,000 in
the tables. Note also that reported parameters are transformed as
described in (6.16), and cannot be compared directly to previous
estimates.
Table 6-5 presents general consumption models for Abidjan: Table
6-5(a) describes OLS estimates on the entire sample, while Table 6-5(b)
describes Tobit estimates using only 81 non-limit observations. By visual
inspection, the two sets of parameters are different along a number of
important dimensions. For example, consumption increases with increasing
levels of liquid assets (as we expect) in both models, and decreases with
increasing levels of non-liquid assets. However, there is a positive (and
significant) correlation between housing assets and consumption in the OLS
model, and (the expected) negative and significant correlation between
housing assets and consumption in the Tobit model. In addition, the size
of the income parameter (.181 as compared to .686) is dissimilar between
the models, and income-based interaction effects are likewise generally
different. Note also the notable differences between demographic
(household size) coefficients in the models.
Table 6-5(a)
Abidjan: OLS Estimates (R2 = .632) /
Household Size Education
Base Men Women Children 0-6 years 7-13 years 14+ years
Base -.076 (1.0) -.040 (1.7) .064 (2.8) .068 (4.7) .028 (1.7) .013 (0.8) .043 (1.4)
Annual income .181 (3.9) .000003 (0.0) -.0025 (0.4) -.0082 (1.9) .0048 (0.5) .0019 (0.3) -.0073 (1.8)
Liquid assets .050 (0.7)
Other assets -.013 (1.2) .0096 (1.7) -.0050 (1.3) .0004 (0.2)
Value of owned housing stock .040 (3.1)
Annual income **2 -.0039 (2.6)
Liquid assets **2 -.0035 (0.4)
Other assets **2 .00003 (0.0)
Estimate of variance of error = .103 (25.6)
Table 6-5(b)
Abidjan: TOBIT Estimates
Base -1.344 (5.3) .0042 (0.1) .039 (0.8) -.1137 (2.7) .0072 (0.1) .031 (0.7) .086 (1.7)
Annual income .686 (6.8) -.0001 (0.1) -.0130 (1.2) .0081 (0.9) -.019 (0.9) -.029 (2.3) -.0070 (1.0)
Liquid assets' .223 (1.9)
Other assets 4 -.0260 (1.3) .0024 (0.2) -.0040 (0.6) .0042 (0.9)
Value of owned housing stock -.697 (2.8)
Annual income **2 -.0069 (2.5)
Liquid assets **2 -.0235 (1.6)
Other assets *12 -.00004 (0.3)
Estimate of variance of error = .154 (2.1)
Notes
1/
2/
3,
4/
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Sample size is 329 total, 81 non-limit households. Value of the likelihood function at convergence is -23.1.
Household cash savings.
Includes all other farm, business, and family assets.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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The computed Hausman specification test statistic is 410.2 for
Abidjan, which leads us to again reject resoundingly the hypothesis that
the models are the same. Insofar as differences can be attributed to
liquidity constraints, there is evidence of liquidity constrained behavior
in sample households in Abidjan.
Table 6-6 shows general reduced form consumption models for
households residing in urban areas outside Abidjan. These models are
similar to those estimated for Abidjan; income, savings, and other assets
have roughly similar effects in both OLS and Tobit estimates, while the
coefficient for housing assets is inexplicitly positive in the OLS model,
and negative (and in this case insignificant) in the Tobit model.
Demographic variables likewise evidence different effects between the two
specifications, as do most of the education variables. The computed
Hausman test statistic is 571.2, indicating significant differences
between the models and suggesting (as in Abidjan) that other urban
households are affected by current liquidity constraints in determining
consumption patterns. Note that this finding contradicts the final
results of the pooled sample comparisons in the previous section.
However, we consider this approach the better of the two for identifying
potential liquidity constraints in the sample population.
6! The statistic is computed using all parameters in the reduced form
equation and the variance estimate of the error term.
Table 6-6(a)
Other Urban Areas: OLS Estimates (R2 = .648) /
Household Size Education
Base Men Women Children 0-6 years 7-13 years 14+ years
Base -. 799 (10.4) .0737 (2.2) .0054 (0.2) .0613 (3.9) .041 (2.3) .022 (0.9) .129 (1.4
Annual income .473 (8.8) -. 0247 (2.1) .0099 (1.0) -. 0150 (2.4) -. 0097 (1.0) .0017 (1.4) -. 042 (1.8)
Liquid assets .087 (1.8)
Other assets .0054 (0.6) -. 0002 (0.0) -. 0029 (1.2) .0012 (0.9)
Value of owned housing stock .058 (3.4)
Annual income **2 -. 026 (3.9)
Liquid assets **2 -.0024 (1.0)
Other assets **2 .000 (0.0)
Estimate of variance of error = .115 (25.7)
Table 6-6(b)
Other Urban Areas: TOBIT Estimates , -
Base -1.162 (5.5) -.0410 (0.7) -. 0491 (0.9) -. 0224 (0.8) .0071 (0.2) -. 0144 (0.3) -. 246 (1.6)
Annual income .683 (7.1) .0328 (1.7) .0106 (0.7) .0052 (0.6) -.0160 (1.0) .0090 (0.7) .0667 (1.9)
Liquid assets Y .071 (1.2)
Other assets .007 (0.5) -.0029 (0.3) -.0050 (0.9) .0014 (0.4)
Value of owned housing stock -.012 (0.5)
Annual income **2 -.056 (5.4)
Liquid assets **2 -. 0013 (0.5)
Other assets **2 .0004 (1.2)
Estimate of variance of error = .129 (1.8)
Notes
1/
3,
4,
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Sample size is 330 total, 87 non-limit- households. Value of the likelihood function at convergence is -2.3.
Household cash savings.
Includes all other farm, business, and family assets.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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Problems were encountered in computing the Hauseman test
statistic for rural households; if the full rural sample is used, the
variance matrix (VTobit - VOLS) is singular. This does not occur if the
estimation sample is truncated to include only households earning more
than CFA 250,000 per year, which constitutes more than 80 percent of the
rural sample. Table 6-7 presents reduced form consumption parameters for
these households. The results are by and large consistent with previously
described estimates. Note, however, that the coefficent on non-liquid
assets is positive and significant in both the Tobit and OLS equations.
Care must be taken in interpreting these results; because of demographic
interactions, this does not mean that consumption levels necessarily
increase with increasing levels of fixed assets. Consider the derivative
of consumption with respect to family assets based on rural Tobit
estimates:
3c t/3(Fixed Assets) = .014*(Fixed Assets) + .000002*(Fixed Assets)2
- .0026*(No. Women) - .00008*(No. Men) - .0006*(No. Children)
Thus, the model predicts that, all other things being equal, consumption
will rise with increasing fixed asset levels only for relatively small
households. As household size increases, consumption falls with asset
levels at an increasing rate.
The Hauseman statistic for the 80 percent rural sample is
154.3. If the sample truncation point is increased to CFA 400,000 per
annum, the statistic falls to 145.1. As in other regions, we thus reject
Table 6-7(a)
Rural Areas: OLS Estimates (R2 = .433)
Household Size Education
Base Men Women Children 0-6 years 7-13 years 14+ years
Base -.865 (17.8) .0276 (1.2) .0393 (2.1) .0289 (3.1) .0268 (2.3) -.0190 (0.7) -
Annual income .343 (9.6) .0159 (1.3) -.0129 (1.6) .0041 (1.2) -.0063 (0.9) .0025 (0.3) - -
Liquid assets - .279 (3.0)
Other assets 4 .019 (4.8) -.0029 (2.0) .0003 (0.3) -.0006 (1.1)
Value of owned housing stock - -
Annual income **2 -.0219 (6.9)
Liquid assets **2 -.0294 (2.5)
Other assets **2 -.0000 (0.0)
Estimate of variance of error = .135 (38.6)
Table 6-7(b)
Rural Areas: TOBIT Estimates I 2/
Base -1.523 (9.8) .0263 (0.5) .0085 (0.2) .0012 (0.1) -. 0241 (0.9) .0570 (1.1)
Annual income .573 (9.3) -.0085 (0.5) .0012 (0.1) .0103 (2.0) .0938 (1.0) -.0129 (0.9)
Liquid assets .324 (2.6)
Other assets 4 .014 (1.8) -.0007 (0.3) -.0026 (1.2) -.0006 (0.7)
Value of owned housing stock - -
Annual income **2 -.0375 (7.3)
Liquid assets **2 -.0300 (1.9)
Other assets **2 .0000 (0.2)
Estimate of variance of error = .163 (2.2)
Notes
21
3/
4/
t-statistics are in parentheses.
Sample size is 746 total, 86 non-limit households. Value of the likelihood function at convergence is -46.8.
Household cash savings.
Includes all other farm, business, and family assets.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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the null hypothesis of parameter equality between the two samples, and
thereby once again find evidence of liquidity constraints affecting
current consumption behavior.
Specification tests were carried out on other selected
subsamples, with similar results. For example, household were partitioned
into those receiving wage income (509 cases) and those not receiving wage
income, and the OLS and Tobit models re-estimated for wage households only
(on the assumption that households receiving wages may yield more accurate
estimates of income than households dependent on income from self-
employment). The estimated Hauseman statistic is 526.3 for the wage
group, which provides strong support to the hypothesis of liquidity
constraints. Households were also partitioned into nuclear (526 cases)
units and extended units; evidence of liquidity constaints was found for
nuclear households -- the Hauseman statistic is 192.8 -- but problems with
matrix singularity prevented us from computing the Hauseman statistic for
non-nuclear households.
While more extensive testing within different segments of the
population is possible, these results are sufficient to support the
hypothesis of liquidity constraints acting to influence consumption
patterns across a wide and heterogeneous band of the Ivorian population.
How severely do current liquidity constraints affect consumption
patterns in the C6te d'Ivoire? As noted in a previous section, the Tobit
parameters provide unbiased estimates of true consumption parameters in
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the population regardless of the outcomes of the specification tests.
Accordingly, we used these parameters to predict desired consumption
levels, c , based on exogenous variables and the reduced form consumption
coefficients. Based on this exercise, households residing in Abidjan are
found to be consuming on average 4.6 percent less than they wish to (limit
households alone are consuming 13.8 percent less than desired), households
residing in other urban areas are consuming an average of 6.5 percent less
than desired levels (12.8 percent for limit households alone), and rural
households are consuming 5.6 percent less than desired levels (the figure
for limit households is only slightly larger than for the total). Thus,
while the quantitative effects are not so great as the outcomes of the
statistical tests might have lead up to expect, they are still
considerable for a substantial share of households in the C6te d'Ivoire.
To summarize the results of this chapter: We found convincing
evidence that liquidity constraints influence consumption patterns in the
C6te d'Ivoire, despite data limitations and potential problems with
measurement error. However, this work should be viewed as a bare
beginning to the identification and analysis of liquidity constraints in
developing areas. What we have established is that consumption patterns
may be significantly affected by liquidity considerations; not all
households manage to "realize" their permanent income potential, which
results in a loss in consumer welfare. These findings have broad
ramifications, both in terms of modelling consumer bahavior and assessing
the potential welfare impact of economic policy. On the modelling side,
care must be taken in assessing savings and consumption propensities; a
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low correlation between consumption and permanent income may reflect an
inability to obtain credit and invest at the proper time and to the extent
desired. Policy ramifications are somewhat broader; clearly greater
availability of credit and more extensively developed capital markets will
improve overall levels of welfare. Many household's responses to policy
actions will be dictated by their access to credit and capital markets;
austerity measures that do not greatly change long run or permanent income
may have a much sharper impact on (generally poor) households for whom
current income is a more accurate measure of permanent income (in the
sense of influencing consumption behavior) than permanent income itself.
Annex Table 6.1
Household Production Functions By Region and Limit/Non-Limit Grouping
Abidjan Other Urban Areas Rural Areas
Limit (N=215) Non-limit (N=90) Limit (N= ) Non-limit (N ) Limit (N= ) Non-limit (N=
Physical Assets
Personal assets (CFA) .054 (3.6) .053 (4.1) .095 (4.7) .050 (2.9) .038 (3.3) .069 (5.2)
Non-farm business (CFA) .0139 (0.1) .0085 (0.9) .0067 (0.7) .029 (3.3) .017 (1.6) .042 (4.9)
Land holdings (Ha) .157 (1.0) .099 (0.8) -. 061 (0.9) -. 012 (0.2) .573 (8.5) .303 (4.8)
Time Inputs
Adult male (hours/year) .063 (2.4) .066 (2.9) .030 (1.3) .015 (0.6) .113 (5.1) -. 023 (0.7)
Adult female (hours/year) .036 (1.6) .014 (0.9) .057 (3.4) .004 (0.3) .093 (4.8) .025 (1.0)
Human Capital
Experience (age-6-educ. of head) .197 (1.2) .321 (3.6) .095 (0.8) .067 (0.6) -. 063 (0.6) -. 016 (0.1)
Education
Male 0-6 years .027 (0.7) -.009 (0.3) .087 (3.3) .080 (3.4) .064 (2.7) -.012 (0.5)
Male 7-13 years .001 (0.0) .149 (4.4) .064 (1.8) .032 (2.2) .027 (0.5) .079 (2.1)
Male 14+ years .157 (1.4) .030 (0.9) .039 (0.3) .063 (1.0) - - - -
Female 0-6 years .083 (2.2) .065 (2.1) .045 (1.7) .045 (2.0) .027 (0.9) .089 (3.2)
Female 7-13 years .081 (1.3) -. 027 (0.8) .024 (0.5) -. 004 (0.1) .. 163 (1.1) -. 022 (0.3)
Female 14+ years -. 024 (0.2) .039 (0.9) .881 (1.0) 4234 (1.4) - - -
Intercept 11.743 (19.2) 12.366 (28.4) 11.419 (23.1) 13.025 (31.7) 10.264 (21.9) 12.608 (26.3)
R2 .235 .638 .411 .490 .318 .396
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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7. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
This chapter presents a broad overview of the findings of the
research. These are described in roughly the order in which they occur in
the body of the work.
Beginning with the descriptive work in Chapter 2, households who
obtain income from wages are typically among the wealthiest in the Cbte
d'Ivoire, with the exception of a small number of very successful
entrepreneurs. In contrast, farm households, particularly those who do
not engage in income earning activities outside the household, are among
the poorest. This is somewhat surprising, given the export-crop lead
growth strategy pursued by Ivorian policy-makers since independence. As
expected, however, cash crop farmers (primarily coffee and cocoa
cultivators) are significantly better off than households growing only
subsistence crops. Note that over two-thirds of farm households grow
coffee or cocoa, and most of these grow basic food crops as well. An
estimated 53 percent of the total value of food consumed in rural areas is
home-produced rather than purchased, in contrast to 28 percent for the
country as a whole.
Urban households appear notably better off than rural hosueholds,
earning nearly twice as much on average as their rural counterparts.
Unfortunately, urban/rural comparisons are hindered by a lack of
dependable regional price indices. However, based on rough estimates,
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urban households in the COte d'Ivoire consume at least twice as much on
average as rural households. In contrast to differences in absolute
levels of welfare, the distribution of income and consumption are
relatively similar between the regions. For example, the Gini coefficient
on income in Abidjan is .536 as compared to .525 in rural areas. In
contrast, the Gini coefficient on consumption expenditures is .354 for
households residing in Abidjan and .379 for rural households. While
consumption is more evenly distributed than income, neither measure
indicates a very equitable distribution of resource flows in the country.
Stocks of assets are even more unevenly distributed than income
or consumption, as documented in Chapter 3. Exceptions include primary
and secondary schooling in urban areas (particularly in Abidjan), and land
in rural areas. Education, or so-called human capital, appears to be the
main type of asset held by urban households, while land is the predominant
asset held by rural households. Note that the COte d'Ivoire is not (yet)
a land scarce country; under present policies, anyone can obtain land
(albeit sometimes in inaccessible areas) at little or no cost. However,
there is virtually no land market in most rural areas due to prevailing
traditions regarding land acquisitions and transfers. There is, however,
a very active rural labor market that operates under the guise of
sharecropping contracts. Nearly 40 percent of farmers who cultivate cash
crops report that sharecroppers work on their land. Note that
sharecropping arrangements in the COte d'Ivoire appear to be a means by
which a landowner acquires labor rather than a laborer acquires land; the
landowner by-and-large retains control over the land that is sharecropped,
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and often spends considerable time working on the land with the
sharecropper. The sharecropper is "paid" a fixed percentage of crop
revenues, typically one-half or one-third of the total. Not surprisingly,
we found few individuals who report working for wages (as opposed to a
share of crop revenues) in the C6te d'Ivoire's agriculture sector.
While savings rate estimates described in Chapter 4 are low
compared to other developing areas (possibly due in part to problems of
income underestimation), national accounts estimates suggest that CILSS
estimates are not greatly out of line with interpolations based on
historical trends in private savings. Only 35 percent of respondents
earned more than they spent in the survey year, while 59 percent were
dissavers and 6 percent spent roughly what they earned. Note that over 90
percent of all households in the bottom 20 percent of the income
distribution are dissaving, in contrast to only 19 percent in the upper 20
percent of the income distribution. Note that we found little correlation
between savings rates and consumption levels, which lends credence to the
hypothesis that consumption expenditures are highly correlated with
permenant income levels.
The savings models described in the latter half of the chapter
provide convincing evidence that the likelihood of being a dissaver is
highly correlated with income shortfalls -- the greater the difference
between permanent income and current (or reported income), the higher the
probability of dissaving in the survey year. This is an expected and (in
terms of evaluating data quality) encouraging result.
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Based on consumption function estimates, marginal propensities to
save are indeed found to be highest for households obtaining income from
self-employment activities (both farm and non-farm), in support of our
first major research hypothesis. We interpret this as a propensity to
invest in own-production activities, possibly reflecting one way in which
private savings respond to investment opportunities. In addition,
permanent income effects are important in the consumption models described
in the chapter; the marginal propensity to save out of permanent income is
low on average (.2 to .3 for the country as a whole) in comparison to the
MPS out of transitory income, which typically ranges from .5 to .6,
depending on model specification and the level of income at which it is
evaluated.
Finally, convincing evidence of liquidity constraints was found
in all three regions of the country. Liquidity constrained households
evidence different consumption behavior than non-constrained households.
Further, the permanent income model is much more strongly substantiated
for non-constrained household than for the (potentially) constrained
group. Our rough estimates show that households in Abidjan consume on
average 4.6 percent less because of liquidity constraints, while
households in other urban areas consume 6.5 percent less than desired.
Rural households consume on average 5.6 percent less than they would if
there were no liquidity constraints. It is not surprising that the
effects of liquidity constraints are less in Abidjan, where formal credit
and savings institutions are more pervasive. Note that households
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reporting low levels of income in the current year are most heavily
affected by liquidity constraints; our estimates show that these
households are consuming some 12 to 13 percent less than they would if
credit were more readily available.
In summary, households in the Cote d'Ivoire are not extensive
savers, likely due to expectations formed by past trends in goverment
spending and public policy (for example, schooling and health care have
been virtually free and are generally accessible), underdevelopment of
factor markets in rural areas, particularly land and credit markets, and
twenty years of impressive economic growth. At present, only small-scale
entrepeneurs are making a significant contribution to the expansion of the
capital stock, and much of this is in the service sector rather than the
export sector. The country's primary exports, coffee and cocoa, are still
cultivated in a traditional, labor-intensive fashion. Farmers are
cautious in expanding land area under cultivation because coffee and cocoa
prices have been somewhat unstable in recent years, and government
controlled prices are historically well below world prices. However, the
Cote d'Ivoire has undergone drastic changes since 1980, and the government
is making a consolidated effort to "liberalize" the economy and encourage
expansion of the private sector. For this to be successful, individuals
will have to change savings and consumption patterns. Thus far, shifts
have primarily occured in sectors where individuals preceive a reason to
save and have viable investment alternatives. On this basis, it appears
that the government will have to actively pursue policies that encourage
the development of viable investment alternatives in order to increase
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levels of private savings. In addition, it is critically important to
improve household's access to sources of credit to increase private
resource mobilization.
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ANNEX I
Imputed Rents for Urban Households
In line with previous work (see, for example, Lee and Trost,
1978, Maddala, 1984) selectivity corrected (Heckman, 1979) hedonic rent
equations were estimated in order to impute rental values to owner-
occupied housing. The approach is conceptually simple; households who own
their dwelling unit receive an annual flow of services from the unit equal
to what they would have had to pay to rent it -- in short, home owners are
treated as if they rent their dwelling unit from themselves.
Rent imputations were made for home owners in urban areas
(Abidjan and other urban) only. Rural households were excluded primarly
for reasons of data availability; some 97 percent of rural households
reside in units they own, and infomation on rural rental markets is too
limited to allow any assessment of rent-to-value ratios in these areas.
Further, many rural households are not permitted (due to family, ethnic,
or other cultural sanctions) to sell land or buildings. The exclusion of
rural households from rental assessments does not mean that rural
households receive no housing service flows from owned dwelling units, but
rather that we lack sufficient information to estimate said service flows
with any degree of accuracy. In any case, exclusion of rural households
from rent imputations will not affect savings estimates as rent
imputations enter both income and consumption valuations.
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Some 46 percent of households in urban areas outside Abidjan
reside in a dwelling unit they own themselves, in comparison to only 23
percent of households living in Abidjan. On the assumption that
regionally diverse housing markets may operate along different lines,
seperate hedonic equations are estimated for (i) Abidjan and (ii) other
urban areas in aggregate. While it be preferable to further dissagregate
other urban estimates, sample size limitations made this impractical.
This Annex includes a brief description of the underlying sample
selectivity model (knowledge of standard hedonic rent equations is
assumed), estimates for Abidjan and other urban areas of a probit
indicator function to predict probabilities of renting and owning, and
selectivity-corrected hedonic rent estimates for each group of households.
Derivation of the Basic Model
We only observe rental payments for households presently in the
rental market; the CILSS data does not include a measure of estimated rent
for home owners, nor does it include the present market value of the
dwelling unit. We will use the actual rents paid by renters to impute
rents for households who own their dwelling units.
In doing so, we first estimate a hedonic rent function which
relates rents paid to characteristics of the housing unit and neighborhood
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for all renters. In general terms, the hedonic function can be represented
as
R = f(Zi,...,Znjhousehold is a renter) (A1.1)
where: R is the market rent, and
ZP,...,Zn are characteristics of the neighborhood or
housing structure.
What we ultimately want is the expected rental value of owner-
occupied dwelling units, that is,
E[R|(Z ,...,Zn), household is an owner].
We obtain this measure in the following way. First, assume all households
are either renters or owners (squatters are ignored for the present).
Define an indicator variable, 6, which takes on a value of one if the
household rents its dwelling unit and 0 otherwise. If we assume that
rents are some linear function of housing and neighborhood
characteristics, then
unknown, if 6 = 0
R=
6Z + E1if 6 = 1 (A1.2)
We specify a function to predict whether a household rents or owns its
dwelling unit. The function includes characteristics of the households
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and its members on the right-hand side, and the indicator variable, 6, on
the left-hand side. It is likewise assumed to be linear in parameters.
6 = aX + e2 (A1.3)
where: 6 is a 0,1 indicator variable, and
X is a vector of independent variables describing
household and individual characteristics.
We wish to obtain an unbiased estimate of rents from equation
(A1.2). We cannot simply estimate (Al.2) for renters and use the
coefficents to impute rents for owners due to classic selectivity
problems. Heckman (1979) has shown that an unbiased estimate of rents for
the total population can be obtained using the following approach.
As before,
R = $Z + e given that E[c ]=0, E[e 2]=
6 = aX + E given that E[E ]=0, E[s 2 = 22 1
f(C ,62 ) is bivariate normal,
F(e ,E2 ) is the corresponding cumulative density function,
E[e 1 , 2 ] = a1 2.
R is observed iff E 2> -aX,
R is not observed if E 2< -aX.
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We know that the expected value of rents for the total population
is (the following derivation is based on Van der Gaag, 1984):
E[RIZ] = aZ (A1.4)
However, the expected value of rents for households in the rental market
(that
is, conditioned on the fact that the household is a renter rather than
owner)
is
E[RIZ, e2 >-aX] = aZ + y(X ) (A1.5)
where X (typically called the Mills-ratio correction
factor) is defined as
S= f(-aZ) (Al.6)1 1-F(-aZ)
012
Y = 1 (A1.7)
22
and f(.) and F(.) are the normal denisty and cumulative
functions, respectively.
Recall that we actually want to estimate the expected value of
rents conditioned on the household being a home owner, that is, the
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expected rental value of an owned dwelling unit. Given the above
derivation, this is equivalent to
E[RIZ, e2<-aX] . (A1.8)
We know that
E[RIZ] = E[RjZ, e >-aX]*E[2 >-aX] + E[R|Z, e2<-aX]*E[2 <-aX]
(Al.9)
From this it follows that
E[RIZ, 2 <-aX] = 6Z + y(X 2
where X -f(-aX)2 F(-aX)
(A1.10)
(Al.11)
Using equation (A1.10), we can compute the expected value of
rent, conditioned not only on housing and neighborhood characteristcs for
home owners, but also on the likelihood of being an owner. The measure of
imputed rent used in this study is just this -- the expected rent for the
sample of owners rather than the full sample (as is more typically done in
income and consumption assessments).
The model is estimated in two steps following Maddala (1984).
First, estimates of -aX are obtained from a binary probit model
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using 6 (the decision to own or rent) as the dependant variable. These
results are then used to estimate X, , which is one of the exogenous
variables in the hedonic rent equation. X2 is likewise estimated from
the probit equation, and is used with the a's from the hedonic rent
equation(s) to impute rents for home-owners, i.e.,
Imputed Rent = BZ + y (X 2
The next section describes the specification of and empirical results from
the binary owner/renter probit equation and hedonic rent functions for
CILSS sample households.
Empirical Results
The owner/renter probit model includes a wide array of variables
specific to the household. Among these are: (i) employment variables;
(ii) measures of housing subsidies; (iii) meaures of assets and income;
(iv) demographic variables; (v) length of time in present location; and
(vi) specific characteristics of the household head. Annex Table 1-1(a)
shows means and standard deviations of these variables for households in
Abidjan and in other urban areas. According to this table, some 11
percent of households in Abidjan and 12 percent in other urban areas
receive some form of wage-related housing subsidy. Only 4 percent of
dwelling units are used for business purposes in Abidjan as opposed to 11
percent in other urban areas. In addition, households in Abidjan have
lived in the city (although not necessarily in the same dwelling unit) for
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Annex Table 1-1(a)
Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables: Indicator Function for Tenure Choice
Abidjan Other Urban Areas
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Employee in household? .74 - .58
Public employee in household? .30 - .31
Does household receive housing subsidies? .11 - .12 -
Value of subsidies per month (CFA) 5,987 20,796 6,012 18,549
Is dwelling unit used for business? .04 - .11
Measures of assets and income
- total expenditures I (CFA/yr) 2,513,928 1,721,709 1,684,050 1,162,245
- present value of business assets (CFA) 664,660 4,378,490 276,114 1,211,956
- income from durables (CFA/yr) 40,897 89,584 33,464 36,382
- value of outstanding debts (CFA) 441,394 2,437,225 219,582 1,228,481
- present value of cash savings (CFA) 322,285 1,085,908 342,494 1,607,442
Years household lived in current place 17.63 11.73 13.14 13.89
Household size 7.37 4.54 8.85 5.79
Characteristics of the household head
- female? .12 - .11 -
- not Ivorian? .30 - .20 -
- age 42.12 11.32 44.81 13.62
- years of education 5.95 5.99 4.29 5.23
Notes:
1/ Excludes imputed rents and durables.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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an average of 17.63 years, while households in other urban areas have live
in the same place for an average of 13.14 years. Note also that 30
percent of households in Abidjan are not native to the country, as
compared to 20 percent in other urban areas. This suggests that there are
a significant proportion of non-indigenous people in the C6te d'Ivoire.
Households are large in both areas; in Abidjan, households have on average
7.37 members, while in other urban areas they have 8.85 members.
The hedonic rent equations only include variables relating to the
housing unit or neighborhood. In particular, these are (i) descriptions
of the physical structure; (ii) availabiltiy of public services; and (iii)
size of the unit. Annex Table 1-1(b) shows means and standard deviations
for exogenous variables included in the hedonic rent equations. From this
table, we see that dwelling units in urban areas outside Abidjan are
substantially larger than those in Abidjan -- units in Abidjan are on
average 54.95 square meters, as compared to 81.37 square meters in other
urban areas. Note also that units in Abidjan are far less likely to be
occupied by single families, but generally have higher levels of public
services (particulary water and sanitation).
Annex Table 1-2 shows parameter estimates of probit owner/renter
indcator functions for households in Abidjan and other urban areas. In
general, the results are encouraging and reveal some interesting facets of
Ivorian housing markets. In particular, for households in Abidjan, other
things being equal the probability of renting increases with increasing
levels of total expenditures, housing subsidies, and education, and
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Annex Table 1-1(b)
Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables: Hedonic Rent Equation
Abidjan Other Urban Areas
Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Area (meters ) 54.95 57.53 81.37 67.31
Dwelling unit characteristics
- walls of permanent materials? .96 - .80
- electric lighting? .81 - .75
- fuel supply gas or electricity? .29 - .13 -
- indoor water faucet? .44 - .21 -
- flush toilet? .80 - .24 -
- inside toilet facilities? .45 - .25 -
Structural characteristics
- detached, single family home .09 - .28 -
- compound, single family occupied .07 - .34 -
Rent (CFA/month) 25,961 36,771 22,408 22,215
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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Annex Table 1-2
Indicator Functions for Choice of Housing Tenure, Renters' Versus Owners
(all coefficients estimated with respect to the rent alternative)
Abidjan Other Urban Areas
Employee in household? -.286 (0.75) .332 (1.30)
Public employee in household? - - .968 (3.29)
Does household receive housing subsidies? 1.259 (1.76)
Value of subsidies per month (CFA) -.000011 (1.38)
Is dwelling unit used for business? .411 (0.75) -.205 (0.07)
Measures of assets and income
- total expenditures (000 CFA/yr) .000468 (1.79) .00116 (2.26)
- present value of business assets (000 CFA) -.0000357 (0.79)
- income from durables (000 CFA/yr) -.00395 (1.37) .0025 (0.50)
- value of outstanding debts (000 CFA/yr) -.0000346 (0.64) -
- present value of cash savings (000 CFA) .0000249 (0.23) -
Years household lived in current place -.012 (1.49) -.013 (1.21)
Household size - -.150 (4.91)
Characteristics of the household head
- female? - -.328 (1.09)
- age - -.033 (1.86)
- not Ivorian? - 1.198 (4.32)
- years of education .031 (1.31) -.556 (0.52)
Interaction variables
- Employee * total expenditures (000 CFA) .000129 (0.75) -
- Age of head * total expenditures (000 CFA) -.0000154 (3.88) -.0000173 (1.6)
- Age of head * education of head - .0017 (0.64)
Intercept 1.389 (3.77) 1.482 (1.85)
Model statistics
Log-likelihood value
- at zero -172.3 -209.3
- at convergence -136.5 -103.4
X2 statistic 71.73 211.96
Percent renters 76.0% 50.3%
Number of cases 313 302
Notes:
1/ Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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decreases with increases in durable flows, outstanding debt, and length of
residence. Interaction effects (total expenditures with employment
status, age, and education of the household head) were generally not
significant, with the exception of age*expenditures, which has a negative
(and significant) sign. Combining of the two expenditure variables (total
expenditures, age*total expenditures) tells us that the probability of
renting increases as income rises, but at equal levels of income "older"
households are more likely to own their dwelling unit than households with
younger heads.
The models for other urban areas are generally similar to those
for Abidjan, with one or two notable exceptions. For example, households
with at least one public employee are more likely to rent a dwelling unit
than those without an employee, In addition, large households are less
likely to be renters than smaller households, as are female-headed
households, and households with older heads. Not surprisingly, non-
Ivorian households are significantly more likely to rent a dwelling unit
than indigenous households. At least some of the effects found in urban
areas outside Abidjan reflect the stronger rural orientation of these
households -- other "urban" areas range from medium-sized cities to
villages.
(Note that specifications are not identical between the two areas
due to estimation problems with the second step of model estimation -- the
hedonic rent functions. Some full(er) specifications caused problems in
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the estimated ratio of error variances between the two equations in the
model.)
Annex Table 1-3 shows hedonic rent estimates for households in
Abidjan and other urban areas. The variable on the left-hand side is cash
plus kind rental payments measured in CFA per month. A standard linear
model is estimated for each subsample. In addition, a semi-log model --
the natural log of monthly rent is used as the dependent variable -- is
estimated for Abidjan. This latter model was used to make rent
imputations for households in Abidjan.
Comparisons can be made between the rent equations for Abidjan's
households and those residing in other urban areas, although the models
are not symetric so far as variable inclusion is concerned. Note that
both models include a measure of the total area of the housing unit (and
area squared, to control for nonlinearities), structural characteristics
(single family versus non-single family units), some dwelling unit
characteristics (materials used in the walls, source of fuel supplies),
and "cluster"-specific dummy variables. Models differ in terms of
dwelling characteristics -- for Abidjan, a source of lighting dummy is
included, while dummy variables relating to water and sanitation were
found significant for other urban areas.
According to Table 1-3, households in Abidjan are willing to pay
an average of CFA 309.7 per square-meter per month, in comparison to CFA
337.2 per square-meter per month for urban households outside of
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Annex Table 1-3
Hedonic Rent Equations Corrected for Sample Selectivity
Abidjan 1/ Other Urban Areas 3
Log (rent) Rent
Area (meters2)
Area-squared
.023 (7.93) 309.7 (2.9)
-.000049 (3.08) .843 (1.5)
337.2 (8.93)
-. 392 (7.37)
Dwelling unit characteristics
- walls of permanent materials?
- electric lighting?
- fuel supply gas or electricity?
- indoor water faucet?
- flush toilet?
- inside toilet facilities?
Structural characteristics
- detached single-family home
- compound, single family occupied
Community intercepts:
- Bietry
- Autre Abobo
Community intercepts:
- Agnibilekrou
- Man
- Bouake Air Force
Abidjan
.416
.177
.552
(2.28)
(1.79)
(5.67)
12,863
588.7
19,067
(1.9)
(1.2)
(5.4)
-.154 (0.94) 10,237 (1.7)
.755 (2.53) 49,712 (4.6)
.593 (2.43) 59,226 (6.5)
.282 (1.40) 13,499 (1.8)
other urban areas
861.3
12,949.0
3,384.1
7,177.2
6,954.7
(0.30)
(4.61)
(1.22)
(1.87)
(2.10)
-7,541.0 (3.27)
-2,721.5 (1.08)
2,790.5
-2,231.2
8,565.5
(0.61)
(0.55)
(1.94)
7.988 (38.92) -17,465 (2.4)
.176 (1.05) 13,309 (2.2)
.696
51.9
238
25,961
-1,846.9 (0.57)
5,270.0 (2.40)
Model statistics
.645
F-statistic
Number of cases
Mean of dependent variable
41.43
238
9.636
.782
38.16
152
22,408
1/ Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of monthly rent (cash + kind) and monthly rent (cash + kind).
2/ Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses.
3/ Dependent variable is monthly rent (cash + kind).
Source: CILSS tabulations.
Intercept
Lambda
Notes:
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Abidjan. Note that rents per unit area fall gradually with increasing
size of the dwelling unit in other urban areas, while tending to rise with
increasing size in Abidjan. Note also that the area-based variables
evidence stronger effects in the log-linear model, which suggests that
there are substantial non-linearities in the relationship between rents
and the size of dwelling units.
In Abidjan, households are willing to pay some CFA 12,863 per
month to obtain walls made of permanent materials (cement, brick, stone,
wood, iron), CFA 588.7 per month for electricity, and CFA 19,067 to reside
in a unit with gas or electric cooking facilities. In comparison,
households in other urban areas are willing to pay only CFA 861.2 per
month for walls made of permanent materials, CFA 12,949 for gas or
electric cooking facilities, CFA 3,384 for an indoor water faucet, CFA
7,177 for a flush toilet, and CFA 6,955 for inside toilet facilities.
Also, households were willing to pay an additional CFA 10,237 per
month to live in a single family detached home in Abidjan, and CFA 49,712
to live in a single family compound. In contrast, households in other
urban areas were actually willing to pay less for single family units than
multi-family units. However, the signs and magnitudes of the parameters
must be interpreted in light of other variables included in the model --
we are, in effect, controlling for different factors in each of the
regionally-based models, and these differences may impact the scale and
direction of all coefficients.
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It is interesting to note that the coefficient for the Mills-
ratio correction factor is positive and significant in the linear models
for both Abidjan and other urban areas, although not significant in the
log-linear model. This means that there is significant correlation
between the error term in the probit equation and the error term in the
hedonic rent equation (recall that y , the correction coefficient, is
equal to 012 2 2 from (A1.7)); in short, sample selectivity appears to12 22
cause problems in imputing rents to home owners in the C6te d'Ivoire, and
should therefore be taken into account (for example, as we have done here)
in the imputation procedure.
The explanatory power of the model in both regions is good -- for
Abidjan, the estimated R2 is .645 and .696 (semi-log and linear,
respectively), while for other urban areas the R2 is .782 (linear only).
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ANNEX II
Annualized Value of Durables
In the CILSS, households were asked to identify the durables they
own, when each was purchased, for what price, and the current value of
each durable at the time the survey was administered. This information
was used to impute an annualized flow of services obtained from the stock
of durables owned by the household. This annex briefly describes stock of
durables owned by Ivorian households, and how durable flow imputations
were made.
Annex Table II-1 shows durable ownership by region for thirteen
classes of durable stocks. According to these tabulations, urban
households, be they in Abidjan or outside, are much more likely to own
almost any kind of durable good than rural households. Bicycles form the
one exception to this rule; some 44.5 percent of rural households report
owning a bicycle at the time the survey was administered, as compared to
only 22.6 percent of households living in cities outside Abidjan and 3.6
percent of households in Abidjan.
According to Annex Table II-1, the most frequently owned
household durable is a radio/cassette player -- some 45.8 percent of
households in the C6te d'Ivoire report owning at least one. 68 percent of
households in Abidjan own a television set, 57.8 percent of households in
other urban areas, and 8 percent of rural households, for a national total
of 30.7 percent. About half of the urban households also reported owning
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Annex Table II-1
Percentage Households Owning Durables, By Durable Category and Region
Other
Durable Abidjan Urban Areas Rural Areas Total
Sewing machine 33.2 36.4 12.7 21.9
Gas stove 37.7 23.8 2.0 14.0
Refrigerator 53.6 50.0 4.7 24.3
Air conditioner 19.2 11.1 0.0 6.4
Fan 49.7 49.4 3.7 22.9
Radio 30.8 28.0 19.6 23.5
Radio/cassette player 55.7 64.2 36.4 45.8
Phonograph 6.3 6.6 3.2 4.5
Stereo equipment 20.9 13.9 0.5 7.6
Television set 68.0 57.8 8.0 30.9
Bicycle 3.6 22.6 44.5 30.7
Mobylette 1.5 21.4 18.5 15.3
Car or truck 22.2 14.8 2.2 9.0
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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a fan and a refrigerator; country-wide totals are 22.9 and 24.3 percent,
respectively (ownership is rare in rural areas). Sewing machines are
fairly common throughout the C6te d'Ivoire; ownership levels are 33.2
percent, 36.4 percent, and 12.7 percent in Abidjan, other urban areas, and
rural areas, respectively. Note that only 22.2 percent of households in
Abidjan own an automobile or truck, as compared to 14.8 percent on other
urban areas and 2.2 percent in rural areas. These levels of automobile
ownership are typical for sub-Saharan African countries.
Annex Table 11-2 shows an average estimated annual rate of
depreciation for each class of durables included in the CILSS
questionnaire. These typically range from around 9 percent (sewing
machines and bicycles) to a high of 17 percent (fans, radios, air
conditioners). The measure is derived as follows: Consider the
relationship between the value of a commodity purchased at some time t0
for price p0 and the value today, represented by market price pt. If the
durable good was purchased t years ago,
pt = (1-6)t (A2.1)
where: 6 is the rate of depreciation, and all other
variables are as previously defined.
Solving for 6, equation (A2.1) becomes:
((logept - logp)/t)
(A2.2)
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Annex Table 11-2
Estimated Depreciation Rates by Type of Durable
Durable Depreciation Rate
Sewing machine .091
Gas stove .153
Refrigerator .132
Air conditioner .173
Fan .167
Radio .161
Radio/cassette player .146
Phonograph .142
Stereo equipment .122
Television set .122
Bicycle .092
Mobylette .125
Car or truck .117
Source: CILSS tabulations.
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Note that both the purchase price (p0 ) and the estimated price at
the time of the interviews (pt) is needed to estimate an average rate of
depreciation for some particular commodity. Roughly 3 percent of
households in the CILSS did not report either or both measures, and were
excluded in estimating average depreciation rates (although these
households were not excluded from service flow imputations). In addition,
households obtaining durables by way of non-market mechanisms (for
example, as gifts) were likewise excluded in estimating depreciation
rates. These households were identified by a self-reported zero price at
the time of purchase.
Following Diewert (1974), and Deaton (1980), the annual flow of
services from a particular durable is defined as
V = p t (1-) (A2.3)
where: r is the real interest rate or opportunity cost
of capital,
V is the annualized flow of services from durable stocks,
pt+1 is the price of the durable at the beginning of
next year (that is, at the end of this year),
and all other variables are as previously defined.
For simplicity, we assume that all price changes (pt-pt+,) are caused by
stock depreciation. By implication, then,
V = p (1 - (1-6)
t (1+r)
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or,
V = p (r+6) (A2.4)
t (1+r)
In short, the annualized flow of services from durable stocks is equal to
the opportunity cost of capital plus the rate of depreciation times the
current value of the stocks (or price today), all divided by one plus the
opportunity cost of capital.
The major problem in measuring the annual flow of services from
durables is that we do not know the opportunity cost of capital. In point
of fact, interest rates likely vary across households in LDC's, with this
variation being a function of economic conditions and how well various
commodity markets operate. Published market rates may bear little
relation to actual rates. For purposes of this study, we simply assumed a
zero opportunity cost of capital in computing annualized durable flows.
While this is a far from ideal solution, it seems the most practical given
the objectives of the research, i.e., analyzing private savings behavior
in the COte d'Ivoire: Recall that durable flows enter both income and
consumption estimates, and are netted out in assessing residual savings
rates. Thus for the majority of the work described here, interest rate
assumptions are irrelevant.
However, how much impact will the assumption of zero interest
rates have on the welfare evaluations in Chapter 2? This depends on
relative values of the interest rates and depreciation rates, that is, on
the specific household and the type of commodity under consideration. For
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example, if the depreciation rate is .08 (roughly the lowest found amongst
the CILSS durable types) and the interest rate is .10, then annualized
flows would be equal to .16 times the current value of the durable (in
contrast to .08 times the current value if interest rates are assumed
equal to zero). In contrast, if the depreciation rate is .15 (which
represents a general upper bound on estimated depreciation rates in our
sample) and the interest rate is .10, annualized flows would be .22 times
the current value (in contrast to .15 times the current value). If the
actual real rate of interest is lower, corresponding values are closer --
for example, if the interest rate is .05 and the depreciation rate .08,
the annualized value is equal to .12 times the current value of the
commoditiy (in comparison to .08 times the current value at zero interest
rates); if the depreciation rate is .15, the annualized value is equal to
.19 times the current value (in contrast to .15 times the current value if
the opportunity cost of capital is assumed to be zero).
Are these differences large or small, that is, does the
assumption of zero interest rates seriously compromise the results
presented in Chapter 2? In a relative sense, they somewhat large --
durable flows can as much as double, depending on interest rate
assumptions. However, in an absolute sense, the differences are not so
large, as durable flows constitute only a small proportion of total
income, so that even a doubling of the estimated values will have little
impact on overall welfare levels. For this reason, and given the
objectives of the research, the admittely ad hoc assumption of a zero
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opportunity cost of capital in estimating the annualized flow of services
from durables is deemed acceptable.
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